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Note on Transliteration
THE KOREAN NAMES of persons, places, and terms are translated by the
co-authors, who follow the traditional East Asian practice that the surname
is usually written first, as in Kim II Sung. Exceptions are made for a few figures
whose names are widely known in reverse order, such as Syngman Rhee. If a
place has different spellings in Korean and English literature, parentheses are
used at its first appearance—for example, Hahwaokri (Hagaru-ri).
The pinyin romanization system is applied to Chinese names of persons,
places, and terms. The transliteration is also used for the titles of Chinese
publications. A person's name is written in the Chinese way, the surname
first, such as Mao Zedong. Some popular names have traditional Wade-Giles
spellings appearing in parentheses after the first use of the pinyin, such as
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), as do popular names of places like Beijing
(Peking).
Preface
EXPLAINING THE METHODS employed to collect these soldiers' sto-
ries poses something of a problem, in part because three different nationali-
ties are involved—American, Korean, and Chinese. Since the co-authors
worked independently, we proceeded quite differently. Consequently, as co-
authors we decided to describe the process in the same way, independently,
and to break it down by nationality. We will begin with the recollections of
the American veterans.
Stories by American Soldiers (Dr. Richard Peters)
Obtaining stories of American veterans of the Korean War was undoubtedly
much simpler than collecting stories on the Chinese and Korean veterans,
but it was not without some problems. One might assume that since I served
in Korea during the war, I needed only to contact some of the men in my
unit, the Fifth Regimental Combat Team. But like many veterans, I had not
kept in touch with a single person. Nor did I belong to any of the estab-
lished veterans' organizations where one could expect to meet Korean War
veterans.
Fortunately, an active chapter of the Korean War Veterans Association
existed in Oklahoma City. I joined the chapter and began attending their
monthly meetings. I was pleased to learn that the veterans in the chapter
represented a large number of the units that had served in Korea during the
war. After becoming acquainted with some of the members, I encouraged
them to write (or tape) their stories about the war with the hope they would
someday be published. I encouraged them to write about their noncombat
experiences as well as their time in combat, because hard work, boredom,
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and even humor are also part of war. Eventually, some of the veterans began to
write down their wartime experiences. These stories varied greatly in length
and style. Sometimes I made extensive changes and sometimes only minor
editing and grammatical changes. In all cases, I returned my copy of the story
to the veteran, who then had the opportunity to make any corrections and
perhaps add a bit of new material that he had failed to recall earlier. Eventually,
often after lengthy telephone conversations, the story was finished.
Some veterans who did not write their own stories still helped the project
along by providing the names of others they had served with in Korea who
might be willing to tell their stories.This usually led to a telephone call and
sometimes to another story on the war.
Stories by Chinese Soldiers (Dr. Xiaobing Li)
The Chinese and North Korean war stories were both difficult to obtain
and complicated by the tedious job of translating them into English. As a
native of China, I assumed the responsibility for collecting and translating
the stories of the Chinese soldiers, a project that has consumed several years.
The reader will notice that, unlike the Americans in this book, the stories
from Chinese soldiers were nearly all from officers. Since the Chinese army
at the time was essentially a peasant army, most of whom were illiterate, this
is understandable. I gathered these unique reminiscences from several differ-
ent sources, all the result of my research in China. Some of the stories are the
result of personal interviews with CPVF soldiers. While in Beijing in 1997,1
received valuable assistance from the China Society of Strategy and Man-
agement Research (CSSM), and was permitted to interview some of the
retired officers and veterans who had served in the Korean War. Between
1998 and 2000, while in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province, Northeast China, I
was permitted to meet several dozen Korean War veterans for individual and
group interviews with the help of the regional military command and the
Center for Archives and Information, Provincial Academy of Social Sci-
ences, Harbin.
It is important to point out that only in recent years have these Chinese
officers and soldiers felt comfortable talking about their Korean War experi-
ences. Fortunately, many of them had kept personal papers, diaries, letters,
and photographs that served as important checks on their memories. This
direct testimony by Chinese soldiers has only recently been made available
in China, and only now to an English-language audience.
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Stories by Korean Soldiers (The co-authors
on behalf of Dr. Walter Byungjung)
Obtaining and translating the Korean sources, while fewer in number, posed
essentially the same problems as the Chinese sources. Here, the co-authors
are deeply indebted to our colleague at the University of Central Okla-
homa,Walter Jung, who has made an enormous contribution to this book. A
native of South Korea and the author of Nation Building: A Geopolitical His-
tory of Korea, he is quite familiar with the Korean War and its historical
significance. For this project he obtained written permission from the Insti-
tute of Defense Military History, a Korean government research institute, to
use the contents of articles that earned recognition in the institute's nation-
wide search for the best stories by Korean War veterans. From this collection
he selected those veterans whose wartime conduct was most exemplary. Before
translating these stories into English he interviewed the original authors to
ascertain each story's accuracy In addition to this invaluable contribution, he
has served as a consultant and a source of information for the co-authors on
"all things Korean" throughout the writing of this book.
Comments on the Scope of the Book
The co-authors would like to remind the reader that while it is true the bulk
of the fighting in Korea was carried out by American, Korean, and Chinese
nationals, there were many other countries involved in the war. Altogether,
sixteen nations sent ground forces to Korea to serve under the United Na-
tions Command. Some nations sent hardened battle units, made up of pro-
fessional soldiers, while others sent only small medical detachments.
Collectively, however, the many countries that participated under the UN
Command played an important part in the war.The authors regret that time
and space has not allowed us to include the stories of these veterans, many of
whom performed their duties heroically
Also, our apologies to the men and women who served in the air forces
and navies of all nations in the UN Command. This book is limited to the
land battles of Korea, but anyone with even the most elementary knowledge
of the Korean War is immediately made aware of the enormous contribu-
tions of the air and naval forces.The landing at Inchon would not have been
seriously considered without UN control of the air and the seas. Nor is it
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likely the marines and GIs would have escaped from the Chosin Reservoir
trap. Indeed, without air and naval control the outcome of the war could
have been quite different.
One final point. The stories of all of the soldiers included in this book
are based on their memories. Memory, of course, is not infallible, especially
after so many years have passed. But if these veterans have occasionally erred,
it is most likely an error of detail, usually relating to time and place. All of this
pales in comparison with the advantages of reading the stories as told by the
veterans themselves in their own direct, raw testimony. No secondary source
on the war, no matter how scholarly, can convey to the reader their thoughts,
feelings, and frustrations in the same way. This is best done by those who
fought in the war—the Korean War veterans.
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Chapter 1
Background and Origins
of the War
IT IS ONE of the more unfortunate and ironic events in history that Korea,
a nation that prior to 1945 included the most homogeneous and united of
all peoples, should become a nation divided.Whatever differences may have
existed in regard to caste or class, the Korean people speak the same lan-
guage throughout the peninsula and, with minor variations between north
and south, are of the same culture. This cruel fate is made even more tragic
by the fact that the Korean people were divided by other powers—clearly
the victims of Cold War politics.1
The tragedy of Korea, however, began long before the Korean War.
Thanks to victories over China in 1894 and Russia in 1905, between 1905
and 1945 Japan governed Korea as a colony, with the blessings of Great
Britain and the United States. The Japanese ruled harshly and backed up
their policies with brutal police and army forces as they strived to destroy all
vestiges of Korean culture. While Korea did make economic progress under
Japanese rule, the political climate remained repressive. In the words of one
historian, "Japanese imperialism stuck a knife in old Korea and twisted it,
and that wound has gnawed at the Korean national identity ever since."2
The Japanese occupation was made even more difficult for Koreans to
accept by their close cultural ties to China and their view of the Japanese as
products of inferior culture. Partially for these reasons, in the end the Japa-
nese were unable to extinguish Korean culture and nationalism. When World
War II ended in 1945, Korean nationalists, bonded by their common hatred
of the Japanese, competed for leadership in the attempt to establish a free
and independent Korea.3 The two strongest Korean nationalists to emerge as
postwar leaders were Syngman Rhee and Kim II Sung. Despite the diver-
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gent paths their lives took, both resisted Japanese rule during the occupation
and both shared a strong belief in Korean unity and independence.
Born in 1875, Rhee participated in anti-Japanese activities and worked
on behalf of Korean independence as a youth. Not surprisingly, this brought
him spells of imprisonment and torture. Immigrating to the United States
after a failed revolt in 1919, Rhee headed a self-styled Korean government-
in-exile, married a gifted Austrian woman, earned a Ph.D. from Princeton
University, and pursued a successful academic career. His goal, however, re-
mained the same—to return to his native country and establish a free and
independent government.4
Much of the early life of Kim II Sung (1912-1994), the future leader of
North Korea, is surrounded in myth and remains obscure. He apparently
established himself as a young guerrilla fighter against the Japanese, and at
times commanded several hundred guerrillas. It is also believed Kim joined
the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s and fought against the Japanese
along the Korea-Manchuria border. Sometime in 1939 or 1940, he made
contact with the Soviets and became an officer in the Soviet army. Stationed
in the Khabarovsk district near the Manchurian border, Kim became the
commander of a Korean battalion with the rank of captain in a multiracial
brigade. Specifically, his job was to train cadre for the Korean People's Army
(KPA).When the Soviets swept through Japanese-occupied Manchuria and
northern Korea in 1945, Kim returned to his native land. On October 10,
Kim and sixty-six other officers, who became the core of the North Korean
high command, were carried to the port of Wonsan in a Russian cargo ship.
Carefully groomed by the Soviets, in February 1946 he was appointed chair-
man of the Interim People s Committee, the principal instrument of civil
government in North Korea.5
Meanwhile, in the midst of World War II, the Allied powers discussed
Korea at several of their wartime conferences. At the Cairo Conference in
late November 1943, Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), who
feared postwar Soviet designs on Korea, persuaded President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill to join him in supporting
Korean independence. The joint communique, issued just after the confer-
ence, stated that "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslave-
ment of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall
become free and independent."6 The Yalta and Potsdam conferences later
reaffirmed the principle of an independent Korea. The Soviet Union, by
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signing the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, thus accepted the Cairo
declaration on Korea, at least according the U.S. interpretation.7
What Roosevelt had in mind for postwar Korea was a multipower trust-
eeship that would include the United States, Great Britain, China, and the
Soviet Union. He believed it would be many years before Korea was ready
for independence—hence the phrase "in due course" at Cairo. Only
Roosevelt, however, supported the trusteeship enthusiastically. The British
and the French were primarily concerned with their own empires, while
Stalin had little to say on Korea during wartime conferences.8
Korean nationalists, such as Syngman Rhee, were naturally offended by
the "in due course" phrase, which seemed to postpone any chance of an
immediate "free and independent" Korea. On August 8, 1945, the Soviet
Union entered the Pacific war, and within a few days the Soviet army had
occupied the northern provinces as far south as Pyongyang.The Americans,
who had no large number of troops closer to Korea than Okinawa, realized
that it was essential for the two powers to reach an agreement on the respec-
tive occupation zones before disarming the large Japanese garrisons in Ko-
rea. About midnight on August 10—11, two young colonels, Charles H.
Bonesteel and Dean Rusk (the future American secretary of state), were
directed to draw a military demarcation line across Korea that would divide
the peninsula into American and Russian occupation zones. Without con-
sulting the Korean leaders, they chose the 38th Parallel, in part because it
would place the capital city of Seoul in the American zone. Surprisingly, the
Soviets made no objections and General Douglas MacArthur made the de-
cision public on August 15, the official date of the Japanese surrender and
the liberation of Korea.9
On September 8, 1945, American troops arrived in Korea under the
command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, who began the task of
setting up the military government. Often referred to as the "Patton of the
Pacific," Hodge was a hero of the Okinawa campaign and a competent sol-
dier, but he lacked the political, intellectual, and diplomatic skills needed for
the difficult and often thankless task of an occupation commander. He failed
to sense the deep loathing the Koreans had for the Japanese and the strong
patriotic feelings they felt for their newly liberated country. Hodge callously
included Japanese officials and well-known Korean collaborators among his
advisors, and subjected the Korean people to the same repressive laws they
had endured under Japanese rule.10 The Korean people, through no fault of
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their own, were under the authority of another "occupation" force and faced
the strong possibility their nation would be divided.11
The Soviets, in contrast, arrived in North Korea with a highly trained
political staff, complete with public relations and propaganda personnel.The
Soviets presented themselves as liberators who entered Korea to disarm the
hated Japanese army and to facilitate a "democratic re volution."While ini-
tially popular, the Soviets were still foreigners, and tension soon developed
between the Soviet soldiers and the Korean people, who wanted real inde-
pendence. Unlike the Americans, who governed South Korea with direct
military control, the Soviets maintained indirect control by delegating gov-
erning power to the North Koreans. After a few months, however, it became
clear that only those Koreans who held the correct political views could
expect to play a role in the new government.12
President Truman attempted to follow the basic outlines of Roosevelt's
policy for Korea and to prepare Korea for the time it would become free and
independent. American policy still envisioned placing a united Korea under
a four-power trusteeship consisting of the United States, Great Britain, China,
and the Soviet Union. In December 1945, at a meeting in Moscow, the
United States did win Soviet acquiescence to a modified version of the
trusteeship that provided for the election of a provisional government for a
unified Korea. To prepare Korea for the elections, a joint Soviet-American
commission was established, but the all-Korean elections were never held.13
Unfortunately, while the Moscow agreement shortened the period of
the trusteeship to no more than five years (Roosevelt had thought it would
last forty years or more), Koreans of all political persuasions in both the
North and South greeted the agreement with demonstrations and work
stoppages.They wanted immediate independence; five years was too long to
wait. Also, signs of the "two" Koreas were already beginning to emerge. In
the North, the Soviets had clearly placed their trust in Kim II Sung as the
Korean leader most capable of establishing a socialist state. The Soviets also
supported the people's committees that sprang up throughout Korea after
the war for the purpose of securing Korea's independence, but were soon
under the effective control of the political left. In the South, the Americans
opposed the committees and backed Syngman Rhee, who had returned to
Korea in October. Finally, the emergence of the Cold War saw a hardening
of relations between the two super powers and found an echo in U.S.-Soviet
relations in Korea. Truman, accepting Soviet expert George Kennan's view
that Soviet expansionism must be contained, increasingly adopted a get-
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tough policy toward the Soviet Union, a nation that fully understood such a
policy.14
Thus, the high hopes many Koreans had for independence following
World War II were soon dashed in both the North and the South. In the
North, Kim II Sung, backed by the Soviets, proceeded to eliminate all those
who stood in the way of his establishing a Communist Korea. An opportun-
ist, Kim quickly saw the advantages of developing a close relationship with
Stalin. Publicly, however, he presented North Korea to the world as the very
model of independence. South Korea he pictured as nothing more than the
puppet of Washington and Wall Street.15
In the South, very little about the occupation went smoothly for the
Americans. In the early months the pressure came from the political leftists,
especially the Communists, who sought a fundamental change in the politi-
cal and social structure of Korea. As in the North, Communist-led "people's
committees" emerged, which the American military government under
Hodge suppressed. This suppression, however, when combined with the ef-
forts of the conservative landowners to block plans to redistribute land to
the peasant tenants, spawned widespread dissatisfaction, resulting in further
disorder and even guerrilla activities.16
To counter the threat from the left, the Americans allied themselves with
the Korean landowners and businessmen on the right, many of whom had
enjoyed a privileged status under Japanese rule. They also embraced Syngman
Rhee, who was both fervently anti-Japanese and anti-Communist. Supported
by General MacArthur and other prominent Americans, on October 16,1945,
Rhee had arrived in Korea (in MacArthur s personal plane) and gathered around
him the parties on the right to form the Korean Democratic Party (KDP). He
soon emerged as the most powerful political leader in South Korea.17
Syngman Rhee's demand for the immediate unification of Korea and
the formation of a national government, however, proved to be a serious
problem for the Americans, who wished to focus first on bringing order and
stability to the peninsula. The Americans quickly discovered this would not
be an easy assignment, made more difficult by the lack of a democratic or
liberal party in Korea. There was no "middle" in Korean political life, only
very poor peasants and a small elite of wealthy landowners and businessmen.
Thus, the Americans faced the unhappy dilemma of supporting people who
on one hand were essentially anti-democratic, but on the other hand strongly
anti-Communist—the single most important criteria in determining U.S.
policy in the Cold War era.18
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As the trusteeship unraveled, the United States began to abandon its goal
of a united Korea in favor of an independent South Korea.To accomplish this,
the U.S. turned to the United Nations. In October 1947, the American del-
egation requested that the UN sponsor an election for a Korean government
to be supervised by a United Nations Temporary Commission, or UNTCOK
(the"Temporary" was later dropped). As expected, the Soviets refused to allow
UNTCOK to enter its zone. In February 1948, the UN adopted a resolution
giving UNTCOK the authority to supervise the election where feasible, that
is, in the South. The election, resulting in the selection of a National Assembly
for South Korea, was held on May 10,1948.19
The South Korean Communists, represented by the South Korean Work-
ers' Party, opposed the UN-sponsored election. Believing the election would
divide Korea permanently, they attempted to prevent it by carrying out acts
of sabotage, guerrilla activities, and rioting.The Korean National Police (KNP),
who were firmly in the hands of Rhee's KDP, responded by employing the
most brutal methods to repress the Communists and left-wing sympathizers.
Such methods made it appear that the chances for true democracy were no
better in the South than in the North. Nevertheless, determined to prevent
the Communists from taking over the South Korean government, the United
States backed the autocratic Rhee.20
Since the Communists and left-wingers boycotted the elections on May
10, the newly elected National Assembly naturally represented Rhee's con-
servatives and right-wingers. In a symbolic gesture on behalf of the Korean
people's desire for a united Korea, one hundred seats, representing North
Korea, were left vacant. A constitution was drawn up and signed on July 17,
after which the Assembly promptly elected Rhee the first president of the
Republic of Korea (ROK).The Republic was officially proclaimed on Au-
gust 15,1948, the third anniversary of the liberation, with MacArthur on the
podium. Despite evidence the police had corrupted the voting process, the
UN followed by recognizing the Republic as the only legitimate govern-
ment in Korea.21
At this same time the birth of the ROK Army (ROKA) took place.The
Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG),made up of five hundred American
officers and men, replaced the military government, and the Truman admin-
istration moved toward building and equipping a South Korean army strong
enough to defend itself from attack. The members of the KMAG both re-
tained operational control of the ROK Army and served as its advisors as
long as U.S. combat troops remained in Korea.
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The Americans still had serious concerns over whether President Rhee
would use the ROKArmy responsibly, but they realized South Korea needed
a military force to defend itself against a hostile North Korea. While Hodge
both disliked and distrusted Rhee, he knew he had to work with him be-
cause there was no other suitable alternative.22
When South Korea formed its government in 1948, Kim II Sung still
had the option of joining the new government, although representatives
from the South in the National Assembly would have outnumbered those
from the North by about two to one. Allied to the leftist parties in the
South, however, North Korea would have still wielded considerable influ-
ence in a united Korea. Kim, of course, chose—or was forced to choose—
another path. On September 9, 1948, he proclaimed the formation of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in Pyongyang.23 While
Soviet pressure on Kim was undoubtedly very real, recent scholarship sug-
gests that Moscow's influence on Kim and North Korea's puppet state status
has been exaggerated.24
Whatever degree of influence Moscow may have exerted on Premier
Kim, it is clear he soon constructed a totalitarian state that resembled its
sponsor in many ways. Freedom of the press ceased to exist, efforts were
made to insure conformity of thought, and police surveillance was every-
where. A constitution, drafted in 1947 and implemented in September 1948,
offered no protection for individual rights. The North Korean army ex-
panded rapidly, soon augmented by the return of thousands of Korean sol-
diers whom Kim had dispatched earlier to fight for Mao Zedong (Mao
Tse-tung) in the Chinese Civil War. Beginning in 1948, thousands of these
battle-hardened soldiers filtered back home. They would play a huge role in
the Korean War.25
Meanwhile, by 1948 the Rhee regime had begun to face serious prob-
lems from organized guerrilla activities. Supported by North Korea, the rebels
were a mixture of Communists, leftists, and sometimes bandits, held to-
gether by their common hostility to the Rhee government. Most com-
monly they attacked local police stations, both because of their hatred for
the national police and because the police stations kept the records on po-
litical dissidents. Operating in small units, the guerrillas would take over a
town, grab the needed food and supplies, and then retreat into the woods
and hills.Their brushes with the police were marked with extreme brutality
on both sides; torture and murder were routine. Not until the spring of
1950, after an aggressive counterguerrilla campaign that may have claimed as
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many as one hundred thousand lives, did the Rhee regime manage to put
down the rebellions. The brutal reprisals, however, further alienated many
Koreans from the Rhee government. At the same time, the guerrilla opera-
tions were a disappointment for Kim II Sung.They failed to overthrow Rhee
and to win widespread support for Communism among the South Korean
populace.26
Satisfied the North Korean government was in good hands, at the end of
1948, the Soviets suddenly withdrew their troops from North Korea. Indi-
rectly, this had the effect of increasing the pressure on the Americans to pull
out their troops, especially since American policy had always been to with-
draw from Korea as soon as possible. No American politician wanted to main-
tain large numbers of American troops in places like Korea when they believed
the main threat to peace was in Europe, not the Far East. In 1947, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff backed up this view by reporting to the president that Korea
remained outside U.S. strategic interests.27 Recent events in Europe strength-
ened the Truman administration's view that Europe should be America's first
line of defense. In 1948, the Communists took over the Czech government,
and when the Berlin crisis followed only a few months later, tension be-
tween the Soviet bloc and the Western powers increased to dangerous levels.
The fear of a huge Soviet army marching westward into western Europe was
very real.28
Political pressure on the Truman administration to withdraw American
troops from South Korea also came from Congress, which was determined
to cut back on military spending.29 Since only a limited number of troops
was available in the Far East, the military believed the pressure of other
commitments made it unwise to keep large numbers of American troops in
Korea, where the terrain was unfavorable to the use of armor. The growing
strength of the ROK Army, which reached about one hundred thousand by
the end of 1949, also seemed to justify the departure of American troops.
Ignoring the bitter complaints of Rhee, in June 1949 the last of the Ameri-
can troops pulled out, leaving only those who remained as a part of the
KMAG Command.30
Once the Soviet and American troops had left Korea, border clashes
took place with increasing regularity, especially on the Ongjin peninsula.
Brigadier General William Roberts, head of the KMAG, reported to Wash-
ington in August 1949 that while both sides were at fault, the South actually
initiated more battles than the North. Neither Kim II Sung nor Syngman
Rhee, it appears, made any serious effort to prevent their armies from attacks
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across the 38th Parallel. General Roberts, who had the unenviable job of
attempting to train and equip the ROK Army while at the same time trying
to restrain its aggressiveness, at one point threatened to remove the KMAG
from Korea if the attacks continued. These attacks, when combined with the
general distrust of Rhee, were among the reasons the Americans refused to
arm the ROK Army with the tanks and heavy artillery it would need later to
stop the invading North Korean army.31
On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson spoke to the
National Press Club in Washington on the subject of U.S. policy toward
China.The American defensive perimeter in Asia, he said, ran from the Aleu-
tian Islands to Japan to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) and down to the
Philippines. If an attack should occur anywhere in this area, it must be met
first "by the people attacked," and second by the "commitments of the entire
civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations."32 Since it ap-
peared Acheson had left Korea out of the defensive perimeter, his political
opponents later vilified him for inviting an attack from North Korea, even
though the "defensive perimeter" referred to by Acheson had been backed
up by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MacArthur.33 How Pyongyang
reacted to Acheson's speech is surrounded in controversy, but there is evi-
dence that Kim used the speech in his effort to persuade Stalin to support
the invasion.34
In view of the frequent border clashes and even some intelligence re-
ports indicating the North Koreans were preparing to invade South Korea,
it is reasonable to expect that a state of military readiness existed on the part
of both the ROK Army and their American allies. But this was not the case,
and when the attack came on June 25, 1950, it came as a surprise to nearly
everyone.35 At the time, most Americans assumed the attack was provoked
by Stalin, with the support of Mao Zedong. Clearly, the Soviet Union and
China were involved; Kim II Sung would never have attacked without their
acquiescence. But the story of their involvement is a complicated one, un-
raveled, at least in part, by the opening of Soviet archives in recent years.
Here, the story can only be briefly traced.
Inspired by the Communist victory in China, Kim II Sung had sought
Stalin's approval for the unification of Korea by military force even before
1950, but without success. Determined, in late March and early April 1950
he secretly visited Moscow, where, it appears, Stalin reluctantly approved
Kim's plan to invade South Korea, but only after consultations with Mao.36
Stalin did not wish to risk war with the United States, but since the American
The North Korean Invasion, June 25—28,1950. Source: Department of the Army, United States Army in the Korean War:
South to the Naktong, North to theYalu (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Map III.
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army had pulled out of Korea, there seemed to be nothing to prevent the
North Korean army from rolling over the ROK Army in a matter of days—
which Kim had promised to do. In this event, Stalin would find it embarrass-
ing if he had withheld support for a Communist ally On the other hand, he
did not wish to shoulder the responsibility for anything that went wrong, such
as the entry of the United States into the war. The responsibility for this, he
thought, belonged to the Chinese. Therefore, Stalin demanded that Kim seek
approval from Mao before he would give his final approval for the attack.37 ''If
you should get kicked in the teeth," Stalin reportedly said to Kim in Moscow,
"I shall not lift a finger.You have to ask Mao for all the help."38
This way, Stalin had nothing to lose; the onus of the attack would fall on
Mao and Kim, regardless of its success or U.S. reaction. If Kim moved quickly
and decisively, North Korea would overrun South Korea and present the world
with a fait accompli. Even if the U.S. did intervene, it would take many months
to move masses of men and materiel into Korea. American intervention would
lead to an increase in hostilities between Washington and Beijing, but to the
cynical Stalin this was not all bad because it would increase Mao's dependence
on the Soviet Union. At the very least, a war in Korea would test American
resolve and draw U.S. power away from Europe.39
The relationship between Kim II Sung and Mao Zedong prior to the
outbreak of the war is even more difficult to establish. It does appear, how-
ever, that Kim made a secret visit to Beijing in May 1950 to secure Mao's
blessing for the attack on South Korea. After explaining how Stalin had
approved the plan—which Mao had verified—Kim asked Mao only for his
approval, not military assistance. At the time, Mao feared a North Korean
invasion might interfere with other and higher priorities, such as economic
recovery and his plans for reclaiming Taiwan (Formosa) from Jiang Jieshi's
Nationalists (hopefully, with help from Moscow). He could not, however,
express his fear of American intervention in Korea without admitting to
Stalin the likelihood of the same American intervention in Taiwan, which
would jeopardize expected Soviet support. And how could he fail to support
a plan so recently approved by Stalin, who was generally recognized as the
leader of the Communist movement worldwide and of the nation with
which Mao had just concluded a mutual assistance agreement?40 Reluc-
tantly, Mao agreed that Korea must be unified, even before the liberation of
Taiwan. He did express concern, however, that the Japanese or Americans
might enter the war, which would prolong the conflict.41
Stalin's and Mao's approval of the attack, even if given reluctantly, proved
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to be the green light for the outbreak of the Korean War. In the weeks
immediately before the war, massive quantities of Soviet weapons began
arriving at the North Korean port of Chongjin.42 On June 25, 1950, the
North Korean forces under Kim attacked, beginning on the Ongjin penin-
sula in the west, then spreading to other parts of the front. The frequent
border clashes along the 38th Parallel made it an easy matter to elevate the
civil conflict into a general war, and Kim did not hesitate to accuse the
South of invading the North. While Rhee must bear his share of the respon-
sibility for the civil conflict, the responsibility for the general war clearly
rests on the shoulders of Kim. Stalin and Mao Zedong may have given their
approval, but they did not initiate the war, despite the fact many Americans
thought so at the time.43
Chapter 2
The Opening Phase
South toward Pusan, North to the Yalu
WHEN THE NORTH Korean army invaded South Korea on June 25,
1950, it is hard to conceive of a nation more ill-prepared for war than the
United States, psychologically as well as militarily. World War II had ended
only five years earlier, a war in which Americans had fully committed them-
selves to the defeat of the Axis powers.Young men and women had volun-
teered for military service by the thousands; others had turned to defense
work. Children had collected rubber, paper, and scrap iron, and everyone
with a whit of soil had planted a victory garden. Every family with a son or
daughter in the service had proudly displayed its blue star in the window, or
sadly, a gold star in the event one of them had been killed in the war.
When the war finally ended in 1945, the GIs were welcomed home as
heroes who had triumphed over the evil genius of Hitler, Mussolini, andTojo.
While there were problems, such as finding jobs and housing for the vets, the
majority of Americans were optimistic about the future. Most had high hopes
for the United Nations as a means of preserving the hard-earned peace and
keeping the Communists in check. Since the United States alone possessed
the atomic bomb, there could be no serious threat to American security. The
bomb would also serve to deter the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet
Union. A sizable navy and air force might be necessary, but a large and expen-
sive army was clearly an anachronism and unessential in the atomic age.
Accordingly, the United States proceeded to downsize all of its armed
forces with all deliberate speed. During World War II the American armed
forces had peaked at near 12 million men; by 1950 this figure had dropped
to about 1.6 million.The army had suffered the most severe cuts, and when
the Korean War broke out in 1950, it had been reduced to only 596,000
men. While the United States had four divisions in Japan (Seventh,Twenty-
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fourth,Twenty-fifth, and First Cavalry), their regiments were short an entire
battalion. Neither did they have the best equipment. Instead of the 3.5-inch
rocket launcher, they had only the 2.36-inch, an inferior weapon that had
already proved its inability to stop enemy tanks during World War II. Nor
could the United States realistically count on the forces of Syngman Rhee
and his ROK Army to stop an invasion by Kim II Sung's North Korean
army. When the American troops pulled out of South Korea in 1949, they
left the ROK Army with no tanks, no fighter aircraft, and no heavy artillery,
.despite frequent border clashes and the well-known hostility between the
leaders of the two Koreas.1
The American divisions in Japan were not only understrength in num-
bers, they were also inadequately trained. The occupation troops lived in a
laid-back peacetime atmosphere that did little to prepare them for the reali-
ties of combat, either physically or psychologically. They had plenty of lei-
sure time, with excellent clubs for both officers and noncoms, access to a
free railway system, and for one-twentieth of a second lieutenant's pay they
could have a Japanese maid or "boy-san" to do the laundry and cleaning.
Simply put, they were not combat ready, and some GIs paid dearly for this in
the early days of the war.2
When Americans first learned of the war in Korea, most thought this
was the work of the Soviet Union, the godfather for all the Communist
states. If North Korea invaded South Korea, this could only have been the
result of Stalin's devilish work. Neither North Korea nor Communist China,
most Americans believed, would act alone,3 and they were not eager to send
their sons and husbands to faraway Korea, where they could be killed fight-
ing against the "second" team.
President Truman, of course, was fully aware of the strong aversion to
war on the part of the American public. However, he also knew that the
Communists had taken over Czechoslovakia in 1948, had attempted to take
over West Berlin the same year, and had defeated Jiang Jieshi's Chinese Na-
tionalists in 1949. Communist success in Korea, he feared, would place Japan
within easy striking distance of Red troops. Clearly, the expansion of Soviet
Communism must be contained. On June 27,Truman authorized MacArthur
to use the U.S. air and naval forces at his disposal to support the ROK Army
south of the 38th Parallel. On the same day the United Nations Security
Council, thanks to the absence of the Soviet delegate, adopted the U.S. reso-
lution requesting that all members of the UN give assistance to South Korea.
Three days later, on June 30,Truman boldly authorized MacArthur to make
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full use of the U.S. ground troops he had under his command in the Far East
for the purpose of repelling the Communist aggressor.4
On July 1, 1950, 403 disoriented GIs from the Twenty-fourth Infantry
Division, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Smith, arrived
in Pusan from Japan. Although U.S. air and naval forces had already moved
into the combat zone, these soldiers in Task Force Smith were the first Ameri-
can troops to engage the North Korean army on the ground. This engage-
ment took place on July 5, in fighting south of Seoul, near Osan. Outnumbered
and inexperienced, the fighting went very badly for these men and for the
additional troops that poured into Korea during the early weeks of the war.
Armed with the inferior 2.36-inch rocket launcher, the GIs in Task Force
Smith were unable to stop the heavy Russian-built T-34 tanks. Both the
American and the ROK armies were pushed southward, toward Pusan.5
During the summer of 1950, the UN forces continued to retreat. While
some units fought bravely, others withdrew in disorder. There were occasions
when units in both the American and ROK armies abandoned weapons and
equipment in their haste to escape the fast-moving North Koreans. As the
summer passed, however, more American divisions arrived, with tanks and
heavy artillery. All the units, including the ROK Army and the newly ar-
rived units from other UN countries, were placed under the authority of
Lieutenant General Walton H.Walker, commander of the Eighth Army. While
driven back to a defensive perimeter around Pusan, the Eighth Army finally
halted the advance of the North Koreans along the Naktong River.The UN
forces were aided by the inadequate supply system of the North Korean
army, which could not keep up with the advance of their frontline troops.
Clearly, the Pusan perimeter fighting represented a very critical stage in
the war for both sides. The possibility that the North Korean forces might
push the UN forces off the Korean peninsula was very real and would likely
have occurred had it not been for the mastery of the air and seas by the U.S.
Air Force and Navy.6 Immediately following the outbreak of war, the mod-
est U.S. Navy in the Far East began transporting troops and equipment to
the peninsula, an'action that was absolutely essential to prevent a Korean
"Dunkirk." Quickly enlarged, the U.S. and UN naval forces continued to
play an important role in the war by cruising along Korea's coastline, repeat-
edly shelling North Korean troop concentrations, supply lines, and other
strong points, sometimes with the big sixteen-inch guns of battleships. As
the war continued, the UN navies imposed a blockade on the entire penin-
sula so tight that the Communist forces could not even use their own ports
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in North Korea, such as Wonsan and Hungnam, to supply their troops.
Throughout the war, loaded troopships made their way from Japan to Pusan
unmolested by the enemy7 After the war, Sergei G. Gorshkov, Admiral of
the Fleet of the Soviet Union, stated that "Without the extensive active
employment of the Navy, the interventionists would hardly have been able
to avoid a military defeat in Korea."8
Ironically, despite the attention military strategists gave to the future role
of the U.S. Air Force following World War II, it was still ill-prepared for the
type of air war required in Korea. During the early Cold War years the
strategists believed the primary mission of the air force should be directed
toward the Soviet Union, which required an ultra-heavy nuclear bomber,
like the new B-36 (which was never deployed in Korea). Fighter aircraft,
such as the new swept-wing F-86 (which was deployed in late 1950), were
designed to intercept Soviet bombers. The Korean War, however, called for
close air-ground operations, especially in the early months of the war. Armed
with F-80 jet Starfighters and the Wo rid War II propeller driven planes then
available in the Far East Air Force (F-51 Mustangs, F-4U Corsairs, B-26
Invaders, C-47 Skytrains), they went to work. The North Korean air force,
equipped with Soviet-built WWII aircraft, offered no serious challenge, so
the fighter pilots devoted themselves largely to strafing, bombing, and drop-
ping napalm on the invading Communist troops. The heavy bombing role
was carried out by the four-engine World War II B-29, primarily against
industrial targets in North Korea.9
The near disaster in the Pusan perimeter fighting was followed almost
immediately by the great success story of the Korean War—the amphibious
landings at Inchon, just west of Seoul. MacArthur began planning the op-
eration almost from the beginning of the war. It was a daring plan, and on
July 13, at a meeting in Tokyo, a special deputation of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff made it clear they considered it too risky. Their concerns included the
dangerous approaches to the port and the notoriously high tides. MacArthur,
however, strongly defended his plan. By the end of August, MacArthur s will
had prevailed over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were not prepared to chal-
lenge this legendary hero of World War II, who with five stars outranked
them all by at least one star. Besides, at a time when it was uncertain the UN
forces could even hold out in Korea, who had any better ideas?10
The landings, carried out on September 15,1950, succeeded beyond all
expectations. The First Marine Division and the Seventh Division, now a
part of the newly formed X Corps under the command of MacArthur's
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chief of staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, overcame the tide prob-
lems and drove inward. By the end of the month, they had liberated Seoul.
At the same time, Eighth Army forces under Walker began driving north
from the Pusan perimeter. After initially putting up strong resistance, the
North Korean army collapsed. Some units dropped their weapons and re-
treated into the hills on a scale equal to or greater than the ROK Army's
retreat during the first week of the war. As the UN forces advanced to the
north, they also became painfully aware of the many atrocities committed by
North Korean troops earlier in the summer.11
Unfortunately, Almond's X Corps failed to drive across the neck of
Korea to the east coast. As a result, most of the North Korean army managed
to slip into North Korea to fight another day Walker, unhappy when X
Corps carried out the Inchon invasion under a separate command, placed
the blame squarely on General MacArthur. In his view, MacArthur should
have ordered Almond's "public relations brigade" to strike directly across the
neck, instead of opting for the symbolic capture of Seoul.12
Despite this failure, nobody could deny that Inchon represented a bril-
liant and much needed victory for the UN forces. But it did come at a price,
which would become clear in the next several weeks. Since MacArthur
almost alone had fought for Inchon, and over the objections of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the success of the operation enhanced his reputation as a
military genius to such God-like dimensions he was virtually unchallenged
in making forthcoming decisions.
Surprisingly, no decision had been made about what the UN forces
were to do when they reached the 38th Parallel, and this quickly became the
next great debate. MacArthur, supported by President Rhee, wanted to cross
the 38th, drive into North Korea, and inflict a total defeat on the Commu-
nist aggressors. The UN resolution, however, had provided authorization
only to repel the North Korean army, not to invade North Korea. The Brit-
ish especially questioned the wisdom of crossing the 38th Parallel.13 The big
problem: would the Chinese enter the war if UN troops approached the
Yalu River? MacArthur and his staff insisted they would not and vigorously
relayed this view to Washington. While MacArthur has been widely criti-
cized for his blindness on this issue, Washington must share the blame. The
Truman administration, following the Inchon triumph, saw an opportunity
to win a total victory over the Communist aggressors. According to General
Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the view persisted, supported
by the CIA, that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese Communists were
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prepared to risk global war over Korea, and "China was not militarily ca-
pable of unilateral intervention"; consequently, "there would be no Soviet or
Chinese communist intervention in Korea."14 In the end, Washington sup-
ported MacArthur. On September 27, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur
a directive that authorized him to destroy the North Korean armed forces.
MacArthur quickly concluded this provided him with all the authority he
needed to pursue the enemy above the 38th Parallel. On October 7, the UN
General Assembly followed with a vaguely worded resolution approving
UN troops north of the 38th Parallel for the purpose of establishing an
elected, unified government.15 "My mission," MacArthur stated at the Sen-
ate hearings in 1951, "was to clear out all North Korea, to unify it and to
liberalize it."16 Clearly, a wider war now became a real possibility.
On October 9, the UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel (the ROK forces
had crossed on October 1), and the drive to theYalu began. Since the North
Korean army had been largely destroyed, no major problems were expected.
MacArthur assigned the eastern part of North Korea to X Corps under
Almond, and the central and western part to the Eighth Army under Walker.
The two commands were separated by theTaebaek Mountains.
Meeting no strong opposition on the ground, and with total control of
the air, Eighth Army forces moved northward rapidly. On October 19, the
First Cavalry entered Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. On October
26, elements of the First ROK Division reached theYalu, and on November
1, elements of the U.S.Twenty-fourth Division reached Chonggo-dong, only
eighteen miles from theYalu. Optimism swept the UN Command; the end
of the war seemed imminent. But it was not to be.
Chapter 3
China Enters the War
WASHINGTON, OBVIOUSLY, HAD concluded that neither China nor
the Soviet Union would intervene if the UN forces advanced north of the
38th Parallel. By late September, however, Washington had already received
a disturbing report indicating Mao had called for a major build-up of the
Chinese army Even more ominous, in an October 1 speech at Beijing, Pre-
mier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) warned that the Chinese people "will not
tolerate foreign aggression and will not stand aside should the imperialists
wantonly invade the territory of their neighbor."1 The premier followed up
the next day by informing the Indian ambassador to China, K.M. Panikkar,
that China would intervene if the UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel.2
Clearly, neither the Truman administration nor MacArthur in Tokyo heeded
these warnings.
As the UN forces advanced north toward the Yalu, Beijing prepared for
war. Mao still found the decision to go to war a difficult one, however,
despite the pressure to intervene. Following the Inchon landings, Kim II
Sung had dispatched two of his top aides to Beijing and asked Mao for
emergency help, but the Chinese were not ready to make any firm commit-
ment. Stalin, following the landings, also pleaded with the Chinese to go to
the aid of the North Koreans. According to Chinese sources, the Soviet
leader promised to provide air cover for the Chinese troops and to send
Russian troops in the event the Chinese army faltered. Still, Mao hesitated.
Most disturbing to Mao, if the Chinese armies intervened and were pushed
back, would Stalin really send troops as promised in order to save China?
Also of concern, if China became involved in a war with the United States,
China's dependence on Stalin would inevitably grow, an unsavory thought
to Mao. Finally, all hope of conquering Taiwan would vanish indefinitely.3
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Despite his hesitance, step-by-step Mao moved closer to intervention.
On October 1, Stalin telegraphed Mao and encouraged him to send "volun-
teer" Chinese soldiers into North Korea for the purpose of defending the
area north of the 38th Parallel.4 On October 2, Mao directed the Chinese
Politburo to pass a resolution to send these Chinese troops into North Ko-
rea, beginning on October 15. The same day, Mao cabled Stalin of China's
decision to send volunteers into Korea to "fight the United States and its
lackey Syngman Rhee."5
Although Chinese preparations for war accelerated, Mao refused to give
the green light, perhaps held back by the reservations expressed by some of
the other members of the Politburo.6 As Mao pondered his options, how-
ever, he concluded the reasons for entering the war outweighed the reasons
for remaining neutral. Profoundly distrustful of the United States, Mao be-
lieved that after a victorious war in Korea the Americans would attempt to
make China their next victim. Already U.S. naval action had effectively blocked
the conquest of Taiwan, which for Mao was itself a sufficient cause for war.7
The Soviet presence and the Sino-Soviet alliance, Mao believed, would keep
the war limited and non-nuclear, and the U.S. involvement in Europe would
prevent the Americans from making a total commitment to a war in Korea.
If the war dragged on indefinitely, the US. would be under pressure from its
European allies to conclude a peace agreement. In the meantime, China must
fight to prevent the presence of a large and hostile army on the Manchurian
border. This not only threatened China's industrial base, but the United States
would also use North Korea as a springboard for operations inside China.The
U.S., Mao believed, would never accept the permanent loss of China to the
Communists. Since a war between the United States and China, at some fu-
ture date, was inevitable, the Chinese might as well select the time and place.
Better to fight in Korea than China, Mao reasoned, because an invasion of
China obligated the Soviets to send troops in accordance with the Sino-Soviet
treaty. Thus, either American or Russian troops would occupy Chinese soil.
Mao, of course, found both alternatives unacceptable.8
Although some members of the Chinese Politburo still expressed views
in opposition to the war in meetings held after October 4,9 on October 8
Mao issued an official order for the Chinese People's Volunteers Force (CPVF),
under the command of General Peng Dehuai, to enter the war. On October
19, Peng's armies crossed the Yalu and moved into North Korea. Mao gave
specific instructions that the operation should be kept "absolutely secret"
and that the crossing of the Yalu must take place only between dusk and 4:00
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A.M. After taking cover in the mountains of North Korea, the Chinese troops
would watch the American and UN armies push northward toward the Yalu
and wait for orders to attack.10
In this way, quietly and unconventionally, the Chinese entered the Ko-
rean War. In many respects the Chinese army was unconventional, because it
reflected the ideas of its creator, Mao Zedong. Chinese tactics and strategy in
conducting the war need to be understood in this context.
Mao had long studied the military strategists, especially the fourth cen-
tury B.C. Chinese writer SunTzu and the nineteenth-century Prussian army
officer Karl von Clausewitz. A committed Communist, Mao accepted the
basic Marxist-Leninist idea that the origin of modern wars was rooted in
class conflict, which made war inevitable.11 "Political power," Mao wrote in
an often quoted maxim, "grows out of the barrel of a gun."12 If an army
expects to win, it must "become one with the people so that they see it as
their own army"; political training should be of "equal importance" to mili-
tary training.13
Chinese soldiers, Mao believed, must possess both fighting spirit and
high morale for success on the battlefield. "Weapons are an important factor
in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive."14
If the soldiers grasped the issues at stake, they were more likely to make
sacrifices, endure hardships, and fight bravely. Good relationships between
the officers and the soldiers, built on the basis of "brotherhood and com-
radeship," would also contribute to high morale.15
Conditions for high troop morale, Mao believed, favored the Chinese
over the Americans. American soldiers, he thought, were incapable of en-
during hardships, were afraid to die, and were politically unmotivated, be-
cause they had invaded a country belonging to others and were fighting an
unjust war. In contrast, Chinese soldiers had developed a "stronger political
consciousness and higher combat spirit," were "brave and willing to sacrifice
life and blood and capable of bearing hardships and heavy burdens," at-
tributes that would compensate for their inferior firepower.16
Mao's military tactics were based on years of guerrilla warfare fighting,
usually against superior forces with greater firepower. The most basic prin-
ciple in war was "to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the
enemy"17 To accomplish this, Mao wrote that commanders should concen-
trate a superior force against the enemy, completely encircle the enemy forces,
and—when the right moment arrived—wipe them out. "In this way, al-
though inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we shall be absolutely
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superior in every part and every specific campaign." In addition, special ef-
forts should be made to attack when the enemy is on the move, and to avoid
a battle of attrition.18 Commanders must adhere to the principle of mobile
warfare, and while they should fight to win, they should retreat when vic-
tory is impossible. Mao firmly believed that by following these principles, a
weak army could defeat a stronger army19
While the Chinese army, which moved into North Korea, certainly
embodied many of the strengths favored by Chairman Mao, it nevertheless
had a number of problems. It moved almost entirely on foot and possessed
little in the way of motor transport, armor, artillery, and air support. The
troops were supplied with a wide range of equipment, most of it Soviet,
Japanese, or American, that required different calibers for the small arms and
created huge supply problems. Their communications were primitive, and
the famous whistles, bugle calls, and cymbals that accompanied their attacks
were used as a substitute for radios more than for the psychological effect.
The troops wore cotton-quilt uniforms, which were quite warm but almost
impossible to dry when wet. For shoes, they wore a low-cut canvas shoe,
which provided inadequate protection from the cold and contributed to
frostbite. They ate rice, parched wheat, soybean, and corn flour; when they
were on the move, all of this was cooked into concentrated cakes and packed
into a sock. Since they were not issued name tags, some left their names on
scraps of paper inside their clothing for identification. Political commissars,
responsible for maintaining orthodoxy of thought, always accompanied the
Chinese armies.20
Once in North Korea, the Chinese troops took to the mountains as they
had been instructed. They moved mostly at night, avoided the main roads,
and hid away during the day in camouflaged tents or in the villages. Ameri-
can reconnaissance aircraft found them difficult to detect; even the brown
uniforms of the Chinese soldiers matched the brown hills and villages of the
winter landscape in Korea. Unimpeded by heavy weapons, such as artillery,
they would rely upon their mobility, concealment, and nighttime surprise
attacks, all of which would prove to be very effective in the early months of
the war.21
Chapter 4
The Chosin Reservoir Retreat
and Advance to the North
ON OCTOBER 25,1950, the ROK First Division captured the first Chi-
nese soldier, a clear indication Chinese troops were entering North Korea.
The prisoner reported thousands of Chinese soldiers had already crossed the
Yalu and were holing up in the mountains while the UN forces advanced
north. In late October and early November, after waiting patiently for the
right opportunity, the Chinese troops sprang the trap. They set fires to the
forests north and northeast of Unsan to obscure UN aerial observation, then
emerged from the hills, sometimes behind the UN lines.They attacked the
ROKs first and then the Americans. The Eighth Regiment of the U.S. First
Cavalry Division was mauled trying to escape a Chinese roadblock near
Unsan.1 Amazingly, despite the seriousness of the attacks, both Eighth Army
headquarters and Far East Command refused to believe the main body of
the Chinese army had entered the war, and no orders for a general with-
drawal were given. Mac Arthur s intelligence chief, Major General Charles A.
Willoughby, thought the "most auspicious time" for the Chinese to inter-
vene had passed, and he cavalierly dismissed captured Chinese prisoners as
stragglers or volunteers of no real significance. Urged on by Mac Arthur, the
UN forces even continued the advance whenever possible. Then, on No-
vember 6, for reasons which are still not clear, the Communist forces broke
off their attacks and withdrew back into the hills as suddenly as they had
appeared. Optimism returned—on to the Yalu.2
Meanwhile, in the X Corps area east of the Eighth Army, Almond's First
Marine Division and Seventh Division had landed at Woman and Iwon
Harbors, respectively, in preparation for their drive to the Yalu. The landing
of the marines at Wonsan, however, did not go exactly by the book. Forced
to remain on the crowded transports for over a week while the navy cleared
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mines from the harbor, they finally disembarked on October 26 only to
discover the ROKs had already arrived by land. More embarrassing, Bob
Hope and his USO show had also arrived before the marines, and this made
the A.P. wire.3 Despite the delays, the First Marine Division moved north
into the Chosin Reservoir area. They advanced more slowly, however, than
either the U.S. Seventh Division or the ROKs, which annoyed Almond.
Major General Oliver P. Smith, the division commander, feared the dispersal
of his marines placed them at risk, and he so informed Almond.4 Neverthe-
less, they advanced, through Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, andYudam-ri, all destined
to become part of the hallowed marine tradition.
On the east side of the reservoir, where there were no Chinese forces,
the Seventh Division advanced easily against weak North Korean opposi-
tion. On November 21, elements of the Seventh Division's Seventeenth
Regiment actually occupied the town of Hyesanjin and the surrounding
area all the way to the Yalu River. Mac Arthur immediately sent his "Hearti-
est congratulations" to Almond.5 Clearly, the ground war was going well.
The U.S. Air Force (USAF), however, faced its first serious challenge
about the same time the UN ground forces were achieving their maximum
penetration of North Korea. On November 8, 1950, MiG-15s, the latest
Soviet jet fighter, appeared suddenly over the Yalu and jumped a formation
of B-29s and its escort of F-80 jet fighters. It took only a few encounters for
American pilots to realize their straightwing F-80s were no match for the
new sweptwing MiG-15s.
Recognizing that the UN mastery of the air over Korea was in jeopardy,
in December the USAF rushed to Korea a wing of the new, sweptwing F-86
Sabre jets, the only fighter in the U.S. arsenal capable of dueling with the
MiG-15s.6They also dispatched the straightwing F-84, but like the F-80, it
could not compete with the MiGs and was soon relegated to ground sup-
port. After some initial losses, especially among the B-29 bombers, Ameri-
can pilots met the challenge and resumed their control of the skies over
Korea. Fighting largely in "MiG Alley" near the Yalu, the air war between the
Sabre jets and the MiGs provided the little glamour that existed for an oth-
erwise most unglamourous war. Americans waited anxiously for news of the
latest air battles involving their local heroes, such as Major James Jabara of
Wichita, Kansas, who became the first jet ace in the war.7
Although suspected at the time, the Soviet archives have now confirmed
that Soviet pilots were flying the MiGs, using bases in North Korea and
Manchuria.8 Soviet authorities, however, required the pilots to do every-
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thing possible to conceal their true nationality. They wore Chinese uni-
forms, were restricted from flying over UN-controlled territory, and were
forbidden (in theory) from speaking Russian in radio transmissions. If cap-
tured, they were expected to identify themselves as Chinese of Russian ex-
traction. One Soviet pilot shot down behind UN lines ejected safely and
then shot himself.9 American pilots were also restricted, and they fumed
when they got MiGs in their gun sights but could not pursue them north of
theYalu (many did anyway). When MacArthur complained about enemy
reinforcements pouring over theYalu bridges, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave
permission to attack the bridges, but only the Korean side of the spans;
Manchurian air space must not be violated. MacArthur's predictable reac-
tion to the JCS orders: "The most indefensible and ill-conceived decision
ever forced on a field commander in our nation's history."10
November 23 was Thanksgiving Day in Korea. On or near that day,
American troops were served a turkey dinner with all the trimmings. No
effort was spared to reach all the troops, even if this meant airdrops.11 Morale
remained generally high; after all, it appeared the UN armies were within
striking distance of a total victory. MacArthur even suggested, perhaps partly
in jest, that if the troops advanced fast enough, "maybe some of them could
be home by Christmas."12 It was not to be.
After about a three-week lull, on the night of November 25—26 the
Chinese attacked in force. The first blow fell on the ROK Eighth Division,
followed by strong attacks on the American Second Division. A day later,
November 27, they hit the First Marine Division and Seventh Division in
the X Corps area. Chinese tactics, in all cases, were virtually the same. While
the UN forces advanced to the north on the roads, the Chinese penetrated
the surrounding mountains and remained under cover.When they emerged,
they hammered the UN forces with mortars and small arms fire and threw
up roadblocks behind them to prevent their escape. It was a formula they
repeated over and over in Korea.
Again the UN armies were forced back, toward the 38th Parallel. The
hard-hit Second Division managed to cut through the Chinese roadblocks
but suffered such heavy losses it was combat ineffective and had to be pulled
out of action to rebuild. Some of the most bitter fighting took place in the
Chosin Reservoir area, where both the Seventh Division and the First Ma-
rine Division were forced to fight their way through Chinese roadblocks
while being pounded by Chinese shellfire from the surrounding hills.Those
engaged in this retreat, "The Chosin Few," as they now call themselves with
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pride, endured unbelievable hardships. The fighting was not only intense,
the men also had to fight in temperatures that often dipped to more than
twenty degrees below zero. Automatic weapons, if not fired regularly, froze
up. Frostbite forced the evacuation of hundreds of men. Fortunately, this was
possible because of a short runway hacked out by engineers at Hagaru-ri,
where C-47 pilots battling terrible weather conditions brought in supplies
and took out the casualties.When the Chinese blew a bridge at the Funchilin
pass just south of Koto-ri, C-119 transports dropped the necessary bridge
spans by parachute. Within hours engineers had repaired the bridge that
provided the only escape possible. The retreat required the maximum effort
from everyone; cooks and clerks became riflemen. Smith's well-known ex-
planation of the retreat, in response to a reporter's question—"Retreat, hell—
we're attacking in another direction"—made headlines in the United States
and has been forever associated with the marines at the Chosin Reservoir.13
Finally, with much support from UN fighter-bombers, most of the men
made it to the port of Hungnam. On December 24, 1950, the U.S. Navy
evacuated the men to Pusan to regroup and fight another day.Then the navy
bombarded the abandoned port into a heap of wreckage.14
Meanwhile, in Washington the Chinese entry into the war effaced the
recent optimism brought about by the UN offensive and revived the old fear
that UN forces might yet be pushed off the Korean peninsula. It also revived
the fear that atomic weapons might be necessary to stop the charging Com-
munist forces in Korea. President Truman did not help matters at a press
conference on November 30. In response to a question about the possible
use of atomic bombs, he stated that in order to meet the military situation
the United States would include "every weapon that we have."15 A hastily
prepared press release later the same day did little to clarify the issue. World
reaction against the use of atomic weapons in Korea was strong, no doubt
strengthened by the Soviet explosion of its own bomb in 1949. In Britain,
the uproar in the House of Commons over the bomb prompted Prime
Minister Attlee to pay a personal visit to Washington in early December for
reassurances on this issue. He urged Washington to accept a negotiated cease-
fire in Korea, even if this meant UN withdrawal.16
In late November, following the fighting that took place during the first
entry of the Chinese into the war, the Chinese Sixty-sixth Army Headquar-
ters issued a report on its perceptions of the performance of the American
forces as well as its own army. They commented favorably on the American
"coordinated action of mortars and tanks," the "great hazard" of American
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"aircraft strafing and bombing," and the "very active" American artillery.
Their estimate of the American infantry, however, was less complimentary.
The report described the Americans as "weak, afraid to die," unfamiliar with
"night fighting or hand-to-hand combat," and "afraid when the rear is cut
off." In future operations, the report concluded, as its "main objective" the
Chinese forces "must fight its way rapidly around the enemy and cut off
their rear," while avoiding "highways and flat terrain" so American tanks and
artillery could not hinder their attack operations.17
While the retreat had revived speculation about the UN pulling out of
Korea, that speculation was soon countered by General J. Lawton Collins,
Army Chief of Staff. On December 8, he returned from a fact-finding tour
of Korea. He reported that while the situation was serious and that it might
be necessary to retreat to a line south of Seoul, the UN forces could hold in
Korea, even without major reinforcements.18
During December, the Communist forces continued to push the UN
forces southward along the entire front in what proved to be the largest
retreat in U.S. military history. They paid a heavy price for their success in
casualties, however, and by late December their supply lines, repeatedly ham-
mered from the air, had been stretched to the breaking point. Exhausted, the
Chinese offensive temporarily came to a halt.
On December 23, a freakish jeep accident claimed the life of Lieutenant
General Walker. That night, General MacArthur called General Collins in
Washington and requested Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway as
Walker's replacement to command the Eighth Army. Ridgway was an offen-
sive-minded officer and a true WWII hero, and MacArthur had high respect
for his strong leadership ability. Although stationed in Washington at the
time, Ridgway's duties as the deputy chief of staff for operations and admin-
istration had kept him well informed on operations in Korea. Ridgway left
Washington immediately for Tokyo, where he stopped briefly on December
26 for a meeting with MacArthur. When he asked MacArthur if he had
permission to attack, providing conditions were favorable, the general re-
plied: "The Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think best."19
Pleased, Ridgway flew to Korea the same day and immediately met
with his top commanders. He found the leadership in "many instances sadly
lacking," and he criticized them openly for their "timidity about getting off
the scanty roads" and their "lack of imagination" in dealing with an enemy
they "outmatched in firepower and dominated in the air and on the sur-
roundings seas "The main problem, Ridgway believed, was how to restore
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the "lost confidence and lack of spirit" among the troops. Ridgway also saw
Syngman Rhee, in order to impress him with "our determination not to be
driven from the peninsula, and to go on the offensive again as soon as we
could marshal our forces."20
Ridgway was eager to attack, but knew he first had to deal with a pend-
ing Chinese offensive, which intelligence expected imminently. It came on
New Year's Eve, preceded by an extensive artillery barrage. Reluctantly,
Ridgway ordered his troops to fall back to the south bank of the Han River,
and on January 3, to evacuate Seoul. At one point, frustrated by truckloads
of ROK soldiers scurrying south without either orders or their equipment,
Ridgway personally stood in the middle of the road waving his arms franti-
cally to stop the retreat. To restore order, he set up straggler posts in the rear
manned by American military policemen.21
While the Communist offensive in January 1951 succeeded in pushing
the UN forces south about fifty or sixty miles across the peninsula, it also
cost the Communist armies an estimated thirty-eight thousand casualties.
More than half of these casualties were the result of air attacks by American
pilots, who bombed and strafed the Communist forces unmercifully during
their advance.22
Fortunately, most of the UN armies retreated in good order with their
equipment intact. Once the Communists armies had exhausted their offen-
sive capacity, Ridgway ordered a new defensive line established in the vicin-
ity of the 37th parallel. Known as the "D Line," it ran from Pyontaek in the
west to Samchok on the east coast. This line proved to be as far south as the
Eighth Army would go for the remainder of the war.
Reinforcements and additional equipment were pouring into Korea,
and Ridgway was ready to take the offensive. He now had under his com-
mand not only I Corps and IX Corps, but also X Corps, which had been
rebuilding in the Pusan area following the Chosin Reservoir fighting. Be-
ginning in late January, the spring of 1951 is notable for a series of UN
"limited" offensive operations, all intended to push the Communist forces
back to the 38th Parallel or beyond. They were also designed to take full
advantage of superior UN firepower and to inflict maximum casualties on
the enemy while keeping UN casualties at a minimum. Eighth Army Head-
quarters gave each operation a name (Thunderball, Roundup, Killer), and
each pushed the line further to the north toward a new defensive line, also
named (Topeka, Kansas, Utah).23
Cautiously, in the spring of 1951, the UN forces worked their way
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north—toward the 38th Parallel. Unlike the uneven advance of the UN
forces in the fall campaign, they moved forward as a solid front, and units
remained in contact. This did much to prevent the Communist armies from
flanking the road-bound columns of UN troops and setting up roadblocks
behind them, a common tactic in earlier campaigns. The fighting was often
intense, and the Communist forces were still capable of carrying out their
own offensive operations for limited periods of time. They paid dearly for
any success, however, because any large-scale attack forced the Chinese troops
into the open, where UN air power and artillery inflicted horrendous casu-
alties on them.
Chipyong-nijust northwest ofWonju, was the scene of an intense battle
in mid-February. A Communist offensive, launched on February 11, had suc-
ceeded in surrounding the U.S. Second Division's Twenty-third Regiment
and its attached French battalion. Supplied from the air, the U.S. and French
troops managed to hold on until finally relieved by a task force from the First
Cavalry Division. This gutsy defense, which cost the Communist forces an
estimated five thousand casualties, allowed the UN forces to retain the initia-
tive and resume the advance to the north a few days later. Ridgway thought
the battle a turning point that symbolized the confidence the Eighth Army
had lost during the December withdrawals. Both the Twenty-third Regiment
and the French battalion received the American Distinguished Unit citation
for their heroic defense against far superior forces at Chipyong-ni.24
On March 15, UN forces captured the battered capital of Seoul for the
second time, and a few days later they moved into Chunchon. When the
advance brought the UN troops close to the 38th Parallel, Washington de-
cided to make the crossing a tactical decision rather than a political one.
Since in Ridgway s opinion this mystic line was "neither defensible nor stra-
tegically important," he decided, with MacArthur's approval, to "continue
the advance."25 By early April, UN troops had reached the Kansas line, a few
miles north of the 38th Parallel.
The UN armies were now fighting with professionalism and spirit, and
Ridgway had reason to be pleased. Attention, however, now shifted from the
battlefield to politics—the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Essentially,
MacArthur wished to carry the war to the Chinese in a way that contra-
dicted Washington policy. He had proposed, sometimes publicly, a blockade
of the Chinese coast, the use of Chinese Nationalist troops on Taiwan, and
bombing targets on the Chinese mainland. All of these proposals were well
known in Washington, and all had been rejected to prevent a wider war.
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As the Eighth Army approached the 38th Parallel, Truman thought the
timing right for a negotiated settlement. On March 20, in a statement cleared
with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Defense Secretary George Marshall,
and President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur that
the United Nations was now prepared to discuss the "conditions of settle-
ment in Korea," and that "further diplomatic effort" should be made "before
any advance with major forces north of the 38th Parallel."26 MacArthur,
however, considered a negotiated settlement that failed to punish the Com-
munist aggressors unacceptable. On March 24, without notifying anyone in
Washington, he issued his own "routine communique," which essentially
torpedoedTruman's plans for a negotiated peace. MacArthur belittled China s
military weaknesses and its failure to accomplish the conquest of Korea by
force "even under inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United
Nations forces. . . ."The general went on to say that an "expansion of our
military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red
China to the risk of imminent military collapse."27
President Truman was furious. The statement was "in open defiance of
my orders as President and as Commander in Chief" and "a challenge to the
authority of the President under the Constitution," Truman wrote in his
memoirs. MacArthur "left me no choice—I could no longer tolerate his
insubordination."28 A few days later, the general gave the president yet an-
other reason to act. On April 5, Congressman Joseph W. Martin, the House
minority leader, read a letter from MacArthur on the House floor. In the
letter, MacArthur asserted that "if we lose the war to Communism in Asia
the fall of Europe is inevitable " He ended the letter with his often quoted
statement, "There is no substitute for victory."29
Truman was determined MacArthur must go, and he received full sup-
port from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On April 11,1951, in an unpopular move,
Truman relieved MacArthur from his command. The general returned to
the United States to deliver his celebrated "old soldier's" speech before a
joint session of Congress and received a ticker tape parade in New York City.
He returned a hero to many (but not all) Americans, but especially to the
"limited war" and Truman critics. Ridgway replaced MacArthur in Tokyo,
and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, at the time in the States, took
over the Eighth Army30
Meanwhile, the war went on. On April 22, a quarter million Chinese
troops attacked along a forty-mile front, complete with a massive artillery
barrage, bugles, drums, flares, and whistles. They managed to break through
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two ROK divisions, and one of the breaches opened the way for another
drive on Seoul. The UN forces withdrew about twenty-five miles to a line
just north of Seoul, which Van Fleet did not name (the "No-Name Line")
but expected the Eighth Army to hold. Once again the Chinese forces could
not sustain the attack. Hit repeatedly from the air, by the end of April the
offensive had run its course, and the Chinese fell back for resupply and
replacements with very heavy losses.31
The exhaustion of the Communist armies presented the Eighth Army
with the opportunity to seize the initiative and retake ground lost during
the recent Communist offensive. Although Van Fleet had only been in Korea
about a week, he was eager to attack, and on May 20, the UN armies again
headed north on a broad front. By early June they had driven beyond the
Kansas line to the Iron Triangle, the Hwachon Reservoir, and the Punchbowl
area. During the advance Eighth Army troops also captured an unusually
large number of prisoners. Many of them were clad in rags and in poor
physical condition, suffering from malnutrition and low morale. UN com-
manders also reported the Communists had abandoned unprecedented
amounts of equipment during their retreat, indicating disorganization.32
Once the Chinese and North Korean troops had retreated to their de-
fensive positions, they began to dig in, as if they were planning to stay for a
while. They dug tunnels and built bunkers strong enough to withstand all
but direct hits from the American 155mm guns. They would not easily be
dislodged from these positions. Perhaps the time to talk peace in Korea had
finally arrived.33
Chapter 5
Truce Talks and Prison Riots
CLEARLY, THE BATTERED Communist forces lacked the firepower to
break through the UN lines on a wide front. Realistically, they could no
longer expect to recapture Seoul and drive into South Korea. They could
achieve temporary success in limited sectors, but even this success came at
the cost of huge casualty figures. On the UN side, even if the firepower and
troops to drive the Chinese back to the Yalu were available, the will to do so
was lacking, especially in Washington and among the other UN participants.
Although Ridgway believed the Eighth Army, if ordered to do so, "could
have pushed right on to the Yalu in the spring of 1951," he also believed the
"price for such a drive would have been far too high "! In June,Van Fleet
did order limited operations to consolidate the UN positions, but nothing
more. Unless one side or the other was willing to pay the cost in casualties
and equipment required to carry out a major offensive, which would have
been enormous, the war was effectively stalemated.2
The Truman administration was more than ready for peace talks. Secre-
tary of State Acheson, at the MacArthur hearings in early June, had implied
a willingness of the U.S. to accept an armistice based on the 38th Parallel
provided certain conditions were met. On June 23, the Soviet ambassador to
the UN, Jacob Malik, after talks with the American government's Soviet
Union expert, George Kennan, suddenly called for discussions leading to a
cease-fire and an armistice that provided for the mutual withdrawal of forces
from the 38th Parallel. When the Beijing People's Daily followed by endors-
ing the Soviet proposal, it appeared the key players in all the warring powers
except South Korea were ready to talk. Syngman Rhee, of course, adamantly
opposed any settlement that left Korea divided.3
Given the green light by Washington, Ridgway followed up with some
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timely peace-feelers. In a radio message on June 30, Ridgway indicated his
willingness to name a representative to begin discussions for a cease-fire and
armistice. He suggested the meeting take place on a Danish hospital ship in
Wonsan Harbor. The Communist reply, signed by Kim II Sung for North
Korea and Peng Dehuai for the Chinese People's Volunteer Forces, came
two days later. They suggested talks begin on July 10 at Kaesong, a neutral
site between the lines. Ridgway agreed to the changes.4
When the UN delegation under Vice Admiral Turner C.Joy met for the
first time at Kaesong on July 10, hopes were high for an early end to the
fighting.They quickly discovered, however, that the Communists were more
interested in using the talks for propaganda purposes and making the UN
look like losers than real peace. They began by surrounding and bringing
under Communist control the "neutral" city of Kaesong. When the UN
delegation arrived under a white flag, as previously agreed, the Communists
presented this to the world as a token of surrender. When the delegates took
their seats, the Communists sat in high chairs, while the UN delegation sat
in low chairs. At some meetings the two delegations sat for hours in silence
and just glared at each other across the table. It was an ominous beginning
for the peace talks, which were to drag on for more than two years.5
During the early weeks of the talks, the major disagreement on the
agenda occurred over the demarcation line. The Communists insisted the
cease-fire line should be along the 38th Parallel, which the Truman admin-
istration had seemed to endorse when first suggesting the peace talks. Dur-
ing the ensuing fighting, however, the UN forces had moved into areas north
of the 38th Parallel, areas that provided a more natural defense, and Ridgway
insisted the line must be in keeping with the military realities. He did not
object to surrendering some areas south of the parallel that could not be
easily defended, but he wished to retain a buffer zone established along the
general line of battle, much of which was north of the 38th.6
Finally, after the talks were suspended in August and after UN forces
took Heartbreak Ridge and Bloody Ridge in bitter fighting, the talks re-
sumed on October 25.This time, at Ridgway's insistence, they took place at
the village of Panmunjom, about midway between the two lines. Ridgway
favored a tough, hard-line position in dealing with the Communists, and
opposed a cease-fire until agreement on the demarcation line had been
reached. This often put him at odds with Washington, which backed a softer
stand to create more favorable conditions for peace. On November 14, after
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rejecting Ridgway s appeals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Ridgway to
"press for an early settlement" of the fighting. Accordingly, Ridgway ordered
Van Fleet to cease all major offensive operations and seize only the terrain
needed for defense, such as outposts. In this way, the UN negotiators hoped
that the existing main line of resistance (MLR) could be frozen into the final
demarcation line on the effective date of the armistice. To implement this
proposal, the UN negotiators insisted that a cease-fire must take place within
thirty days. On November 27, the Communists accepted the proposal, but
when the thirty days passed, no agreement on a cease-fire had been reached.
The Communists instead used the time to strengthen their defensive posi-
tions, well aware of the growing war weariness among the Western powers
and confident that time was on their side. When the war finally ended nine-
teen months later, the final demarcation line differed only slightly from the
MLR as it existed at the end of 1951.7
While the negotiators agreed on the demarcation line, they could not
agree on the details for implementing an armistice, especially the'methods of
supervision. During the spring of 1952, the negotiators went back and forth
on these issues, sometimes making progress and sometimes meeting for only
five or ten minutes before stalking out of their truce tents.8
It was the POW issue, however, that deadlocked the negotiations and, in
effect, extended the war. Despite all the emotion and appropriation of the
issue for propaganda purposes by both sides, the matter was quite simple.
The United States insisted that the repatriation of POWs should be strictly
voluntary, and the Communists insisted that all of their prisoners should be
returned home. The issue was made more contentious by the exchange of
POW lists, which the Communists had reluctantly agreed to on December
18,1951. During the early months of the war, the Communists had reported
through radio broadcasts and news releases the capture of over 65,000 pris-
oners.When the UN Command received the lists, however, they were shocked
to learn the Communists held only 7,142 ROK soldiers and 4,417 UN
personnel, for a total of 11,559 prisoners.9 What happened to the others?
On the POW issue, President Truman took a personal interest, undoubt-
edly haunted by the memory of thousands of desperate Russian prisoners
the Western Allies forced to return in 1945 to an uncertain fate in Stalin's
Russia. He insisted that the UN position of "voluntary" repatriation must
not be compromised. On May 7,1952, in a public statement, Truman stated
bluntly that there would be no "forced repatriation of prisoners of war,"
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despite the insistence of the Communists. "We will not buy an armistice by
turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery," the president contin-
ued.10 He could not have made his position more clear.
Unfortunately, the Communists were equally adamant on this issue. If a
massive number of Communist prisoners declined repatriation and the glo-
ries of their system in favor of freedom, this would constitute a major propa-
ganda setback. This is precisely what happened. In April, after screening, the
UN Command reported that only 70,000 of the 132,000 prisoners held in
UN custody were willing to go home. The Communists, of course, found
these figures humiliating and totally unacceptable. Even the UN negotiators
were disturbed by these events.They were much more interested in ending
the war than scoring propaganda victories and knew this would interrupt
the progress of the truce talks.11
The POW issue not only deadlocked the peace negotiations, it also had
other tragic consequences. It played a major role in sparking riots in a num-
ber of the UN prison camps. One of the worst—and the best known—took
place at Koje-do.
During the early months of the war, the North Korean captives were in
the care of the ROK Army. When the number of captives swelled, however,
as a result of the swift UN advance into North Korea, the U.S. Army as-
sumed the responsibility for captured Communist prisoners. Many of them
were detained in hastily constructed prison compounds built on islands sur-
rounding the peninsula, such as Koje-do, a small island off the coast of South
Korea.The 150,000 Communist prisoners were guarded by a mix of Ameri-
can and ROK soldiers, nearly all without experience in prison camp duty.12
The administration of the camps can only be described as chaotic, in part
because no effort had been made to separate the Communists and the anti-
Communists. As a result, hard-core militants on both sides battled it out in
the camps while the American and ROK guards watched but did nothing.
There is even evidence Communist military leaders ordered some of their
more promising and dedicated cadre to intentionally fall into enemy hands
on the battlefields and enter the UN prison camps, where they could orga-
nize the prisoners.13
Once prisoners inside the camps understood the UN Command in-
sisted on voluntary repatriation, the hard-core Communists went to work
on the non-Communist prisoners, that is, all of those who refused to return
to China or North Korea.While beatings were most common, on occasions
the Communist prisoners convened kangaroo courts inside the compounds
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and sentenced the recalcitrant prisoners to death, sometimes by torture.Where
non-Communists were in control of the compound, they meted out justice
in much the same way. The result was total pandemonium, and it created a
huge public relations problem for the UN Command, which Communists
worldwide exploited in the propaganda war. General Ridgway and Admiral
Joy actually favored an increase in the number of Communist prisoners
volunteering to return, because they knew a larger and more acceptable
figure to the Chinese would facilitate the signing of an armistice.They could
not, however, tolerate the brutal methods employed by the Communist zealots
in the camps.They had to be stopped. But first, the UN had to regain con-
trol of the camps. The attempts to do this sparked the riots at Koje-do in
May 1952 u
The problems at Koje-do go back as far as the summer of 1951, when
several prisoners were killed inside the compounds. In February 1952, the
UN began the process of screening the prisoners one by one to determine
who wished to be repatriated to China and North Korea and who did not.
This had the effect of increasing the disorder, however, and the riots and
murders inside the compounds continued. On February 13, to enforce the
screening, U.S. troops moved into one of the compounds and fought a pitched
battle with Communist resistance groups, resulting in casualties on both
sides. Nevertheless, the screening of prisoners continued, except in com-
pounds controlled by Communist hard-liners, which General Ridgway de-
cided were all eligible for repatriation. Then a foolish act by the American
commandant of the island, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, changed ev-
erything. Despite warnings from UN intelligence sources of a Communist
plot to make him a prisoner, on May 7,1952, Dodd met with representatives
of Compound 76, who managed to drag him into the camp. Brigadier Gen-
eral Charles F. Colson took command and, after negotiating with the Com-
munist prisoners, managed to secure the release of Dodd on May 10, but
only after signing a humiliating confession.The entire affair received intense
media coverage and amounted to a major propaganda victory for the Com-
munists. Soon afterward, Generals Dodd and Colson found themselves colo-
nels and retired from the army. Order gradually returned to the camps, in
part because many of the American and ROK guards were replaced with
other UN troops. Nevertheless, the prisoner riots were more than embar-
rassing to the UN Command; they also undercut the high moral ground the
UN had assumed when it endorsed the principle of voluntary repatriation.15
Chapter 6
Trench Warfare and Peace
IN THE MEANTIME, the war went on. Since the end of 1951, when the
two sides agreed on the demarcation line, the nature of the war had changed.
It was no longer a war to "win," and every UN soldier soon knew it. Instead,
it had now become a stalemated war of the trenches, the most forgotten part
of the forgotten war. Yet, about 45 percent of all U.S. casualties tragically
occurred after the beginning of the truce talks.1 Much bloody fighting lay
ahead, but the front lines remained essentially unchanged. Both sides just
dug in and prepared to stay.
Back in the States, without movement and big battles, news of the war
gradually dropped off the front pages. Once it became a war of the trenches,
casualty figures generally declined and thus became less of an issue. A new
rotation plan meant that no GI would be doomed to Korea indefinitely.
Most Americans, unless they had a family member involved, went about
their business without paying much attention to the war. They did find the
war frustrating and wanted it over. At the same time, the majority of Ameri-
cans seemed determined to "stay the course" in Korea and even supported
Truman's position on the POWs, which deadlocked the negotiations. Be-
sides, the wrath of Senator McCarthy's "Red-hunters" could come down
hard on anyone who suggested a pullout in Korea and peace at any price. So,
most Americans patiently waited it out and, unlike during Vietnam, never
became actively involved in opposition to the war. When young men re-
ceived their draft notices, they went silently into the service without protest,
not eagerly, but they went.2
On the front lines, however, all UN soldiers still found the war to be
very real. Even without major Communist attacks, which were rare except
in the final weeks of the war, there were still patrols, guard duty, work details,
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wiring parties—all part of the routine. For excitement, there were frequent
incoming mortar and artillery rounds, and on occasions, firefights with the
enemy. Frequently, small units of Chinese and North Korean soldiers infil-
trated the UN trenches, killed as many UN soldiers as possible with gre-
nades and small arms fire, then slipped away only to repeat the process a few
nights later. The attacks always took place at night, so soldiers on guard duty
hoped for a cloudless night with a bright moon.
Sometimes UN Command sent down orders that a particular hill must
be taken, perhaps to consolidate the line, or perhaps it gave the enemy too
much of an advantage. Such an order virtually guaranteed hard combat and
high casualties for those involved, and it was not always easy for frontline
soldiers to see the purpose in such attacks.To most soldiers, the hills in Korea
looked amazingly similar, including those selected for an attack.
Some of the most hazardous duty in Korea for UN soldiers, and the
scenes of some of the bloodiest fighting, took place on the outposts. Located
well in front of the MLR, and usually on hill crests, outposts were built to
provide an early warning against surprise attacks. They consisted of well-
constructed bunkers housing command posts and artillery observation posts,
all connected by telephone to the MLR. Down the hill, but linked by trenches
to the command post, were still more trenches, manned by UN soldiers well
equipped with grenades and small arms. Since they would most likely spot
the enemy first, they were expected to warn the others. Barbed wire en-
tanglements and minefields ringed the entire outpost to prevent rapid infil-
tration by the enemy. Outposts were usually defended by platoons or
companies, which were relieved every four or five days.3
In contrast, the Communists built their defenses around tunnels rather
than trenches, a decision no doubt prompted by the UN control of the air
space over the front. Using their huge manpower resources, they cut tunnels
into the mountains to connect the front and reverse slopes, then added miles
of intercommunication tunnels with unlimited storage facilities. Chinese
artillerymen could wheel a 76mm field gun to the entrance of the tunnel,
fire a round, and quickly withdraw the gun to safety within the tunnel.
General Maxwell Taylor, the last commander of the Eighth Army in Korea,
rated the Chinese defenses superior to the German defenses during WWII.4
For the most part, UN Command fought the Korean War with WWII
weaponry. There was one notable exception—the helicopter. Despite some
limitations, such as its vulnerability to enemy ground fire and adverse weather
conditions, it played a major role in the war. Helicopters were used for battle-
42 Voices from the Korean War
Tending to a wounded soldier in a MASH unit. (Courtesy of Forty-fifth Infantry
Division Museum)
field observation, air-sea rescue, transport of men and supplies, and for the
evacuation of the wounded.b
Because of the film and television series M*A*S*H, there is no more
enduring image of the Korean War for most Americans than a helicopter
landing at a MASH unit with wounded soldiers. Like the helicopter, MASH
(Mobile Army Surgical Hospital) units were relatively new. Designed late in
World War II, they were essentially field hospitals intended to provide emer-
gency surgery to stabilize and prepare the severely wounded for evacuation,
often to Japan. Located near the front lines, MASH units were prepared to
move as often as necessary to keep pace with combat operations.When heli-
copters brought in the wounded, they arrived at MASH units in a fraction of
the time required by litter jeeps and ambulances. The combination of MASH
units and helicopters, plus other medical advances at the time, clearly im-
proved the survival rates for wounded American and UN soldiers in Korea.6
In sharp contrast, the Chinese and North Korean medical services, which
were inadequate by any standard, nearly collapsed by early 1951 when UN
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armies went on the offensive. Much of the problem rested with their inabil-
ity to evacuate their wounded in a timely manner. Since UN air forces
controlled the airspace, the Communists could not safely evacuate their
wounded soldiers until nightfall, and even then over the most primitive
roads.Wounded soldiers evacuated by train also had to wait it out during the
day; the trains ran only at night. Since this flawed evacuation system was
combined with serious problems pertaining to medical equipment, medi-
cines, sanitation, and nutrition, survival chances for wounded Chinese or
North Korean soldiers were much lower than for UN soldiers.7
As the war continued, UN Command began to realize that for the sake
of morale the men needed a break in the routine of combat and training.
While serving on the front line, soldiers had no opportunities to go to bars
or clubs, and passes were unknown. When in reserve, they'might occasion-
ally see a movie or a USO show, but that was about it. Otherwise, soldiers in
Korea experienced little but snow and bitter cold in the winter, rain and
mud in the spring, humid heat in the summer, and monotonous mountain
ridges all year. To boost morale, during the early part of 1951 the Eighth
Army initiated a new program that provided each soldier with the opportu-
nity to spend five days in Japan for "rest and recuperation" (R&R). For most
soldiers, this meant club life and women, but for everyone it meant the
opportunity to take a real bath, get dry and warm, sleep in a bed, and eat
something other than army chow. Just getting out of Korea provided a big
morale boost for everyone, even if only for a few days.8
During March 1951, the Eighth Army adopted another new program—
a rotation system for all UN personnel, based upon points. As modified in
March 1952, soldiers received four points a month for frontline duty, three
points for service in an intermediate combat zone (divisional reserve), and
two points for service elsewhere in Korea.The magic number was thirty-six
points, and any soldier who collected four points each month could rotate in
nine months.While individual soldiers appreciated knowing there were lim-
its to their service in Korea, critics have often pointed out that the system
damaged combat effectiveness by lessening comradery and adhesion to the
unit. Also, by the time the new men had become proficient soldiers they had
accumulated so many points that some were more focused on going home
than on their jobs. Soldiers could measure their rotation date with some
accuracy, and many did not hesitate to remind others they were a "short-
timer" when they neared the end of their service in Korea.9
Toward the end of the war, when it appeared the negotiators were near
The Line of Contact, July 1, 1951. Source: Department of the Army, United States Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting
Front (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1988V Mao I.
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A battery of 105mm howitzers, the standard artillery piece used by the American
army in Korea. (Courtesy of Forty-fifth Infantry Division Museum)
an agreement, the intensity of the fighting actually picked up. In part, this
was because the Communists were trying to strengthen their military posi-
tion for the purpose of strengthening their negotiating position. Also, they
wished to prove they had more staying power and were more willing to
make sacrifices than the UN forces. Consequently, the Communists ordered
frequent attacks, usually against one of the outposts scattered across the pen-
insula in front of the MLR. The names of some of these outposts became
well-known, such as Old Baldy, Bunker Hill, and Pork Chop Hill.While the
size of the Communist forces assaulting these outposts varied greatly, the
fighting was consistently savage for those involved. Some of these outposts
changed sides several times during the war. In April 1953, the fighting was
especially intense on Pork Chop, and the heroic defense of the outpost
prompted Hollywood to turn the story into a movie starring Gregory Peck.10
Between June 10 and 18,1953, the Chinese made a serious attempt to take
Outpost Harry in the central sector, attacking in regimental strength. Each
night one company from either the Third Division, the Fifth Regimental
Combat Team, or the Greek Expeditionary Force defended the outpost, but
only for one night. After one night, each company suffered so many casual-
ties it was pulled off the line and replaced by another company before the
next round of attacks came on the following night. An estimated 4,118 U.S.
and Greek soldiers participated in the fighting on Harry, and 2,422 soldiers,
or 59 percent, were killed or wounded. Artillery rounds fired, on both sides,
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reached record proportions. Ironically, it was during June, just weeks before
the end of the war, that the UN Command fired more artillery rounds than
any other month of the war (2.7 million rounds).11
Despite this increase in the fighting, by the spring of 1953 there were
some positive signs in favor of an armistice. General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
now president, publicly stated his determination to do everything possible to
bring the war to an end. Accordingly, the Eisenhower administration dropped
hints that if the deadlock in the peace negotiations were not broken soon, the
Chinese Nationalists could be unleashed to invade the mainland and the U.S.
might employ atomic bombs in Asia. After this, Eisenhower wrote later in his
memoirs, the "prospects for armistice negotiations seemed to improve."12 Stalin's
death on March 5, however, probably had more to do with improving the
prospects for peace than Eisenhower's threats. Only ten days after the death of
Stalin, the new Soviet leader, Georgi M. Malenkov, seemed to extend an olive
branch when he declared there was no existing dispute between Moscow and
Washington that could not be solved peacefully. Eisenhower, replying in a
cautiously worded speech, challenged Malenkov to match his words with deeds,
including "an honorable peace" in Korea.13
It is difficult to assess how these hints of new directions coming from
Moscow and Washington affected the thinking in Beijing. At the very least,
it must have created uncertainty among the Chinese leaders. It is even pos-
sible Moscow may have applied pressure on China and North Korea to end
the war.14 It is also possible the Chinese were war weary and more than
ready to quit.They badly needed their resources to rebuild their nation after
years of civil war. Since they had pushed the UN forces back from theYalu,
they could claim a victory. Kim II Sung may not have been so eager for a
truce, but he could hardly continue the war alone.15
Whatever the reasons, events began to move in the direction of an armi-
stice. The big break came on March 28, when Chinese and North Korean
negotiators suddenly agreed to a previous International Red Cross proposal
for an exchange of the sick and wounded POWs.Two days later, the Chinese
foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, issued a statement that promised a breakthrough
on the POW issue, suggesting that all POWs who did not wish to be repatri-
ated should be turned over to a neutral state.16
On April 20, Operation Little Switch began.The UN Command deliv-
ered 6,670 sick and wounded North Korean and Chinese prisoners, while
receiving a total of 684 UN prisoners. This was clearly a sign the Chinese
were ready for peace.17
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The negotiators at Panmunjom were now able to carry on discussions
with the serious intent of breaking the deadlock on the POWs. There were
still many problems, however, such as the problem of determining which of
the neutral nations would assume the responsibility for those POWs who did
not wish to return home. Finally, on June 7, the negotiators came together on
this difficult issue. Based on a proposal made earlier by India, prisoners who
did not wish to be repatriated would be turned over to a five-member Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission. The commission would assume responsi-
bility for these prisoners for a maximum of 120 days and, if necessary, attempt
to relocate them. The road was now clear for an armistice.18
Not surprisingly, as the two sides drew closer together trying to work
out the last details, Syngman Rhee became a major obstacle to a settlement.
Rhee was opposed to any armistice that did not provide for a united Korea
with himself in control. In April, he had even threatened to withdraw the
ROK forces from UN Command and continue the war alone. He made
radio broadcasts, staged mass rallies, and issued press releases—all aimed at
undermining the talks. Most serious, on June 18 he directed the ROK prison
guards to release about twenty-five thousand North Korean prisoners who
had refused repatriation. Not surprisingly, the prisoners quickly melted into
the hills of South Korea, While infuriated, the Communist negotiators did
not allow Rhee s action to sabotage the peace negotiations. A few days later
Rhee promised that while he would not sign the armistice, neither would
he obstruct it.19
On July 23, staff officers reached agreement on the final demarcation
line, and the stage was set for the signing. At 9:57 A.M., on a windy July 27,
the delegates entered the building at Panmunjom from opposite sides and
took their place behind the tables in an atmosphere that has been described
as "marked by cold courtesy on both sides." Generals William K. Harrison
for the UN and Nam II for North Korea sat down without a word of greet-
ing and began to sign the first of nine copies of the armistice agreement. By
10:12 the signing was completed, and the two men departed through their
exits as silently as they had entered. In the distance the sound of artillery
could still be heard; both sides continued heavy shelling until 10:00 that
night, when the armistice went into effect. At that moment the sky suddenly
lit up with dozens of multicolored flares, signifying the end of the war. It was
exactly two years and seventeen days since the talks had begun.20
On August 5, in accordance with agreements reached during the nego-
tiations, the prisoner exchange began at Panmunjom. Known as Operation
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Big Switch, the Communists returned 3,597 Americans by the time the
exchange ended on September 6.21 Twenty-one Americans refused repatria-
tion, although nearly all of them eventually left China. Many of the UN
prisoners arrived emaciated and in a pitiable physical condition, the result of
years of mistreatment in POW camps. All would have their own horror
stories to tell about the camps. Unfortunately, not many Americans wanted
to hear them. Subjected to hours of interrogation, even on their voyage
home, American POWs returned only to discover their country was torn by
the Red Scare, led by Senator Joe McCarthy. They were asked not about
their sufferings and hardships, but about brainwashing and collaboration. It
is little wonder that for most of them it was years before they would talk
openly about their experiences, and some have remained silent to this day.22
The Communist prisoners, in their eagerness to show their country-
men they were uncontaminated by capitalist handouts, often threw away
their cigarettes and stripped off their clothes and boots before arriving at the
exchange point. But at last it was mercifully over, three years, one month,
and two days after the invasion of South Korea.23
The price in American lives for containing Communist aggression was
not cheap. A total of 36,914 Americans lost their lives on the battlefields of
Korea from war related causes. In addition, 3,960 non-Americans in the
service of the United Nations Command died in Korea. Estimates of Ko-
rean casualties vary widely, however, largely because of incomplete records
and the intermingling of the populations of North and South Korea. When
deaths caused by disease, exposure, and starvation are added to the violent
deaths, UN officials believe as many as 900,000 lives may have been lost in
South Korea alone.The North Korean government has never provided offi-
cial casualty statistics on the war, but the South Korean government claims
the NKPA lost nearly 300,000 in deaths alone. Casualty figures for the Peoples
Republic of China are equally vague. After the war, the U.S. armed forces
estimated Chinese military casualties at more than one million, with deaths
exceeding 500,000.24
When the GIs arrived back in the States, most were treated neither as
heroes, as were many WWII veterans, nor with hostility, as were many Viet-
nam veterans.The majority were simply received in silence, and sometimes
with the question, "Where have you been anyway?" Most Korean veterans
accepted this reality, quickly put the war behind them, and got on with their
lives. Nobody was more eager to forget America's forgotten war than the
men who had fought it—the Korean War veterans.
Part Two
Many Faces, One War
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Chapter 7
Getting to Korea
For many soldiers, part of the trauma of going to war is getting there. Going to war for
most meant tearful goodbyes at home, followed by hours of homesickness and loneli-
ness while en route. In the Korean War, most Americans traveled by bus, train, and
troopship, very much like in World War II. While the GIs going to Korea faced no
danger from submarines, unlike their WWII counterparts, they did experience all the
other unpleasantries of troopship travel, including boredom, bunks stacked so close
together you could turn your body only with great difficulty, KP or other unsavory
duties, and worst of all, seasickness. Indeed, for many seasickness is their most endur-
ing memory. The following story, by Second Lieutenant Leslie Davis, describes his
journey from his home in Oklahoma to his arrival in Yokohama. While he tends to
focus on the humorous side of the voyage, it was nevertheless a most unpleasant
experience for the majority of GIs.
Second Lieutenant Leslie R. Davis
Thirty-sixth Engineer Combat Group, Eleventh Engineer Combat
Battalion, Eighth Army
I FLEW FROM Ft. Belvoir,Virginia, for a few days leave in Stillwater, Okla-
homa, before going on to Seattle, where I would ship out for Korea. Since
my buddy Pete Hitt was on leave in Denver, I decided to catch a bus to
Denver and ride the train with him to Seattle.
My mother and I decided to say goodbye at the house, so I took a cab to
the bus station. In a scene reminiscent of the early morning departure of Jeff
Bridges for Korea in the movie The Last Picture Show, I, too, started my trek.
It was a long bus ride to Denver, but I survived.Youth was on my side.
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Pete, his wife, and their brand new daughter met me in Denver. I got to
witness another sad farewell when Pete, the ultimate family man, said goodbye
to his "girls."
There is humor, though, even at the saddest times. His dear wife baked
us both a big stack of homemade cookies to eat on the way. Like so many
guys going to Korea at that time, we had purchased lighter fluid-powered
hand warmers. While on the train we decided to see if the warmers worked;
they did. Then we stuffed them in our handbags. (Incidentally, I never saw
anyone use them Korea.) A little later, we decided to check out the cookies,
which we found to be "A-one" delicious. Unfortunately, we promptly started
burping a "lighter fluid burp." We soon figured out that the fumes had per-
meated the cookies. We burped lighter fluid from Wyoming to Washington.
To this day I hate the smell of lighter fluid. Little did I realize when our train
pulled into Seattle that this was nothing compared to the seasickness soon to
come.
My trip to the Far East started at Fort Lawton,Washington, near Seattle,
which served as one of the two staging areas for the Far East Command, or
FECOM.The other was Camp Stoneman, California, near San Francisco.
After processing, we were told we could go anywhere we wanted. Of course,
we were also told to report to Troop Headquarters every four hours be-
tween 6:00 A.M. and midnight for possible immediate embarkation.The area
was nice, but it rained almost every day. That was normal, the locals said.
We expected a very short stay. Instead, it lasted on and on, through
Christmas. Finally, we were told to grab our duffel bags, and on December
30,1952, they bussed us to Pier 39, where our ship, the General R.L. Howze,
awaited us in the harbor. We quickly dubbed this old WWII retread the
"Lowsy Howze."
Also there to see us off were the obligatory small army band and the
wives and girlfriends of some of the Howze's crew. Some of the ladies were
crying and really carrying on. This aroused "great sympathy" on the part of
the army troops because we realized the poor babies would not see their
guys again until they dumped us in Yokohama and returned—maybe all of
two months. I'll never forget the day's final bit of gallows humor. As the boat
left the pier, the band played "Harbor Lights" and "Now Is the Hour"—
honestly!
The Howze was an old World War II assault transport ship taken out of
mothballs for the Korean War. It was not nearly as large and luxurious as the
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"dependent-class" ships, such as the General Walker, which also carried wives
and children.
As a second lieutenant, I had a few privileges but very little respect. I
bunked in a "C" deck cabin shared by four other lieutenants and one "old"
(about thirty-five) captain. One major bonus—our cabin had a porthole, so
we had fresh air. In contrast, my men were crammed in like sardines with no
fresh air outlets.
Once on board, most of us were stuck right away with some kind of
routine duty. They made me the compartment commander of Compart-
ment 6E, two decks down from my bunk. Half or more of my guys were
Puerto Ricans, and many of them spoke very little English. Although it was
forbidden, a lot of them spent their time gambling. Several vicious fights
took place over small amounts of money in dice or card games.
I was convinced before we left Seattle that seasickness was largely psy-
chological—in a person's head. Shortly after we left the calm waters of Puget
Sound for the wild seas of the North Pacific, however, I knew it was in my
stomach. I became very seasick and stayed that way for most of the voyage to
Yokohama. The trip was supposed to take thirteen days, but the rough seas
slowed us down and we were twenty-two days on the water.
Ironically, the best food I ever had in my army days was on the Howze.
Yet, I practically lived on crackers and oranges provided to those too sick to
eat the good navy chow.
Most of my guys in 6E developed varying degrees of seasickness the first
day. The cramped conditions, the lack of fresh air, and the inability to shower
regularly made the compartment a less than pleasant place to live and keep
clean. We had an inspection of the latrine (the navy called it a head) every
morning at 10:00 A.M. The old chiefs and swabbies were quite critical and
hard to please, as they should have been.
We had a lot of time to kill on the voyage, and boredom was a real
problem.The chaplain had a few books, crossword puzzles, chess games, etc.,
which helped relieve the monotony. Desperation even drove some of us to
try our hand at making crossword puzzles.This wasn't easy, but it consumed
a lot of time, which is why we were doing it in the first place.
Special Services set up talent shows with some pretty good singers and
musicians. One guy had even appeared on the Arthur Godfrey program on
national radio (TV. was still in the wings).
One thing I never figured out was why the mess halls were located in
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the front part of the ship. Every time we tried to eat we would feel the nose
rising and dropping over and over. It seemed so sensible to put mess halls
midship, where the rising and falling would be less violent. But then, the
navy never asked me.
While at sea we surrendered our greenbacks for M.P.C. (military pay-
ment certificates), since it was unlawful to spend dollars in Japan or Korea.
This made us realize we were really leaving home. On the voyage back the
process was reversed, and the old greenback looked mighty good.
If really truthful, I think most of us on the boat would have admitted
that arriving in Korea was a pretty scary thought. At the same time, due to
the boredom, seasickness, and cramped conditions, most of the guys on the
Lowsy Howze were happy to vacate the old tub. Despite all the bad stuff we
had heard about Korea, we were anxious to see it for ourselves and see what
fate awaited us in this cold, distant land.
The entry dock at Pusan, the first view of Korea for most GIs. (Courtesy of Leslie
Davis)
Chapter 8
A Mortar Man's Story
Like many other youths at the time, Bobby Martin decided to join the army and get
his service obligation out of the way. Unfortunately, this meant he was trained and
certain to be called up during the Korean War. Assigned to an 81mm mortar section
in the Eighth Regiment of the U.S. Cavalry Division, the division that had already
been hit hard in the fighting at Unsan, Sergeant First Class Martin arrived in Korea
around the middle of November 1950. Since this was only a few days before the
Chinese committed the main body of their forces, he was just in time to participate in
the general UN withdrawal to the south. Sergeant Martin, the reader will notice, has
the highest regard for General Ridgway, the new Eighth Army commander.
Sergeant First Class Bobby J. Martin
D Company, Eighth Regiment, First Cavalry Division
SOMETIME BEFORE I turned eighteen in 1948, Congress passed a law
that permitted you to fulfill your military obligation by entering the service
for one year and then remaining in the reserve for six years. Several of us in
Pauls Valley, Oklahoma, where I grew up, thought that sounded better than
the alternative, which was to be drafted into the army for two years of active
duty. So we decided to join the army for one year and get our service out of
the way, or so we thought. Little did we realize a war was less than two years
away.
For basic training I was sent to Fort Hood, Texas, and assigned to the
Second Armored Division, Forty-first Armored Infantry Battalion. I can't
say I enjoyed basic, but I can say we received excellent training, largely be-
cause most of the cadre were battle-hardened WWII veterans.
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After my year of active duty, I returned to Oklahoma and ended up as
the manager of a variety store in Healdton, a small town not far from Pauls
Valley In the meantime, on June 25, 1950, North Korea attacked South
Korea, and the Korean War had begun. Since I was trained and in the reserve,
I was ripe to be called up. In September 1950, my mother called me in
Healdton and said I had received a letter from the army ordering me to
report to Fort Hood,Texas, in twenty-one days.That was her interpretation
of the letter. About an hour later, however, a friend of mine in Pauls Valley
called and told me my mother did not understand military abbreviations.
The twenty-one days referred to the minimum length of time I would be
expected to serve; I was due at Fort Hood in two days.
After some hurried goodbyes to my family and to my bride of about
one month, I left for Fort Hood. When I arrived, people were coming in
from everywhere. We spent the first three days processing, getting shots, and
all that stuff. Then we took twelve days for training in a refresher course,
after which we found ourselves on a train heading west.When we arrived at
Camp Stoneman, California, we did more processing, including the prepara-
tion of a will. We shipped out on the General Hase and spent the next two
weeks or so playing pinochle or something to keep from being bored to
death. Some guys got seasick, but for some reason I never did. One guy got
so sick he just stayed in his bunk, and we took turns bringing chow to him.
Finally, we arrived at the port of Yokohama, and from there they trucked us
to Camp Drake (near Tokyo) for more processing. Among other things, we
saw a film on the prevention of trenchfoot and picked up our M-l rifles
with three rounds of ammunition (to zero our rifles in) .We also received our
orders. I was assigned Company D, First Battalion, Eighth Regiment, First
Cavalry Division. I asked someone at the bulletin board where the First
Cavalry was located. The answer—no one had heard from them for two
days. I found this a bit disturbing.
A short time later, we again loaded out on a ship, this time for Korea.
When we embarked the three thousand of us on board had been given
different assignments. By the time we disembarked at Inchon, however, all of
us had been assigned to the First Cavalry Division. I reached my regiment
sometime around the middle of November, while the division was still in
reserve. So, we trained—squad tactics and all that basic training stuff. At the
end of each drill our platoon leader would yell, "Bug out," and we were
supposed to fall back quickly toward the south. In early November, just
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before I arrived, the First Cavalry had been hit hard by the Communist
forces at Unsan and had been forced into a hasty retreat.
Thanksgiving Day saw the army go all out to provide the troops with a
really good meal, a complete turkey dinner. The problem was eating it be-
fore it froze. I remember the meal sat on burners in the serving line, but by
the time we got it on our trays and sat down to eat, much of the food would
be ice cold. By the time I got to my fruit cocktail it had actually frozen.
On November 25, just after Thanksgiving, the war entered a new phase
when the Chinese entered in force. This, of course, changed everything, and
instead of marching northward toward theYalu River, the UN forces found
themselves in a hasty retreat to the south. During the retreat, our battalion
would go into a blocking position and set up, then another battalion would
move through us and block for our battalion. Sometimes we set up with two
of our mortars facing north and two facing south. That was because North
Korean units that had been bypassed earlier attacked from the south, while
the Chinese attacked from the north.
By this time, the temperature had really dropped, sometimes to more
than twenty degrees below zero. It was a sharp, stinging cold that cut right
through to the bone, despite the fact we wore a ton of clothes.We had long-
handled underwear, wool pants, wind-proof pants on the bottom, a wool
shirt, a sweater, a field jacket, mittens with inserts, socks, boots with rubber
soles and leather tops, and overcoats, which we didn't always wear because
they impeded our movement too much. It sounds like a lot, but we were still
cold most of the time. The cold also made it almost impossible to dig in our
mortars, since the ground was completely frozen.
One time during the retreat, when the Second Battalion pulled through
us, our 81mm section was ordered to provide the rear guard while our troops
withdrew. Our orders were to stay in position until 1:00 A.M. that night and
then pull out.They left us with a jeep and a trailer, and somehow we man-
aged to scrounge up a machine gun. We set up the machine gun, dispersed a
bit, and waited until 1:00 A.M. Since we heard nothing and saw nothing, we
loaded the machine gun into the trailer and started walking out behind the
jeep at about four or five miles an hour. We had gone only a short distance
when we heard a Chinese mortar firing from the left side of the road. They
had gone past us on our flank and were already firing into our forward
troops. Somehow we managed to slip past them and rejoin our battalion
okay. The next morning we had no sooner set up in our new positions than
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a runner came by and shouted,"Get ready to move out." So we did, about one
hundred miles to the south, to a new defensive position on a little road junc-
tion east of the main supply road, where we dug in our mortars and set up.
During the retreat our cooks had become separated from us; we didn't
know where they were, and they didn't know where we were. As a result, we
didn't get much food, and we got pretty hungry. We did find some rabbits
and a four hundred—pound calf in a village. We confiscated both the rabbits
and the calf. After butchering the calf, we gave half of it back to its owner.
We kept the two hind quarters and cut them into steaks, so we ate pretty
good for a little while. Later we moved on down to the 38th Parallel, and
again, we ran out of food. This time we found some dried English peas and
some chestnuts in a village.We roasted the chestnuts and ate them but couldn't
find any water in which to cook the English peas.This crisis prompted one
of our old sergeants to do a bit of reconnoitering, and he came back with
some coffee and a gallon of Wesson oil. We boiled the peas in the Wesson oil,
but they were still hard as rocks when we got through cooking them. Fortu-
nately, late that afternoon the cooks found us.They set up their kitchen and
we had biscuits, spam, and cocoa. Some guys were so hungry they ate too
much. Because their stomachs had shrunk, some of them threw up on the
way back from the chow line.
Like everyone else, the First Cavalry Division kept retreating to the
south, and by Christmastime we were near Seoul. To make sure we had a
Christmas tree, we climbed a hill and cut down a fir.Then we discovered we
didn't have anything to make a stand for the tree, so we took a pickax and
dug a hole over a foot deep in the frozen ground. Next, we set the tree in the
hole, held it upright, and poured water into the hole. It took only about
thirty minutes for the water to freeze, and our Christmas tree was firmly
locked in the hole.
To decorate the tree, we took the cans from our beer rations and Cokes
and cut them into stars and moons, or whatever, and then hung them on the
tree with communications wire. One of our more artistic guys cut out the
letters for "Merry Christmas" and "Happy New Year," and we tied them
together and wrapped them around the tree. When we left the area, we hung
Merry Christmas on the lead vehicle and Happy New Year on the second.
In the days following Christmas, we crossed the Han River and contin-
ued our retreat south, finally stopping and setting up our defense near Chungju.
But this time we had retreated as far as we would go. Fortunately, the Eighth
Army in Korea now had a new commander—Lieutenant General Matthew
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Ridgway. He was a wonderful officer, who made a special effort to talk and
listen to the men. In my opinion, he performed near miracles in lifting the
morale of the GIs and getting the troops ready to take the offensive.
In a matter of weeks the First Cavalry was on the move again, but this
time to the north. Admittedly, we were pretty sloppy in carrying out some
of these offensive operations, in part because the troops were still in pretty
bad shape from months of hard fighting. The night before we started our
attack, one man just sat down and cried, asking over and over why were we
not getting on the boats, and where were the boats?
One night in early January 1951, we had one of the saddest things that
can happen in war happen to us—we shot and killed one of our own men.
It was a particularly cold night, with a strong wind blowing. We always had
to keep someone on the radio in case someone called for a fire mission.
About midnight, the relief man approached our radio position and was shot
by the man monitoring the radio.The soldier who fired the shots said he had
hollered halt twice but didn't get an answer, and no action was taken against
him. Whatever the facts, as could be expected, this event really shook us up.
We always wondered if the relief man failed to hear the challenge because of
the strong wind blowing that night, or if he just thought he would be recog-
nized anyway.There was no way to know, of course; these things just happen.
Our own artillery once mistakenly "fired for effect" on our troops while
they were taking a hill. We also had a near tragedy when a soldier on guard
duty shot up a poncho that had been hung up at night to dry. When these
stories get around, they are pretty tough on morale.
During late January, as we continued our advance to the north, the
action picked up. On February 12, the Chinese mounted a major attack on
our positions, starting around 1:00 that night. At the time we had our four
mortars set up but not dug into the ground, which was frozen.We had been
moving so fast there was no time to dig deep enough for a good emplace-
ment. So we just stuck the base plate into the ground as firmly as we could
and fired away. Unfortunately, this left the mortars exposed and more vul-
nerable to enemy fire than if they had been properly set. Because of that, we
had four GIs wounded that night when an incoming round hit between the
third and fourth guns. I was the gunner on the second gun, and we escaped
without injury, but we had to double up on the mortars to make up for
those who had been wounded. That night, from the time the Chinese at-
tacked until daybreak the next morning, we fired twelve hundred rounds.
The firing was made more difficult by our lack of night-firing devices; we
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Preparing to fire a 4.2-inch mortar. (Courtesy of Forty-fifth Infantry Division Museum)
actually lit cigarettes to see the bubbles on our mortars. All night long we
kept two cigarettes burning on each gun, because we fired our guns the
entire night. I might add that the sergeant who ran the ammunition vehicle
was also on the road the entire night bringing us the necessary ammo. For-
tunately, by daybreak our machine gunners opened up and brought the at-
tack to an abrupt end.
That same night, a friend of mine who came over with me on the same
boat and served as the platoon sergeant for one of our machine gun pla-
toons, Ed Hagadorn, won the Silver Star for his action. Unable to direct fire
successfully on an enemy machine gun nest, he knocked it out himself with
hand grenades.
Following this action, we moved off the line and into reserve. This was
when bitter fighting was taking place at Chipyong-ni, where the Twenty-third
Infantry Regiment of the Second Infantry Division was surrounded by the
Chinese and was unable to break out.The Fifth Regiment of the First Cavalry
Division sent an armored task force to break the encirclement, and a few days
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later the rest of the division moved up to reestablish the line north of Chipyong-
ni. Fortunately, the Twenty-third managed to hang on until the Chinese pulled
back, but they suffered heavy casualties for their gallant defense.
During this time, we were driving down the road one day when we
noticed a mountain peak in the distance. We kidded each other that our
positions would probably be on top of that peak, and we would have to
carry everything up to the top. Guess what? When we arrived at the base of
the mountain our platoon leader said we would have to put two mortars on
the top of the mountain to cover the necessary field of fire. He chose the
second section for this honor, because they had screwed up on some assign-
ment. Unfortunately, the first section had to carry up the bedrolls, chow, and
ammo for the second section. We told the platoon leader to punish us next
time; it was less work. When we moved out of this area, we saw more dead
Chinese bodies than ever before. They were piled everywhere.
As the weather became warmer, we made use of a small creek in the area
where we could wash our clothes and go swimming. Once, while we were
swimming, some women came walking down the road, laughing and jab-
bering. When someone hollered "white women," we immediately scrambled
around trying to get some clothes on as quickly as possible. It turned out to
be an American USO show called "Camel Caravan," put on by Camel ciga-
rettes. That evening they performed for us, and they were about thirty min-
utes into a really good show when the British, on our flank, began firing
their artillery. Soon they were firing faster, and then still a little faster, until
the firing was almost continuous. About this time someone jumped up on
the stage and yelled, "Every man to their units; there has been a break-
through on our flank." Unfortunately, we never did see the rest of the show.
Around Easter time, we went through Chunchon, a city in central Korea
that commanded several important road junctions and had served as a major
invasion route for both armies during the war. As a result, there was not a wall
standing over three feet tall. It was the worst devastation I had ever seen in any
one place; there was only one smokestack standing at the end of the city. In
reserve at the time, we set up on a hill on the north side of Chunchon. The
next morning, which was foggy and cloudy, "Bedcheck Charlie"1 flew over
our position at a low altitude with a loudspeaker squawking, "Surrender or
Die." How we would have loved to shoot that sucker down.
That same day we got mail, and a friend at home had sent me a package
that included a bar of Lux soap. It doesn't sound like much now, but when I
opened the package and the smell of Lux soap filled the air there were guys
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twenty or thirty feet away that came over just to get a good smell. I still use
Lux soap to this day.
That evening, a Korean man in a black suit, white shirt, black tie, and
black top hat came by the mess tent and asked to work in the kitchen for
food. With the help of an interpreter, we discovered he owned the factory
with the smokestack still standing. He had no idea where the members of his
family were. He was simply waiting for the war to end so he could get his
factory going again. We gave him some food and he went on his way.
Not long after this we went back on line and moved to the west side of
Korea, a little to the north of Seoul. By this time I had been promoted to
sergeant first class and was serving as a forward observer (FO).We ended up
on top of a large hill, which is where the FOs needed to be for observation
and fire direction. But while the hill was good for observation, it was a pain
for us in every other way. We had to walk to the bottom for everything, and
it was a long hike. When we took the time to clean up, shave, eat, and all of
that, we would be gone most of the day. Some of us, of course, always stayed
on the hill.
At various times during the spring of 1951, different sections of our
battalion were pulled out temporarily to put on firing demonstrations for
other units. My part was to demonstrate the use of 81mm mortars. Once we
even put on a demonstration for the marines, which became the subject of a
lot of speculation and rumors. We were told the marines had been taking
excessive casualties because they usually attacked straight into enemy fire,
but I don't know if that was the reason. The idea of a bunch of marines
standing around watching army guys show them how to fight a war with a
"fire and maneuver" demonstration seemed a little strange to me, as well as
a little humorous.They did it, but I'm not sure they enjoyed it very much.
In the early part of the summer, I flew to Osaka, Japan, for a few days of
R&R (rest and recuperation). While waiting for our plane at Kimpo Air-
port, I met a Greek lieutenant and we visited for some time. I wondered
why the Greeks would come all the way to Korea to fight, and he explained
it. He told me about the war the Greeks had been fighting against the Com-
munists in Greece, and how they saw Communism as a real threat. He also
told me horror stories about atrocities the Communists had committed in
Greece.There were about one thousand Greek soldiers fighting in Korea, all
volunteers, and they hated the Communists with passion. Unless ordered to
do so, they almost never took prisoners.
Once, just after we had arrived at the south bank of the Imjin River, we
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smelled an odor as we were eating our evening meal. We weren't quite sure
what it was, and when we started looking around we found GIs from the
Third Division, long dead, still in their foxholes. One had a hole straight
through the center of his skull and all his flesh was gone to his waist, indicat-
ing he died with his shirt off. It was all very sad. Naturally we called Graves
Registration, which removed the bodies.
We kept moving north, to the Kansas or Wyoming line (I forget which),
and established a patrol base about two miles in front of our battalion area.
The battalion was set up in a perimeter, with the mortars in the center.
During the day, company-sized patrols were sent into no-man's-land, and at
night they set up. It almost seemed like we were daring the Chinese to
attack. Actually, we were trying to prevent the Chinese from getting close
enough to our MLR to attack in force.
At this time, I was serving on the hill as a forward observer, with the
mortars nearby. Once, a tank on patrol in no-man's-land was unable to cross
a tank trap until a dozer came up and filled in the trap. To protect the dozer,
we did our best to silence the enemy mortars, which eventually quit firing.
Then, suddenly, an individual emerged from a house out in the middle of
no-man's-land. After our tank tried but failed to shoot him, he ran into a
cave along the edge of the river. They asked me to burn all the houses in the
area, which we did with a mixture of HE and WP shells. I think we burned
every house. We also spotted a huge enemy observation post (OP) down in
the valley. After some difficulty, we finally dropped enough rounds on the
OP to knock it out. In the process, however, we used more charges on the
rounds than we were supposed to. As a result, we broke two base plates and
weren't able to replace them until we got back to our MLR.
As the month of August approached, I began to think more and more
about going home. After all, that was the month I was scheduled to rotate.
We were on patrol base and getting ready to return to our MLR when I
received the news. While we were loading our mortars and ammo on a jeep
and trailer, our platoon leader came down the road to meet us. "Martin,
you're going home," he shouted; "you are on the rotation list this morning."
Why he came all this way to tell me I don't know, but it was a moment I will
never forget. I immediately started double timing down the road. Then a
surprise—a Chinese soldier emerged from the side of the road with his
hands in the air. It made no difference. I was going home, so I just waved him
on to my rear so the other guys could deal with him. At this point no
Chinese prisoner was going to hold me up.
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When I got back to the MLR, I immediately started gathering up my
things, and within hours I was on my way I rotated through Inchon Harbor
and then on to Japan. Strangely, the further away from the front line I went
the more I heard about problems and dangers, such as enemy infiltrators and
planes in the area. Even after we boarded the ship in Inchon, someone re-
marked about how the mines had never really been cleared from the harbor.
When we reached Sasebo in Japan, we had a good meal with steak and
ice cream, a shower, and fresh clothing. With all of this and no weapons to
lug around, we felt like new men. After a few days at Sasebo, we loaded on a
ship and set out for home.
After about two weeks on the ocean, we approached San Francisco Bay
early on a foggy morning. "Look up there," someone said. We looked up and
there it was, the Golden Gate Bridge just ahead of us.What a sight; this was an
experience I would never forget. Someone on the bridge waved at us, and
everyone on deck started waving back and yelling and laughing. It was truly a
happy moment. And that's the way we returned to the good old USA.
Chapter 9
Escaping the Trap
The U.S. Army assigned a significant role to artillery in Korea, especially after the
war stalemated and the period of trench warfare began. Since the UN forces had
control of the air and roads, equipping and supplying ammunition for the big guns
posed fewer problems than it did for the Communist forces. The expenditure of artil-
lery shells in Korea was enormous; UN Command alone averaged 1 million shells a
month. Private First Class Nelson, in the following story, was assigned to an 8-inch
Persuader howitzer unit, the U.S. Army's heaviest artillery in Korea. Unfortunately,
when the Chinese entered the war in the fall of 1950 his unit was cut off and badly
mauled. Most of the men in Nelson's unit managed to make it through the Chinese
roadblocks, but without most of their big guns.
Private First Class Herman G. Nelson
Headquarters Company, Seventeenth Field
Artillery Battalion, Eighth Army
WE LANDED AT Pusan on August 24,1950, at Dock 5. It was about 4:00
in the morning and still dark. Most of us were out on the deck waiting for
the ship to dock. On the docks, we saw our first Koreans; they were putting
in place the gang planks we would use to disembark. They had a yellowish
complexion, slanted eyes, and wore what we called knee pants.
From the ship's deck we could see part of the city of Pusan, and it
looked very crowded. The main part of the city was built along the flat lands
close to the docks, but a big part stretched up to the hills and mountains
nearby Most of the people wore white or light clothing, and all seemed to
be hurrying off to work or to their daily tasks. A large percentage of these
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people, we learned, were refugees from Seoul or other parts of Korea who
had fled from the North Koreans.
By midday the Seventeenth Field Artillery Battalion had all cleared the
ship and were aboard big army trucks that took us through Pusan to an
abandoned schoolyard. After we had made camp, we were all given K ra-
tions, which I think were left over from WWII. But I was so hungry I stuffed
them down anyway.
On September 3,1950, at 8:00 in the morning, we started for the front
lines. We were assigned to the Eighth Army, which attached us to different
frontline units as needed. At the time, the front was somewhere north of
Taegu, a city about eighty-five miles northwest of Pusan. It took us about
five hours in a truck convoy to reach our positions at the front, which were
in the same area as the First Cavalry Division.You could hear the sounds of
the guns firing long before we reached the front lines. When we got to our
positions, we set up our guns and fire direction center and were ready to
receive our fire missions.That same night, we fired a few rounds for the first
time in the war. And when we fired our guns, everybody knew it for miles
around. The Seventeenth Artillery Battalion had the big howitzers, called
the Persuader. They had a range of around twenty miles and fired a shell
eight inches in diameter and about thirty inches long. The concussion from
these big guns was so powerful that on occasions they would blow down
pup tents two hundred yards away.
In my case, however, I was not one of the guys who worked on the gun
crew that actually fired the weapon. Instead, I was part of a six-man fire
direction center (FDC) that coordinated the messages between the forward
observer (FO) and the gun crews. My specific job was to operate the radio
for the FDC.
At 8:00 the next morning, September 4, UN troops attacked the North
Koreans with everything we had. It sounded like every weapon in the Eighth
Army was firing at the same time, and the air force did its share of bombing
and strafing. Finally, we had the North Koreans on the run. We moved to-
ward Waegwan, just a little northwest of Taegu, where I saw dead enemy
soldiers for the first time. Beside a knocked-out North Korean tank we saw
three dead North Korean soldiers stretched out on the ground. And that was
just the beginning. Further up the road we saw ten GIs on the ground
covered with blankets.They had been killed by incoming mortar rounds just
two hours before we got there.
We moved into position between Taegu and Waegwan. The next day,
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September 5, we surveyed the terrain as we worked our way towardWaegwan
to determine if it was suitable for bringing up our big guns. On the way an
artillery round (or mortar) landed about fifty feet in front of us on the left
shoulder of the road. Although you wanted to turn around and go back, you
knew you couldn't, because it was our duty to stand together as soldiers and
fight for freedom.
On September 15, 1950, we arrived at Taejon, a city with a prewar
population of about one hundred thousand inhabitants, which had been
nearly flattened by the war. The Twenty-fourth Division had occupied Taejon
briefly back in July, before the North Koreans captured the city. During the
five or six days we stayed there, I saw things I will never forget. In an old
civilian jail in the heart of the city, we found thirty-two GIs buried under-
neath the floor. Two of the GIs were still alive, but nearly insane from the
experiences they had endured.The North Koreans had made the GIs put on
Korean clothing, hoping they would be mistaken for Koreans. Fortunately,
an American soldier discovered thirty-two dog tags in the area, and their
serial numbers matched exactly the numbers of the GIs in the jail. Later we
went to an old prison camp and found two older women kneeling down,
clawing the ground, and crying, probably on behalf of their sons and rela-
tives inside the camp. When I saw this, a sense of horror and sickness over-
came me as never before in my life. After all, I was only twenty years old and
had been in combat only about twelve days.
At the time, we were attached to what was left of the Twenty-fourth
Division, the division Major General Dean had commanded before his cap-
ture by the North Koreans. As the North Koreans retreated from Taejon,
they committed some of the worst murders and atrocities to take place dur-
ing the entire war. While occupying the city, they had not only imprisoned
American GIs, but also most of the Korean men and young boys. Then,
when leaving the city, they went by the prison camp and forced the South
Korean men to dig two trenches about two hundred feet long. After the
North Koreans had made the South Koreans line up in front of the trenches,
they gunned them down with Russian burp guns and just left them where
they fell.This is where we found the two women kneeling and crying. Some
of the bodies had been there for days and were very bloated. And that's not
the end of the story. After a GI thought he saw a body in an open well in the
prison camp, an American officer ordered the well searched. A total of twenty-
nine dead American soldiers were fished out of the well. There were also
about three hundred dead GIs discovered in the hills around Taejon, with
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their hands tied behind their backs, ruthlessly murdered by the North Ko-
rean Communist soldiers. If this is what they call a "police action," I would
sure hate to be in real war.
The next few days were quite strenuous for all of us—not just because
of the war, but also because of the sorrow and concern we felt for the help-
less GIs who were murdered in such an unjust and sickening manner. Just
when we thought we had found and buried all the people ruthlessly mur-
dered, we discovered more. With the help of a north wind, we noticed once
again the strong odor of death. We proceeded to follow the smell to a little
red brick church house just north of Taejon.As we approached the church-
yard, we noticed a dead woman lying on the ground, and then another one,
and still another. We also noticed a lot of empty ammunition shells on the
ground from the same Russian burp guns. Then we discovered the church
basement full of women slaughtered by the North Koreans. It was the same
sickening sight we had witnessed a few days earlier. Apparently, when the
women realized the North Koreans were preparing to pull out of Taejon,
they went to the church to pray for their husbands and loved ones who were
still in the prison camp. When the North Koreans slaughtered the men in
the prison camp and the GIs in the hills, the women undoubtedly heard the
shots, and the North Koreans decided they too must be murdered. I feel sure
that those who committed these cowardly acts will be rightfully punished in
eternity.
During the next several days we moved north and supported the recap-
ture of Seoul. By this time we had carried out the Inchon invasion, and
everywhere, UN troops were moving northward. My unit moved up to
Kaesong, on the 38th Parallel, and stayed there for about four weeks. This
turned out to be "resting time" for us.We stayed in an old mission, and since
it had a gymnasium we managed to play some basketball.There were lots of
Korean kids around, and after the cooks had fed us, they would line up these
hungry kids and feed them leftovers. Each kid had his own small tin can that
our cooks had given them, and they protected those cans as if they were
made of gold.
By this time, I had been assigned to Captain Skelly, our company com-
mander, as his jeep driver. One day Captain Skelly had me drive him along
the foothills of the mountains overlooking Kaesong. While we were out
driving, we tested our weapons and did a little sightseeing. Looking around,
I happened to notice a beautiful pheasant about 150 feet in front of us. We
stopped the jeep, and I picked the pheasant off with my carbine. By the time
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I reached the bird, however, I heard Koreans talking and getting closer. I
soon realized I had shot their pheasant, a "tame" pheasant, not a wild one. I
ran back to the jeep with my bird in hand and told the captain we had to get
out in a hurry, which we did.
That night I cooked the pheasant in my mess tin, while about six other
GIs watched and drooled. When done, I took one of the best pieces for
myself and let the other guys divide the rest. It was absolutely delicious.
At the end of October we finally got orders to move out of Kaesong. So
we headed north, into North Korea, along with the rest of the American
army Autumn weather had already arrived, and the temperature had dropped
to the low forties by the time we left Kaesong. We moved up toward
Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, where we stopped for one night.
The next day we moved on to the north, and by this time the temperature
had dropped to around zero. We were headed for the Yalu River, the border
between Korea and China.
One evening, after we had settled down for the night, a Private Pope
came by and asked me to accompany him to the cab of his truck. There he
showed me a stack of letters, and he asked me to read them to him because
he had never learned to read or write. I agreed and found myself reading
letters from his wife back home, most of them quite personal. I soon learned
he also wanted me to write his wife, which I did. So I found myself with an
extra duty, although one I eventually began to enjoy. Even though I was
single, by the time I returned to the United States, about nine months later,
I had acquired a lot of experience writing letters to "the wife."
At last the UN forces were advancing north, and we were pretty opti-
mistic the war would soon be over. General MacArthur had said we would
all be home by Christmas. Little did we know that thousands of Chinese
soldiers had already crossed the Yalu River. They had penetrated deep into
North Korea and were hiding in the hills, well behind advancing American
units, just waiting for orders to attack. Sadly, the war was just beginning.
On Thanksgiving Day, 1950, we moved to a new location near Kunu-ri,
well north of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. We ate our Thanks-
giving dinner there with an armored tank company, and it was really good.
We had a turkey dinner and all the stuff that goes with it.
At about 10:00 that same Thanksgiving night, all hell broke loose as the
Chinese army attacked in force. We found ourselves firing our eight-inch
howitzers into the evergreen trees at point-blank range. The low side of the
mountains in front of our position was blazing like a forest fire. All night
70 Voices from the Korean War
long everybody fired their weapons, big guns and little guns.The next morning
our air force came in at daybreak, strafing and dropping napalm bombs on
the enemy positions. Sometimes they dropped their stuff really close to the
Second Division positions, the division we were attached to at the time.
At 10:00 the following morning, about ninety men in the Ninth Infan-
try Regiment came by and ate breakfast with us. They informed us that
there was a small roadblock behind us and that they were going to knock it
out so we and the rest of the Second Division could bring out all of our
heavy equipment. We proceeded to move out, but just before we reached
the roadblock that afternoon we learned that all ninety of those men had
been killed or wounded. Prior to the Chinese attack, the Ninth Infantry
Regiment had been on our left, the Thirty-eighth Infantry Regiment on our
right, and a ROK unit held the center. Between fifteen and twenty thousand
Chinese soldiers attacked the ROK unit and ran right through it. Then they
set up positions in the rice paddies and mountains behind us. Our positions
were so infiltrated by the Chinese that when we drew near the roadblock
that day we passed a 105mm howitzer company that was firing in three
different directions. We pulled up to the entrance of the roadblock about
5:00 P.M. and were stopped by a Chinese machine gun firing down on the
road from the mountains, knocking out anything that tried to get through.
Finally, someone rolled a half-track down the road with its four .50-caliber
machine guns mounted on top. When that baby opened up on the Chinese
machine gun, it looked like a dust storm had hit the side of the mountain.
After the half-track ceased firing they motioned for a vehicle to move on
through. When the vehicle reached the other side, however, more Chinese
machine guns opened up, plus some mortars. Once again the half-track fired
its quad-.50s and another vehicle moved onto the road, but the Chinese
machine guns, seemingly invulnerable to the half-track, kept right on firing.
Finally, they backed the half-track out and replaced it with a tank equipped
with two twin 20mm gun turrets. The tank promptly silenced the Chinese
machine guns, and our vehicles were finally able to move on down the road.
The road was clear, but for some reason the jeep in front of me re-
mained in place. Major Ross, in the three-quarter-ton truck I was driving,
told me to check out the situation. I walked up to the jeep driver, tapped
him on the shoulder, and told him he needed to move on out.Then a shock.
I discovered he was dead. He had his helmet buckled, his winter parka but-
toned up, a clean shave, and his hands locked around the steering wheel.
Strangely, I could find no trace of where he had been shot. I believe he may
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Firing quad-.50s from the platform of a half-track. (Courtesy of Forty-fifth Infantry
Division Museum)
have had a weak heart and, under the stress, died from a heart attack. So
many times, when I reflect on my experiences in the war, I see that young
soldier in the jeep with his hands locked on the steering wheel.
We went around the jeep and through the roadblock, but not without
receiving plenty of incoming fire. I promised the Lord that night that if He
would get me through that roadblock and home safely I would be his ser-
vant for life. About 4:00 A.M. we finally reached an established line where we
were able to stop and rest for about three hours. During this rest, the Lord
assured me I would make it home okay, and although I went through more
campaigns, I never feared death again.
During our retreat to the south, we spent one night in an old schoolyard.
Right in the center of the yard we noticed some freshly dug up earth. We
carefully removed the loose dirt with our hands and discovered a round
piece of metal about the size of a land mine. Very slowly, I lifted up on the
metal with a knife, which we removed with surprising ease. Underneath we
Lieutenant Leslie Davis, Eleventh Engineer Combat Battalion, extend-
ing an arm to a Korean orphan boy. The GIs have just presented the
boy with some warm clothes and a gift, Kumhwa, 1953. (Courtesy of
Leslie Davis)
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found a fifty-gallon barrel of rice buried. We just put the metal top back on
the barrel and left everything the way we found it. While we were busy
checking for a land mine, about a half dozen young kids had gathered nearby
and were watching us with great interest. That evening I went over to see
what the kids were doing. To my surprise, the oldest little girl, who must
have been about eight, had seated all the other kids around a table. She had
retrieved some of the rice and prepared a meal for all of the kids. It was a
scene that nearly broke my heart, and I have never forgotten it. These kids
were probably all orphans, the tragic losers in war, as kids always are. I have
often wondered what happened to them.
After this, we retreated all the way back to Pusan to reequip our battal-
ion. This was necessary because during the retreat we had lost a number of
our guns and part of our other equipment. By this time General Ridgway
had taken over command of the Eighth Army, and by the end of January
1951, UN troops were again marching north. We provided support for the
recapture of Seoul, which fell to UN troops in March for the second time.
While we were camped in the Seoul area, I learned that we were sched-
uled to support a drive to the north that included the Seventh Division.This
was good news for me, because my brother, Captain Teddy Nelson, com-
manded a company of 105mm howitzers in the Seventh Division. When
our two units came together, I happened to be in a jeep on a mission to our
command mission center. I was parked on the road waiting for the convoy
so I could help guide it to their camping area when I noticed an artillery
unit from the Seventh Division. I got out of my jeep and walked up to the
soldier who was directing the unit to its campsite. Guess what? About ten
feet from this soldier I saw my brother, Teddy. So I decided to play a little
game with him. I went up and asked him for a cigarette. Without looking at
me he took out a pack and told me to take one.Then I said, "Soldier, do you
have a light?" Only then did he turn around to see who was bugging him. It
was a happy occasion, and we saw each other on and off for about a week.
After this, our units went their separate ways, and we didn't get together
again until after the war.
About this same time we were dispatched to help the Twenty-third In-
fantry Regiment of the Second Division, which had been cut off at a place
east of Seoul called Chipyong-ni. After helping to relieve the Twenty-third,
we remained in the area for about a week. During this time, I ran into an old
school buddy of mine from Southward, Oklahoma, Bobby Joe Kopf, who
was in the Forty-fifth Division. One day he came over to my unit, and while
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we were sitting around talking we happened to notice a large number of
empty cartridges down the side of the mountain, obviously left over from
previous fighting. We walked further down the mountain and came across
about seven dead Chinese soldiers, their bodies arranged in a circle around a
barrel. It looked like one of our units had dropped a mortar round right in
the middle of the barrel. Most of them were still clutching pencil and paper,
as if they were writing letters. It was one of the strangest things I ever wit-
nessed in Korea, and I still remember it vividly.
After the lines stabilized, we moved back into Seoul. In June, I went on
two weeks of R&R to Tokyo. We went through Sasebo in southern Japan,
and from there were bused to the Meiji Hotel in downtown Tokyo. While
riding through Tokyo on the bus our eyes fell on the many young Japanese
girls wearing split dresses. They really looked nice, and the guys on the bus
did not pass by these young beauties without comment. The first morning
after arriving I ate breakfast at the hotel, and it tasted so good I ate twice.We
had everything in that hotel—a movie theater, a restaurant, a bowling alley,
and dance clubs.The room only cost seventy-five cents a day.While staying
there, I met some very nice Japanese families and young girls. It was almost
like coming home.The hard thing was going back to Korea after all the fun
and easy living.
I went back, but only for about a month.Toward the end of July 1951,1
rotated back to the States, having served one year in Korea. I had seen Korea
all the way from Pusan in the south to near theYalu River in the north. I
have both good and bad memories of my experiences in Korea, but I sure
wouldn't want to go through all of that again.
Privates First Class Herman Nelson (right) and Bobby Joe Kopf (left),
Seventeenth Field Artillery Battalion, on a guard post near Chipyong-
ni, early 1951. (Courtesy of Herman Nelson)
Chapter 10
A North Korean Officer's Story
When North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, more than eighty
thousand soldiers of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) crossed the 38th
Parallel and engaged the ROKArmy and the United Nations forces (UNF). Since
North Korea is still one of the few closed Communist states in the world today, the
North Korean soldiers' experience in the Korean War has been largely inaccessible to
the West. Colonel Lee, a Korean who lived in China, fought in a Korean unit but as
a part of the Chinese Communist Army. He fought first against the Japanese, then in
the Chinese Civil War, and finally in the Korean War when his unit was placed under
the command of the NKPA. Colonel Lee offers interesting insights about life in the
NKPA during the early part of the war.
Colonel Lee Jong Kan
Thirty-third Regiment, Twenty-sixth Division,
North Korean People's Army
IN 1928, I was born into a Korean farmer's family in Hailin County,
Heilongjiang Province, Northeast China. Let me tell you a little bit about
the Korean immigrants to China. There are about 2 million Korean people
living in China today as one of the fifty-six Chinese minorities. Most of the
Korean Chinese live in Northeast China, including Heilongjiang, Liaoning,
and Jilin Provinces. Most of them work on their farms in the countryside.
We are Chinese citizens, but we speak Korean, celebrate our holidays, and
keep our traditions, just like the Mexican immigrants living in America.
As the first generation of an immigrant family, my parents left North
Korea and moved into Northeast China during Japan's occupation of Korea
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(1895-1945). China and Korea share a land border longer than seven hun-
dred miles. After the Chinese-Japanese War started in 1937, more Korean
people crossed the Chinese-Korean borders, including many Korean Com-
munist Party members and their guerrilla forces.They continued their resis-
tance movement in China against Japan and received strong support from
the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT) Government, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), and the Chinese people.
My parents sent me to a Korean-Chinese elementary school and then to
middle school during World War II. After my graduation from the middle
school in Hailin in 1944,1 couldn't find a job in the town. I had to move
back to my parents' farm and help them with their farming for eight months.
In the spring of 1945, a Chinese Communist Army recruiting team visited
our village. They promised city employment for each Korean soldier at his
retirement from the service. "We are finishing the Anti-Japanese War very
soon," I remember one of the CCP representatives said in Korean at our
village meeting. "We are going to take over many cities from the Japanese.
We need you to win the war and run our cities!"
It seemed a good opportunity for me. To live in a city and use the
knowledge I learned in my school was all I wanted. As a middle school
graduate, I was considered a "degree-holder," or as they say in Chinese, "xiao
zhishifenzi" a "junior intellectual ."This was an important improvement in
social status, which meant a lot to me and to my family. I am the first middle
school graduate in my family. Listen to this, less than 20 percent of the
Chinese people had a middle school diploma at that time. The war could
help me move out of the countryside and land a job in the city. I was so
excited after the meeting, I was ready to sign up.
But my parents said no. They had five boys. Three of them had already
joined the CCP armed forces, later called the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
My parents still hadn't heard from them since they left home. My parents
were so happy to see me coming back home to their farm. "You are only
seventeen," my mother yelled at me with tears in her eyes. "Don't leave.You
don't even know how to take care of yourself."
Two days later, however, everything changed. The recruiting officers told
us that Japan was preparing a final battle against an imminent Soviet invasion
of Northeast China in the summer of 1945. Our hometown would soon
become a major battleground and could suffer very heavy civilian casualties.
Moreover, the Japanese Imperial Army had a zero-tolerance policy against
any family whose members served in any anti-Japanese force. Our entire
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family would be executed if they found out my older brothers served in the
Communist forces. It was not safe for us to stay at home. My parents couldn't
leave, but I could. The Chinese Communist Army seemed a safer place for
me to survive the war.
My parents finally let me go when they learned that a large number of
adult males in this Korean village had signed up, including my uncles and
cousins.They felt even better when I told them that the Chinese Commu-
nist Army would keep us together in the same unit by organizing Korean
companies, Korean battalions, and Korean regiments.
After two weeks of training in a Communist infantry training camp in
Heilongjiang, I was assigned to the Forty-sixth Korean Regiment of the
Sixteenth Division. My middle school education in my record surely caught
the eyes of the regimental officers, who appointed me an assistant political
instructor in the Seventh Company. Having adopted the Soviet Red Army
system, the CCP established a political instructional system in its army. We
had a political instructor and an assistant instructor for each company, a
political commissar and a deputy commissar for each battalion, and a com-
missar and a political department in each regiment, division, and army. This
chain of political control parallels the chain of command.
As an assistant political instructor, my job was to receive political instruc-
tions, educational booklets, and propaganda materials from our battalion po-
litical commissar's office.Then I visited the four platoons in our company, plus
each of the eight squads, and read these political propaganda materials to our
soldiers. Most of our 120 soldiers couldn't read. I had to talk to some soldiers
individually if they did not quite understand the concept or terms like "com-
munism," "capitalism," "class struggle," or "international imperialists."
I did not quite understand the ideas in Marxism, Leninism, and Mao
Zedong's thoughts myself. Sometimes I was confused.To keep the job, I had
to keep reading in order to be able to explain them to the soldiers who had
a lot of questions.They seemed more interested in learning how to read and
write the Chinese characters than in understanding Communist principles.
As poor peasants' sons, most of them never had a chance to go to school.The
Communist army became a huge primary educational institute for the Chi-
nese masses.The word"gongchan zhuyi" (communism) was the first Chinese
character they learned to read and write. If I had a teaching problem, I
always talked to the company political instructor. If I found a morale prob-
lem among the soldiers, I needed to report to the captain of our company.
We aimed to promote revolutionary spirits and high morale in our com-
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pany through political propaganda, mental and psychological education, and
individual consultation. We believed that we could defeat any enemy with
superior weapons and technology and win any war by virtue of not only our
superior numbers, but also our soldiers' superior fighting spirit.
The army recruiting officers who visited my village were right about
WWII.The Pacific war suddenly ended on August 15,1945. As a CCP mem-
ber and a WWII vet, I thought I could retire from the army and get a city job.
I was wrong.The Chinese Civil War between the CCP and KMT broke
out in 1946. Instead of demobilizing, the army fought another nationwide
war, which continued until 1949. Our Korean regiment was enlarged into
the 118th Korean Division, Fortieth Army, Fourth Field Army of the PLA.
Our army fought the KMT troops all the way, about three thousand miles,
from North China to the southern end of China, Hainan Island.
On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong, CCP Chairman, announced the
founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing, following the
PLA forces' conquest of the mainland and the KMT's withdrawal to Taiwan
Island. Finally, the Chinese Civil War was over. By the end of the year, I was
promoted to battalion political commissar. I was looking forward to a more
comfortable retirement and a better job in Guangzhou, the largest industrial
and commercial city in South China, just like Los Angeles in America.
I was wrong again.When we were preparing a massive PLA demobiliza-
tion in February 1950, we heard some rumors about the conflicts between
North Korea and South Korea. In the North, the Korean Workers' Party, or
the Korean Communist Party, had established a Communist state, the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In the South, the Korean Na-
tionalists founded the Republic of Korea. Kim II Sung, North Korea's
Communist leader, wanted his fellow Communist Korean-Chinese soldiers
back home to complete the Korean revolution. Kim intended to defeat South
Korea's Nationalist army and extend his Communist regime over the entire
Korean peninsula. It seems that the Chinese Communists' victory over the
Chinese Nationalists encouraged Kim to unify his country under the Com-
munist government by force.
In April, our Korean division received an order to leave Guangzhou and
move all the way from the south to Northeast China. After a long railway
trip, about twenty-five hundred miles, we were back home in Heilongjiang
Province and prepared for a "return" to North Korea. I didn't know why
they called it "return," since I had never been in Korea. Neither had most of
the Korean soldiers in my battalion.
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My parents were so glad to see me when I visited them in May 1950.
They were even happier to know I was going to Korea to fight my third war.
Well, they believed the Korean War was not supposed to be a bloody one
among the Korean people themselves. My new journey seemed to ease their
homesickness. It had been more than twenty-four years since they left Ko-
rea. They missed their hometown and my grandparents so much.They even
hoped I would find a Korean girl there and bring her home to get married.
(To tell you the truth, they didn't want to have a Chinese daughter-in-law in
the family.)
In June 1950, the Korean War broke out.The battlefield situation seemed
in favor of the North Koreans until mid-July, when their southward offensives
stopped and they faced a strong defense by the ROK Army and the Ameri-
can troops at Pusan.
On August 25,1950, our division entered North Korea.There were two
Korean divisions in the Chinese army, about fourteen thousand soldiers of
Korean origin, both of which were transferred into the North Korean People's
Army (NKPA).We kept our weapons and equipment, and the same forma-
tion, unit, and commanding officers when we were incorporated into the
Thirty-third Regiment of the NKPA's Twenty-sixth Division. Like the So-
viet military system and the PLA, the NKPA had a dual system with a chain
of command and a chain of political control.
The NKPA, however, was a more Russianized army than the PLA. First
of all, they had a Soviet officer ranking system that the Chinese did not have
until 1955. Although I still served as a battalion political commissar, I was
now ranked as a Korean army colonel. Second, their weapons and equip-
ment were better than ours. Before the Red Army withdrew from North
Korea, the Soviets re-armed the NKPA with Russian-made tanks, heavy
artillery pieces, and automatic rifles, which we did not have. Our Korean
comrades were so happy to see us entering the Korean War and hoped we
could win the final offensive battle at Pusan.
In late August, our battalion participated in the NKPA's fourth offensive
campaign. We broke the enemy defensive line and pushed ROK and UN
troops into a small area east of the Naktong River in South Korea. By the
end of the month, the NKPA had liberated 90 percent of the country and
had control of 92 percent of the population.
On August 31, Kim launched his last offensive campaign against the
enemy stronghold at Pusan. At that point, even though our troops' morale
was high, the NKPA had suffered fifty-eight thousand casualties in its four
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southward offensive campaigns. It had also lost 120 of the 150 Russian-
made tanks and one-third of its artillery pieces in the past two months. Most
important, our transportation line had been extended more than two hun-
dred miles. Our supply became more and more difficult. Our defense at the
rear, if any, became weaker and weaker, which did not seem to worry Kim at
all. The faster we could win the last battle, the less opportunity the enemy
had for a counterattack. However, we couldn't break the enemy defense at
the Pusan perimeter during our offensive campaign.
After our failure at the Pusan perimeter, the NKPA could not launch
another major offensive campaign. On September 10, we went on the
defensive when the ROK and UNF launched their first major counterof-
fensive. Our situation became especially serious after MacArthur landed
twenty thousand U.S. troops at Inchon on September 15. We pulled out
from the south and rushed back to the middle of the peninsula to defend
Seoul, the capital city of the ROK, which had been occupied by the NKPA
since June 28.
The defense of Seoul on September 21-28 was our last major battle. I
told my battalion that the NKPA had concentrated more than twenty thou-
sand troops at Seoul, and that Comrade Kim was in the city with us.We had
to stop the enemy offensive right here. Our battalion took up defensive
positions in a tractor factory on the south side of the city. Our job was to
stop any retreat from our front line and then reorganize a second defense.
I also remember that our Thirty-third Regiment Commissar recom-
mended to other battalions my approach to a civilian mobilization. I held a
meeting with about two hundred workers remaining in the factory and asked
them:"Who are the Communist Party members?""We are," they shouted, and
about three dozen workers stood up. I asked them to join our defense. We
showed the workers how to shoot and armed them with our extra rifles.
The NKPA mobilized the entire population in the city, even arming
and training the women and children. NKPA-occupied Seoul was ready for
its final battle.
On September 21, MacArthur launched an all-out attack against Seoul.
Our position was bombed and shelled heavily by superior UN air and artil-
lery firepower. Instead of fighting, many factory workers dropped their weap-
ons and left. I didn't stop them. Later that day, some NKPA soldiers began to
withdraw from our first defense line, passing us and moving northward. I
didn't stop them either. Most of them were wounded. Next evening, UN
troops broke our first defense line.
82 Voices from the Korean War
About 4:00 A.M. on September 23, the enemy began to shell our posi-
tion again. It was so heavy, I realized that the enemy troops were going to
attack our second defense line soon. At 4:30, the enemy charged our posi-
tion with about three hundred infantry troops led by ten light tanks. Our
battalion commander ordered anti-tank teams to go out there one after
another. But they couldn't stop the tanks. Some of the tanks ran over our
trenches.We had to stop shooting and hide ourselves from tank firing power.
We waited until the enemy troops came close and then opened fire. Some of
my soldiers had a hand-to-hand fight. A few factory workers who stayed
with us lit up several gasoline barrels and rolled these fireballs toward the
tanks, finally stopping the tanks.
After we defeated the enemy's second attack around 9:00 A.M., our com-
mander called the Thirty-third Regiment Headquarters for reinforcement
and supplies. We had lost half of our men. Many wounded needed medical
care.We had almost run out of ammunition. But the Thirty-third Headquar-
ters did not send anything. They had the same situation, having asked the
Twenty-sixth Division Headquarters for reinforcement and supplies. They
never came.
We managed to hold our position until 4:00 P.M., when we were ordered
to withdraw after dark and "carry on our defense in the city" We left the
factory about 9:00 in the evening, leaving many comrades' bodies behind.
Our fight in the streets of Seoul, which continued for three more days,
was no longer an organized, effective defense. Kim and the NKPA Com-
mand had fled to the North, and our divisional and regimental communica-
tions had collapsed. We were pretty much on our own. Our men just tried to
find a way to get out of there.The UN troops were well trained for a house-
to-house battle. And the ROK troops were familiar with their capital city
and its population. I was so surprised to see the same residents who warmly
welcomed us a week before now welcome the ROK troops back into the
city with cooked food and the ROK national flags.
During the night of September 27, the battalion commander, two of his
staff, six soldiers, and I broke through the enemy lines and headed north,
through the woods. We had no radio, no ammunition, and no food.
Fortunately, we ran into the NKPA Twenty-seventh Regiment around
the Kaesong area two days later. By that time, we also heard Kim's new
policy, issued on September 27 to all the North Korean troops, party mem-
bers, and people. Our new task was to slow down the enemy offensive, save
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North Korean soldiers defend their position, October 1950. (Courtesy of the Center
for Archives and Information, Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences)
the main part of the NKPA, organize a strategic withdrawal, and build up a
new reserve for a future counteroffensive.
The NKPA defense was put to rout all along the line by the end of
September. We retreated north all the way to Pyongyang, the capital city of
North Korea. After a one-week defense, the UNF took over Pyongyang on
October 19.There was not much room left in North Korea for our further
withdrawal.
Some of our soldiers thought we might pull out and go back to China.
Kim, however, wouldn't let us go. After Pyongyang fell, we were ordered to
break up the battalion into several guerrilla groups. According to the new
order, we would fight on our own behind the lines by harassing the enemy
troops, attacking their communication and transportation, and recruiting for
the NKPA.
As a group leader, I led fifty men to the eastern coast and established a
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small base in a mountain.We hit and ran at night and rested in the daytime.
Without any supplies and local connections, we had to hunt small animals to
feed ourselves and capture enemy ammunition and medical supplies for our
needs. That winter (1950—1951) in Korea was extremely cold. We didn't
even have winter clothes, blankets, or tents. Some of our comrades survived
the battles but did not make it through the long, cold winter.
Finally, we were able to move off of the mountain in April 1951, when
the Chinese armies launched their fourth offensive campaign against the
UN forces along the eastern coast. We were reorganized back into NKPA
regulars in May 1951.
But I could no longer keep up with my unit in the night because of my
poor sight. I got night blindness due to the lack of nutrition and medicine
during our mountainous guerrilla warfare. I was sent back to China for
treatment in the summer of 1951.
After a few weeks in a PLA hospital, I was retired from the NKPA first,
and then from the PLA as a disabled war veteran. An officer asked me in his
office where I wanted to retire to, China or North Korea? "Here, China, of
course," I told him without even thinking about it. China is my homeland,
and the war was still going on in Korea. I was so tired after six years' service
through three major wars in East Asia: the Pacific war, the Chinese Civil War,
and the Korean War.
Eventually, I got a city job as the principal of the Twenty-fourth High
School in Harbin, the provincial capital city in Heilongjiang Province. I
moved my parents into the city with me.Two years later, at the age of twenty-
five, I married a high school math teacher. Like me, she is Korean-Chinese.
Chapter 11
China's Crouching Dragon
The first encounter between Chinese soldiers and an American regiment in the Ko-
rean War was accidental. In fact, the Chinese armies made every effort to avoid U.S.
troops during their early intervention. On the night of November I, 1950, the Chi-
nese Thirty-ninth Army attacked Unsan, believing the town was held by the ROK
First Division. Only after sighting much taller and heavier soldiers did the Chinese
realize that it had engaged the Americans (the Eighth Regiment of the First Cavalry
Division, which was taking over the defense of Unsan from the ROK Fifteenth
Regiment). As a captain, Zhou Baoshan led his Fourth Company and engaged the
Eighth Cavalry Regiment near Unsan. Badly wounded in action, Captain Zhou
suffered permanent injury and was forced to transfer to an engineering unit, where he
lacked the necessary education for advancement in rank. Because of his failure to win
promotion, during the Chinese Cultural Revolution some of his coworkers labeled
him a <(deserter of the Korean War."
Captain Zhou Baoshan
Fourth Company, Second Battalion, 347th Regiment, 116th Division,
Thirty-ninth Army, Chinese People's Volunteer Force
IN 1922,1 was born into a peasant family in Leting County, Hebei Province.
During the Chinese CivilWar (1946-1949), I joined the Chinese Liberation
Army (PLA), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1948. At twenty-
eight I became a captain in the 347th Regiment of the PLA Thirty-ninth
Army. In late July 1950, our army moved one thousand miles from Henan
Province in Central China to Liaoning Province in Northeast China.
We were told that American troops had invaded Korea. Some soldiers
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asked me during our long, northward railroad journey if we were going to
Korea to fight Americans. I had the same question myself and didn't have a
clue at the time. As a civil war veteran, I just followed my orders. Many
soldiers in my company had the same attitude; they would fight as ordered,
and it did not matter where or when the fight took place.
When our train approached Hebei, a soldier made a joke to me by
saying: "Hey, Captain Zhou, we are getting close to your hometown. Don't
you want to get off the train to see your wife?" "Don't worry," I told him. "I
won't leave my company. I will be very happy just to see my village from the
train."
It was the middle of the night when our train passed through Hebei, and
so dark outside that I couldn't see anything. I couldn't sleep for thinking of
my wife and our two young daughters. I didn't know at the time that it
would be more than four years before I could see them again.
We arrived in Liaoyang, Liaoning Province, in early August, and re-
ceived an order to prepare for a possible war with America.Thereafter, some
of our soldiers (about 20 percent) became worried.
Some of them were the "liberated soldiers." They had served in the
Kuomintang army and fought against the Communist army during the civil
war. In the final battles of that war, these KMT soldiers either surrendered or
were captured by the Communist forces. The PLA wasted little time in
incorporating these soldiers into their own forces. During the Communist
offensive campaign against Beijing (Peking) in late 1948, the PLA took in
about 200,000 of these Nationalist troops. Between February and April 1949,
more than 150,000 Nationalist troops were incorporated into the PLA units
in Beijing. These "liberated soldiers" knew very little about the PLA or
Communism. The others were usually young "volunteers" from the newly
liberated regions. They were reluctant to leave their peacetime life behind
and wondered why they had to fight over a foreign country.
To deal with these unsettled minds, our army's political department
launched a timely campaign of ideological education in early September,
emphasizing patriotism, internationalism, and revolutionary heroism. Dur-
ing the political education campaign, first of all, I told the men some histori-
cal facts about American invasions of China in the past and its recent
occupation of Taiwan. We were the victims of American imperialism. I ar-
gued that if we didn't stop Americans in Korea now, we would have to fight
them later in China. To assist Korea was the same as defending our home-
land. Then I tried to explore the nature of the American imperialist "paper
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tiger" and its strategic weaknesses. Even though the U.S. military had mod-
ern weapons, the American troops were fighting an unjust war and suffering
from low morale. They were short of manpower, and their support had to
come from a great distance. Our army was dedicated to a just cause. We had
the brilliant leadership of the CCP and Chairman Mao, and the full support
of our people, the Korean people, and peace-loving peoples all over the
world. Our weapons were not as advanced as those of the Americans, but we
enjoyed a numerical advantage.
In September, the new commander of the Thirty-ninth Army's 116th
Division, General Wang Yang, organized an intensive training program with
two phases. (Our old commander, General Wu Guozhang, was then serving
as a Chinese military advisor in the Vietnamese Communist forces, who
were fighting the French forces in the First Indochina War.) Completed by
mid-September, GeneralWang s first phase focused on the exercises of small-
group combat tactics, including rifle, anti-tank, demolitions, and anti-aircraft
training. His second phase was new to us, stressing large-group cooperation
tactics. I remember our battalion participated in one of his group attack
exercises on a very small hill with two other battalions.We felt very crowded
when hundreds of soldiers charged the same point at once.Wang also brought
in WWII veterans who had once fought alongside the American troops in
Burma (now called Myanmar). They gave us talks about American soldiers,
their training, and their characteristics.
On October 15, our army became part of the Chinese Peoples Volun-
teers Force (CPVF).This reorganization resulted from the order issued by
the CCP Central Military Commission and Chairman Mao on October 8.
In fact, the CPVF troops were exactly the same PLA troops. We were the
Chinese troops assigned to the Korean War. We still wore the same PLA
uniforms, but no Chinese badges, no Red Star cap insignia, no PLA rankings,
and no Chinese names.
After the reorganization into the CPVF, a rocket artillery battalion and
an anti-tank battalion were added to our Thirty-ninth Army. Our 116th
Division established a headquarters security battalion, an anti-aircraft artil-
lery battalion, and a medical battalion. Our 347th Regiment also organized
its own medical company.
After two months of preparations, our regiment crossed the Yalu River,
the boundary river separating Northeast China and North Korea, during
the evening of October 21. We crossed the Yalu at Andong. Under its light-
control and curfew, the city was both quiet and dark when our trucks rolled
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through its streets. I saw the local troops guarding each intersection and
patrol vehicles everywhere. I could feel the war.
While still on the Chinese side of theYalu Bridge, our troops got off the
trucks and marched across the bridge. A great many artillery vehicles, trucks,
horses, and soldiers crossed the bridge that night.To keep China's intervention
undetected, we could only cross the bridge at night. Though the traffic was
unbelievably heavy, nobody yelled, complained, or even talked. All the faces
looked so serious because they knew they were entering the Korean War.
When we marched to the middle point of the bridge, we saw a sign
both in Chinese and Korean,"China-North Korea," which divided the two
countries. One of the soldiers asked me in a very low voice, "Captain, what
time is it?""Eight-thirty," I told him, as I continued to count my steps on the
bridge. "Fifteen hundred steps," I told myself when I put my foot on the soil
of North Korea.
The first Koreans I saw were the security troops of the NKPA, stationed
on the Korean side of theYalu Bridge. They lined up and cheered in their
broken Chinese: "Welcome the Chinese People's Volunteer Forces coming
to Korea to fight!" I was impressed by their Soviet-made automatic rifles and
brand-new heavy machine guns. We had a mix of single-shot Japanese rifles
from WWII and old American rifles captured from the Kuomintang army in
the Chinese Civil War.
Our regiment kept marching twenty-five miles southeast into Korea
through the first night and stopped at dawn. For several days, we moved full
speed in the same pattern, marching at night and resting during the day.
I was surprised when I saw my soldiers became so excited after we
entered Korea. It was the first time for all of us to enter a foreign country.
Everything seemed different, but interesting.We talked to the Korean people
when possible, and we tried to read the Korean signs, even though we didn't
understand them at all.
We marched southeast toward the Kusong area. On October 25, our
regiment passed Kusong.Then we moved into the Kumchon area before the
dawn of the 26th. The same day, we were told that the Fortieth Army had
engaged the ROK Sixth Division. It was the first battle for the CPVF after it
entered the Korean War.
We kept moving fast in the same direction toward Unsan. Having reached
the area north of Unsan on the 28th, we were ordered to get ready to engage
the frontline ROK units.
The battalion commander told us that the ROK First Division was gar-
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risoned at Unsan, about twenty miles from our positions. The Thirty-ninth
Army planned to encircle Unsan and establish roadblocks in case the ROK
First Division tried to withdraw.The army would employ its 115th Division
to attack Unsan from the southwest, its 116th Division from the north, and
its 117th Division from the east. We were told not to engage the American
or British units during this offensive campaign.We should avoid the superior
firepower, attack only weak enemy units and gain some successful experi-
ence in our first battle.
During the night of October 30, we moved into our position near Hill
626.6, where my company was supposed to launch an attack at 1930 hours the
next evening. Next morning I could see the ROK soldiers moving in and out
of their bunkers, and I could hear them yelling to each other on the hill.
Through the whole day of the 31st, sitting in the trench with cover at
the bottom of the hill, I had a mixed feeling of excitement and nervousness.
As a war veteran, I was excited to have a chance to fight again. As a captain,
however, it was my first time to command a company and fight enemy
soldiers who didn't speak Chinese. I practiced a few Korean words we had
just learned, such as "jungji" (don't move) and "hanbok animyun juknundal"
(Surrender or die!). I may need to use these words when we launch our
attack on the ROK troops that evening, I thought.
That afternoon, one of our outpost watchers reported to me, "Captain,
the enemy is moving out!" I looked out and saw a couple dozen ROK
soldiers packing their stuff, walking out of their bunkers, and disappearing
toward the other side of the hill. Without knowing that they were going to
be replaced by the Americans, I reported the ROK troops' withdrawal im-
mediately to the Second Battalion Headquarters and suggested that we launch
an attack as soon as possible. Dong Wencai, our battalion commander, called
me back and rescheduled the attack for 5:00 P.M.
At 4:50 P.M., our supporting artillery began shelling, and Hill 626.6 was
soon covered with heavy smoke. At 5:00, four CPVF companies, about five
hundred Chinese soldiers, charged the hill together. We met only light resis-
tance. Commander Dong ordered us to continue our charge on the next
enemy position at Hill 96.9. We captured three hills in less than two hours
and moved close to Unsan. The ROK soldiers seemed to have just disap-
peared, and we only had a few casualties. I didn't expect that the first offen-
sive battle would be such an easy job.
We learned later that after the ROK troops pulled out from their front-
line positions, the American troops who replaced them had neither enough
The 347th Regiment, 116th Division, CPVF Thirty-ninth Army,
charges a UNF position at Unsan, November 1950. (Courtesy of the
Center for Archives and Information, Heilongjiang Provincial
Academy of Social Sciences)
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men nor enough time to fill in all the ROK defensive positions. The U.S.
Eighth Cavalry Regiment, which had replaced the ROK First Division,
deployed its troops only at key positions outside Unsan.
We did not know the situation that night.When we reached a hill north
of Ryongpo-dong, a small village outside Unsan, we met a very strong de-
fense. Commander Dong employed the Fifth and Sixth Companies to charge
the hill several times. They failed and suffered very heavy casualties, losing
most of their men and both captains.
."The Fourth is up next," Dong shouted to me on the phone."They are
not Koreans. They are Americans!" He hung up before I could ask a ques-
tion. I somehow became excited. After running around all evening without
a serious fight, we were now facing a real challenge—the American troops.
It became completely dark when we moved out and forward to the
bottom of the hill. But the hill soon lit up because of the heavy enemy
bombing and shelling. American firepower was so strong that it could hit
every part of the hill.
At that point, I realized that there was no way for us to take the hill
before the enemy artillery and machine guns wiped out my entire company.
I wanted to persuade Dong to halt the next charge until our supporting
artillery units and regimental reinforcements could take part in the attack.
Slightly wounded and desperate, Dong began organizing the next as-
sault formation.Without even looking at me, he shouted: "Ten minutes! Get
ready!" I understood his decision and the situation he faced.The night was
on our side, and the enemy dominated the daytime. If we could not take
over Unsan and destroy the garrison troops tonight, the enemy would rein-
force their troops and secure Unsan tomorrow with their superior air power.
Our Thirty-ninth Army s entire offensive campaign would fail.
I followed Dong s order without saying anything. I asked my soldiers to
get rid of all their blankets, food, and water bottles in order to run faster. Our
only chance was that some of us might be able to run fast enough and reach
the top of the hill before the enemy fire got all of my company. I tried to talk
to as many soldiers as I could. This could be the last time I would see them.
We were lucky. The regimental commander, Li Gang, arrived with the
First Battalion as reinforcement just before we launched the next charge. Li
reorganized our assault formation. He added two more companies (from the
First Battalion) to our two remaining companies as the frontal attacking
force. He ordered a mortar company to move forward to the bottom of the
hill in order to increase the covering fire. Li also ordered the deputy com-
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mander of the First Battalion to take one of his companies around the hill
and flank the enemy defensive position.
It took about one hour for Li to prepare the next assault. We were now
in a much better position. At midnight, Li gave the order for the attack.
"Good luck! See you in Unsan," Commander Dong said to me."In Unsan!"
I saluted him. I didn't know at the moment that it would be the last time we
would see each other.
Running, I led my company up to the hill.This was a race between our
soldiers and enemy bullets. I saw some of them get shot and fall. But I kept
yelling loudly and pressing them hard."Charge!""Faster!""To the top!" The
faster they could run, the better chance they had of surviving. I kicked sev-
eral men who had slowed down. I pushed those who were looking for cover
from the enemy machine guns. The hill was pretty flat and totally stripped
by the constant firing and shelling from both sides.There was no tree or rock
left to hide behind.
Suddenly I felt like somebody had kicked me on my leg and I almost fell
down. Somehow I managed to balance myself and continue running, but at
a slower pace, and many soldiers passed me.
After a short man-to-man fight at the top of the hill, the enemy troops
gave up and withdrew to Unsan. "We made it!" I cheered with the other
soldiers, but I could not help but sit down on the ground.
"Captain Zhou, you have been shot," one of my soldiers said to me. I
reached for my knees and felt warm blood all over my left leg. A terrible pain
in my left leg suddenly hit me, so strong that it almost knocked me out. A
couple of my soldiers helped me lay down on the ground and tried to stop
my bleeding. I stayed on the hill all night waiting for medical units. I never
made it to Unsan. Nor did my soldiers. My company stayed on the hill
because we had so many casualties. In fact, Commander Li ordered the Sec-
ond Battalion to rest in the Ryongpo-dong area and wait for reinforcements
since the battalion had lost more than half of its men during the first night of
battle. Commander Dong did not make it to Unsan either. He suffered
multiple wounds and died a couple of days later in a field hospital.
I was sent to a CPVF field hospital in a mountain near Sinanju. Three
months later, I had recovered, but I could not return to my company. Even
now my left leg is not normal. In late January 1951,1 was reassigned to the
Fourth Bridge Regiment of the CPVF First Railroad Engineering Division.
I was assigned as a captain for the Sixth Company, Fourth Railroad Bridge
Battalion, Fourth Bridge Regiment.
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I never had a chance to visit the 347th Regiment, which was actively
engaged on the front while I repaired the railroad bridges in the rear areas. I
missed my comrades. With their help and support, I had survived two wars
in the past three years. I missed combat. Only combat action could ease the
pain of not seeing my wife and daughters. I heard that the 347th had a new
regimental commander and that most of my soldiers in the Fourth Com-
pany were gone. Three months in the Korean War seemed a long time for all
of us.
At that time, I did not know our engineering troops would have to stay
in North Korea longer than the Chinese combat troops. After the cease-fire
agreement in July 1953, most of the CPVF armies returned to China, but
not us.We continued to work on the South River Bridge outside Pyongyang
for the rest of 1953, and repaired the Sinsongchon Bridge and then the
Chongchon River Bridge in 1954. Finally, our railroad engineering division
was ordered to return to China in the fall of 1954. After we left, there were
still two Chinese engineering divisions in North Korea working on airport
constructions.
After returning to China in 1954, our division participated in the Ti-
betan Railroad construction in Northwest China, and the Ying-Xia Rail-
road construction at Xiamen, Fujian Province, South China, as part of the
PLA Railroad Construction Corps. I retired from the PLA in 1956 and
worked as an engineer at the Provincial Institute of River and Water Con-
servancy Engineering and Design, Harbin, Heilongjiang Province, North
China, from 1957 to 1982.
During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, between 1966 and 1976, some
of my coworkers questioned my service during the Korean War. They asked
me why I did not get promoted during the war and why I transferred from
combat troops to an engineering corps. During the Korean War, most of the
commanders received promotions quickly because of the CPVF's heavy ca-
sualties. If you were a captain when you entered Korea, you should be a
major or colonel by the time you left Korea.
What they really wanted to know was whether I had made any serious
mistakes as a commander in the war. They wanted to know if I had been
disciplined, and if I had found a way out of a combat unit because I was
scared of death. I tried to defend myself by explaining that I was wounded in
the first battle. After my recovery, I was transferred to the engineering troops,
which did not have as many casualties as frontline troops. And I did not
finish my elementary school. It was very difficult, if not impossible, for some-
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one to get a promotion in engineering units without basic algebra and ge-
ometry. Unfortunately, nobody believed me, and I was labeled a "deserter of
the Korean War." I did not give any further explanation. I did not complain.
Having thought so many times about my many dead comrades, I considered
myself lucky to be one of the survivors in the Korean War.
Part Three
Chosin Accounts
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Chapter 12
The Chosin Reservoir
A Marine's Story
Some of the toughest fighting in the Korean War took place at the Chosin Reservoir,
where the unexpected entry of the Chinese into the war caught the First Marine
Division and the Seventh Division unprepared as they were driving north toward the
Yalu River. Badly outnumbered and frequently cut off by Chinese roadblocks, the
marines and GIs battled cold, hunger, and fatigue as they fought their way back to the
coast. While forced to retreat, they fought tenaciously, and they emerged badly battered
but with their pride intact. Today, many of those who took part in the Reservoir
fighting still meet from time to time as members of "The Chosin Few." Corporal
Harold L. Mulhausen, a marine assigned to a 3.5-inch rocket section, arrived in
Korea in November 1950, just in time to become a member of(<The Chosin Few."
Corporal Harold L. Mulhausen
A Company, Seventh Regiment, First Marine Division
IN DECEMBER 1948, I joined the Twentieth Infantry Battalion, USMC
Reserve, in Oklahoma City. Like many others, I became a marine largely
because so many of my friends had already joined. When summer came, we
climbed aboard a military transport plane and flew to Camp Pendleton,
California. This was my very first ride in an airplane. After two weeks of
marine training I returned to Oklahoma City, where a short time later I
married my girlfriend, Betty Baker.
Little did I realized when I joined the Marine Reserve that I would be
just in time for the Korean War, which began on June 25,1950. Sometime in
July our battalion was activated. I really didn't want to go to war, but I was
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pretty excited about being a marine. The war, I figured, probably wouldn't
last very long anyway.
We left Oklahoma City, and after a long train ride we ended up at Camp
Pendleton. On July 28, I began my active duty in the Marine Corps. We
prepared for combat, and the training was intensive. One of our officers was
a tall, thin, square-jawed lieutenant we called "Snake Face." He was tough as
nails.
One time when Snake Face was lecturing on how we should pull guard
duty, he walked over to a poor, helpless marine, yanked him out of the
company, and yelled, "You are now on guard duty. Son, let me have your
rifle." The dumb guy handed him his rifle as ordered. Lieutenant Snake Face
promptly wheeled around and threw the rifle out to the recruits. Then he
just chewed that poor kid up one side and down the other. "When on guard
duty," he roared,"you don't ever give up your rifle to anybody."
When our training was over, we boarded the USS General Walker in San
Diego and shipped out. The crossing was mostly smooth, and I never really
got seasick. We disembarked at Yokohama and climbed on a waiting train
that took us on a night journey to some base I cannot remember. After more
training we moved to another base I can't remember, and then on to a base
near Osaka, a staging area for troops going to and coming from Korea. This
base had been used as a military academy to train Japanese officers, and was
really nice. When rumors spread that we were going to remain on the base
and process troops we got pretty excited.
The rumors proved to be just that—rumors. One morning they piled us
into trucks and hauled us over to Kobe, a seaport about twenty miles away.
There they put us on a Japanese-owned but American-made WWII Victory
ship, and we set out for Korea.The sea was rough, and the ship bounced up
and down on the water like a cork. And that hellhole where I was sleeping
stunk to high heaven with vomit from seasick marines.
I finally started feeling sick myself.When I realized I was about to vomit,
I headed for a garbage can not far from my bunk. When I got there I pulled
off the lid and found the damn thing already completely full of vomit. I
slammed that thing down and looked for another place to throw up. I made
my way through the toilet and shower area, where the stink from vomit and
crap was unbelievable. I went up on deck, where I seemed to recuperate
with the cold, fresh air, but a guard ordered me below. Retracing my steps, I
made my way back through the toilet and shower area. Every shower stall
seemed to have somebody in it, but I finally found an empty one. Then I
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plopped down on the floor of the stall and vomited over and over. I was so
sick that I didn't care whether I lived or died.
Sometime in early November, we pulled into Woman Harbor, with most
of us sick as dogs. Then we trucked to an airfield, where we boarded C-47s
and flew to a mountainous area somewhere in the north. Another truck
took us to Koto-ri.
Along with Whitney McClain, from Oklahoma City, and Oscar Noriega,
from San Antonio, I was assigned to a 3.5-inch rocket section in A Company,
First Battalion, Seventh Regiment, First Marine Division. We were replace-
ments for the members of the previous 3.5-inch rocket section that had
been wiped out about a week earlier by an enemy tank.
That night, my first in A Company, we had 50 percent watch, one hour
on and one hour off. Fortunately, nothing unusual happened, because I had
not even seen a 3.5-inch rocket launcher before, let alone operated one.The
next morning our section leader, Glen Nolan from Roanoke,Virginia, taught
us how to use it. Actually, it was an anti-tank weapon.
The same day, the Chinese pinned down one of our patrols in a gully
about a half mile away. A sergeant ordered several of us to grab some stretch-
ers and get the wounded out. To reach them we had to walk down a steep
hill, and on my way down I kept hearing funny noises around me—pop-
ping, buzzing, and cracking noises. When we reached the gully, I asked an-
other marine what the noise was all about.
"You've just been under fire," he replied."The enemy is over there about
six hundred yards away and shooting at you."
That was my baptism under fire.We got the wounded marines out okay,
but when it was all over, I was pretty shook up thinking about it.
By this time, mid-November, the weather was turning cold. The wind
was blowing, the sky spitting snow, the rivers and streams freezing, and we
still hadn't been issued our cold weather gear. We couldn't even build a fire,
except on rare occasions. Just before Thanksgiving we did receive our parkas
and cold weather clothing, but by this time, the temperature had already
dropped to around twenty degrees above zero. And we were headed north.
To this day, I cannot think of Korea without also thinking about the intense
cold.
On Thanksgiving Day, 1950, the marines continued to move north
toward the Chosin Reservoir. This meant, of course, my 3.5-inch rocket
squad had to move out, and we were pretty upset over the thought of miss-
ing our Thanksgiving dinner.This appeared to be a certainty when we reached
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our assigned area, somewhere near Koto-ri, and dug in for the night. To our
great joy, next morning the cooks brought the kitchens up to our positions,
and we had our Thanksgiving dinner after all—turkey, dressing, pumpkin
pie, and all the goodies. It was delicious, and I ate until my belly nearly
popped.
On November 2 5, just after Thanksgiving, about two-thirds of.our com-
pany went on a patrol, led by Lieutenant Frank Mitchell, from Roaring
Springs,Texas.The patrol returned about 2:00 the next morning, all shot up.
They had run into a major concentration of Chinese Communists, who had
now officially entered the war.Those guys did some really hard fighting, and
they fought like heroes. Lieutenant Mitchell earned the Medal of Honor for
his part. They managed to bring back all their wounded but had to leave
their dead behind. This was tough on them, because marines are trained to
return with their dead if at all possible.
We kept driving northward, into the Chosin Reservoir area, finally pass-
ing through the little town of Yudam-ri.There wasn't much there but a few
shacks, and we saw very few inhabitants. By the time it became dark, we had
set up a perimeter just outside of town, with our 3.5-inch rockets positioned
on a creek bed. The ground was frozen and so full of rocks it was nearly
impossible to dig, but we finally managed to set up a half-assed defensive
position.
With fighting in the hills all around us, we remained on 50 percent watch.
At about one o'clock that night we were ordered to move back about two
hundred yards.This time we set up our 3.5-inch rockets in a field next to the
road. We tried to dig in again, but the ground was frozen so hard we had little
success.There were firefights everywhere, so they put us on 100 percent watch.
Somehow we managed to avoid contact with the enemy that night, but we
sure as hell didn't avoid contact with the cold. By morning, the thermometer
had dropped to thirty degrees below zero, with a strong wind blowing.
They gave us three days worth of rations and told us we were moving
back. They also ordered A Company to take a hill, which we did after a full
day of hard fighting. We were helped by air strikes, but unfortunately, one of
the F-51 Mustangs hit one of our men in the ankle during a strafing run. He
lost his foot as a result.
That night we set up a perimeter around the top of the hill and stood
watch in the bone-chilling cold. Everywhere we looked we could see firefights.
Clearly, the Chinese army was all around us.The marines in the valley began
to burn huge piles of supplies to keep them from falling into enemy hands.
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Under cover of darkness, we moved off the hill—very quietly. My ser-
geant came by and checked us for anything that rattled; if it did, we had to
tie it down or throw it away. We moved down the hill slowly, slipping and
sliding.Then we just walked and walked, sometimes in snow that came up to
our knees. Those poor devils in the front column got the honor of breaking
the path for the rest of us.
At times, the Chinese were so close we could hear them talking. When
that happened everybody got super quiet and made no noise at all. Nobody
had to tell us how serious the situation was.We walked by one foxhole that
contained three dead Chinese soldiers—all frozen to death at their posts.
All night we walked, with just an occasional rest. When we did stop to
rest we were so tired we would go to sleep immediately, and that's when the
danger of freezing to death was greatest. Sometimes we punched and kicked
each other so no one would die a frozen death.
Shortly after daylight we relieved Fox Company at the Taktong Pass.
Fox had been badly cut up in several days of bitter fighting and had wounded
men all over the area. They had wrapped their dead in parachute cloth and
stacked them in piles. It was not a pretty sight. There were also hundreds of
dead Chinese scattered around the area.
My platoon was ordered to set up a roadblock on a small hill overlook-
ing the road. We sat and watched while hundreds of battle-weary marines
moved down the road, with the wounded and the dead piled into vehicles.
Miraculously, during all of this we managed to get some hot food. The
cooks set up a field kitchen, and we were allowed to go down the hill two or
three at a time. We got sausage, bacon, scrambled eggs, hot cakes, and a big
old cup of coffee. Boy, did it taste good. This was my first hot meal in about
two weeks. I stuffed myself, but my stomach had shrunk so much I could not
eat everything I had taken.
We moved on to Hagaru-ri, where the engineers had built a small air-
strip. Under very difficult conditions, planes brought in much-needed sup-
plies and took off with the dead and wounded.
When we left Hagaru-ri, one of our tanks intentionally ran over our
3.5-inch rocket launchers so they would not fall into enemy hands, and we
ended up in a rifle platoon. We walked on past the airstrip, then along a
ridgeline in the mountains. Eventually we reached Koto-ri, where the fight-
ing just got tougher. When leaving the town, we received steady fire from
the hills on both sides of the road.
Once, when under sniper fire, I ran like hell for a ditch. About twenty
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yards from the ditch I suddenly tumbled headlong into the snow. I got up
and dove into the ditch, where I joined about a half dozen other marines
already there. I was still mad over falling when I noticed the heel of my boot;
it had been shot clean off. I fell down because a bullet had hit my boot.
We moved out again, sometimes able to see no more than thirty feet
ahead of us because of the snow and fog. While we ran into several firelights
along the way, just about dark we managed to move forward to a big hill
overlooking a pass. That night we dug down into the snow as deep as we
could to get out of the stinging wind, but the bitter cold went right through
us. A lieutenant told me to help a wounded man get down the hill and onto
the road, which I did.Then I got lost trying to find my way back in the dark.
I ended up crawling into my sleeping bag beside a tank with its track knocked
off, but still occupied. I was not only freezing cold but starving as well, so
when the tank crew gave me a can of Beanie Weenies I savored every bite.
Somehow I managed to doze off, when—BLAM—the cannon on the
tank went off. It was morning and we were under attack by the Chinese.
They finally withdrew, but not until we had a dandy firefight.
We continued walking down the road and finally came to an assembly
area where trucks were waiting to take us to a train station.There we boarded
a train that took us to the port of Hungnam for evacuation by sea. At
Hungnam, I actually got a good night's sleep, ate a good breakfast, and began
to feel halfway warm.
A landing craft carried us out to a ship named the USS Sultan. I went
below, found a bunk, got a clean set of clothes, and took a hot shower. Boy,
did it feel good. I thought I was in heaven. It had been fifty days since I had
taken a shower. After shaving, I hardly recognized myself in the mirror. When
we had left Japan for Korea I weighed about two hundred pounds. Now, I
weighed 143, fully clothed.
On board the Sultan I ran across Bill Burkett, a kid I went to high school
with back in Oklahoma City. The ship was so crowded he didn't even have
a bunk, so I shared mine with him until we disembarked at Pusan.There we
boarded LSTs for a short voyage to Masan, where the First Marine Division
was reassembling. When I rejoined A Company, only sixteen people were
left from the original company. But soon replacements started coming in,
stragglers returned, and people were getting out of the hospitals. As a result,
we were soon able to form a pretty good company. In the next several weeks
we did some training, updated our shots, checked out our clothes, recuper-
ated, and shared a lot of experiences with each other.
Private First Class Harold Mulhausen, First Marine Division, waiting
to board a ship at Hungnam following the Chosin Reservoir fighting,
December 1950. (Courtesy of Harold Mulhausen)
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Sometime in February 1951, I'm not sure exactly when, we climbed
aboard trucks and headed north.The UN forces were mounting an offensive
once again, and after so much retreating, it was a good feeling to be pushing
the Communists back. It was still winter, however, and we nearly froze to
death riding over mountain passes in those open trucks.
At some point we stopped and set up a perimeter, partially to destroy
enemy forces that were interfering with our supply lines. Everyday we went
on patrol, with patrols ranging from platoon to company size. As a member
of a 3.5-inch rocket section, our primary job was to knock out enemy tanks
and bunkers. Our services were not always needed, however, so the Marine
Corps found other uses for us, such as going on patrol and assisting the
medical corpsmen as stretcher bearers. At other times we served as ammo
carriers, radiomen, or just plain riflemen.When there were no targets for our
3.5-inch rockets, we just filled in as needed.
Going on patrol meant walking, and plenty of it. Often we kept going
until we made contact with the enemy Then, after a brief skirmish, we would
hike back to our company area. Every night we stood 50 percent watch, and it
seemed like we never got any rest. To make matters worse, the chow was the
sorriest I had ever experienced in Korea, perhaps because our supplies were
not getting through regularly As a result, the combination of terrible chow
and lack of sleep seemed to deprive all of us of the energy to do anything.
Maybe this was a carryover from the fighting at the Chosin Reservoir.
One day on patrol we came across an army convoy that had made a
wrong turn and had been ambushed by the Chinese and North Koreans.
Almost all of their vehicles had been destroyed, and dead soldiers were ev-
erywhere—Chinese, Koreans, and Americans. We did not find one person
alive, and all the valuables, including weapons and ammunition, were gone.
It was a very sobering experience.
Once, when we were moving into a new area, we found ourselves run-
ning low on water. Naturally this called for a "water patrol," so off we went,
scouting for water. We heard a noise that sounded like running water, but it
turned out to be flies circling above a dead animal, so thick they formed a
solid black cloud. Then we caught a whiff of the dead carcass, and it was
something unbelievably awful. So we went back to the company and re-
ported that we couldn't find any water.
Gradually, with help of air support, we managed to disperse enough of
the enemy forces to allow our supply lines to operate smoothly again. On
occasion, when we were lucky, we even brought back prisoners.
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As the days grew warmer, and winter turned into spring, we were in-
volved in a strange incident, one that I never read about in the history books
on the Korean War. One morning, between two and three companies of
marines climbed on trucks and we took off down the road.We finally stopped
on a big plateau area about twelve to fifteen miles in front of our MLR. We
set up with heavy machine guns, 81mm mortars, 3.5-inch rockets, artillery, a
field kitchen, and two tanks, with concertina wire placed around the entire
area. Everything considered, we formed a strong defensive position.
Every day, ten or fifteen infantrymen would load up on top of each tank
and head down the road toward a little village in the valley. Often they
would make contact with the enemy, have a brief skirmish, then turn around
and come back. Helicopters quickly evacuated the wounded. We followed
this routine for ten to twelve days.
One night all hell broke loose behind us. Our artillery let loose with an
awesome barrage and kept it up for most of an hour. We immediately went
from 50 percent watches to 100 percent, but nothing happened except we
lost a lot of sleep.
Early the next morning we packed up our gear, got on the trucks, and
headed back to our MLR. After we had gone eight or nine miles, we came
around a big bend in the road that opened onto an area of huge rice paddies.
Littered across these rice paddies were the bodies of dead Chinese—about
five or six hundred of them. They were stacked in piles, some up to ten feet
in height. Army engineers had already moved in with bulldozers and, after
digging huge trenches, were rolling these bodies into mass graves. I had
never seen so many dead people in my entire life.
Later we learned what had happened. Known as Operation Mousetrap,
our group, way out in front of the MLR, provided the bait. When the Chi-
nese tried to sneak into our area under the cover of darkness, our artillery,
mortar, and rocket fire absolutely annihilated them. We set a trap, and the
Chinese fell for it.
Following this strange battle, we went back into battalion reserve for a
few days. Even then, our company sent out daily patrols as a precautionary
measure to prevent ambushes. One day, Chinese mortars wounded a num-
ber of our guys on patrol, and about ten of us were told to get some stretch-
ers and go after them. After a hike of about a mile and a half, we reached the
patrol and proceeded to put the wounded on stretchers and evacuate them.
One guy had an arm wound that didn't appear to be serious. When we
stopped to rest, a marine came along helping a guy unable to walk because
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he had been hit in the ankle. So we said to our guy on the stretcher with the
arm wound, "Hey, why don't you get up and walk along beside us and let us
carry this guy who's got his foot shot off?" He said, "Fine," and got off the
stretcher. We got both of them to an aid station at the bottom of the hill,
where they waited for a helicopter to evacuate them.Then we went back to
our units.
What followed was nothing short of tragic. The poor guy with the arm
wound was repeatedly passed over while the helicopters evacuated the "more
seriously" wounded. When they finally got around to putting him on the
helicopter, they found him dead. With no one to help him, he just went into
shock and died.
Rain can be a real problem in Korea, especially in the spring. One night,
after we had pitched our pup tents in a rice paddy, we ran into a big problem.
We were all snug in our sleeping bags on top of air mattresses when I rolled
over and my hand fell into a puddle of water. When I got up, I discovered the
water inside the tent was about three inches deep. I dressed, went outside,
and discovered the problem. Up above us on the hillside, marines were busy
with shovels cutting holes in the irrigation dikes to let the water flow through.
That's where our water was coming from.
To solve the problem, we dug a ditch across our rice paddy about one
foot deep and two feet wide so we could drain the water. But the rain
continued, and so much water flowed through that ditch that by the next
evening it had grown to about eight feet wide and ten feet deep. It was a real
"gully washer," as we would call it in Oklahoma. As a matter of fact, they
eventually brought in some engineers to build a bridge so we could get from
one part of the camp to the other.
About the same time, our sergeant grabbed six of us early one morning
and said,"Come with me." Naturally we all volunteered; we thought it must
be some emergency. He did not seem particularly bothered by the fact we
had not yet eaten breakfast. We followed him to the motor pool, where we
climbed into several trucks and took off down the road. About 10:30 A.M.
we pulled into a big army supply base.
When we complained about not having had breakfast, one of the army
guys took us to the mess hall for some chow. This was the first time I had
ever eaten army chow, and I was impressed. They served cafeteria style, with
fried eggs, scrambled eggs, boiled eggs, poached eggs, fresh sausage and ba-
con, biscuits and gravy, hot cakes, fresh juice—anything we could possibly
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want. I mean, those army guys really had it knocked. They even had table-
cloths. And the food tasted great. We ate until we were about to bust.
Soon our sergeant came back, and he put us to work. That's when we
discovered the nature of the "emergency." One of our trucks backed up to a
railroad car, and we filled that sucker clear to the roof with Pabst Blue Rib-
bon beer. Unfortunately, we couldn't sneak away with any extra beer be-
cause the old boy at the door counted every can.The other trucks loaded up
with C-rations, mail, and a bunch of supplies, and we drove back to our
company area. Then we had to unload all that junk. This was typical of the
kind of jobs we found ourselves doing while in reserve. The Marine Corps
did not intend for reserve to mean rest.
Reserve also meant inspection, and we had a big one while we were set
up in this area. As a reward for being the best company, our battalion com-
mander came down to our area and told everybody in A Company we could
have a day off to do anything we wanted, but we had to be back by midnight.
About two-thirds of the company took off for a small Korean town about
four or five miles away.The guys I ran around with didn't want to do that, so
we messed around the camp for awhile, got bored, and finally decided to go
into town and join the others. While three of us were hitching a ride, an
army truck came by and offered to take us to another, bigger town, where
we could have a "helluva time."This other town was about twenty-five miles
away, but they promised to bring us back, so we accepted.They were right; it
was a nice town with an open market, shopping stalls, and a pleasant little
restaurant where we had a nice meal. We enjoyed ourselves and caught our
ride back to the company area with the army guys, arriving at about eleven
o'clock that night.
Very quickly we saw that just about everyone in the area was drunk.The
beer we had brought back earlier had been intended as the beer ration for
the entire company. Since most of the guys had gone into town, the handful
of people who stayed behind had access to the entire company's ration, and
they took full advantage of the opportunity. They drank the beer that really
belonged to the guys who went to town. Moreover, the corpsmen had picked
up a couple of jugs of grain alcohol to spike the beer. The result was "drunk
city." I'd never seen anything like it in my life.
When I woke up about 8:30 the next morning, I kept hearing a noise
out in the company street. I raised the flap on my tent and saw a sergeant
trying to pick up a guy passed out in the middle of the street. He actually
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belonged to another company but had found the beer flowing when he
came over to visit a buddy and drank until he passed out.
Our time in reserve soon came to an end, and we went back on the line.
It began very badly. We were about two hundred yards past battalion head-
quarters when we heard a humongous explosion. We turned around in time
to see parts of a jeep flying off in all directions.The jeep had run over a land
mine, and all three of its occupants were killed. How and when that mine
got there, nobody knew. A minesweeping group was called in, and they
found six more. When stuff like this happened in rear areas, we understood
better why we sent out patrols and had guards on duty around the clock.
We continued four or five miles up the road, and when we reached a
rice paddy incoming artillery shells began to fall. I dove into an irrigation
ditch that snaked in and around the paddies, along with fifteen or twenty
other marines. The barrage wasn't particularly heavy, but it was enough to
keep us pinned down. Suddenly, I heard a thud and looked up. About three
feet in front of me a round had hit the bank on my right side but failed to
explode. It was a dud. If that shell had gone off, there would have been a
bunch of dead marines—myself included.
Fortunately for us, the Chinese used quite a bit of ammunition that
failed to go off. Often, their hand grenades would just lay there and fizzle,
like a firecracker. Artillery and mortar rounds were often duds as well.When
it happens, however, and you realize how close you came to being killed, it
really eats away at your mind.
After we had been on the line for three or four days, work trains (i.e.,
Korean laborers) would arrive carrying the nonessential stuff we had left in
the rear, such as shaving gear, writing material, etc. And when we left the line
they would show up and haul it back to the rear.
Once, when we had completed our tour of duty on the line and were
ready to move out, the work train didn't show. After we had waited several
hours, the company commander came by about 11:00 A.M. and told me to
take a couple of guys and remain with the gear until the train came, then
join the rest of the company. He showed me our new position on a map, and
then pointed to it with his hand. It was about one thousand yards away. He
left the map and a walkie talkie with us and went on his way. "We'll see you
later on this evening," he said.
We waited and waited, and finally about 5:00 the work train arrived and
loaded up our gear. Then we took off to find our company. We walked and
kept walking, but with no success. I kept trying to contact the company
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with the walkie talkie, but got no answer. By this time, it was around mid-
night, so we decided to set up for the night in a clump of trees nearby.
Just as we got to the edge of the trees, however, we heard a noise. We
froze. Suddenly we heard an American voice demanding to know the pass-
word. Hell, I didn't know the password, so I tried to identify myself while
cussing and bitching at the same time. Finally, a marine emerged and pro-
ceeded to tell us where we were. Our company lines extended up to the top
of a long hill, which we proceeded to climb. When we reported to the
company commander, he apologized for the sorry map he had given us.
According to the map, we were supposed to have traveled only about a
thousand yards to the new lines, but we had actually hiked closer to seven
thousand yards.
It was not a good feeling to wander around in the middle of the night
lost, with a worthless map. We could have easily stumbled into an enemy
patrol. When we saw our friends in A Company again, they never looked
better.
It was not unusual for our maps to cause us serious problems. Made by
the Japanese before Wo rid War II and translated into English, they were ter-
rible—but they were all we had. About the only thing they attempted to
show were roads and rivers, but many of the roads we encountered weren't
even built when the maps were printed. Other roads shown on the maps no
longer existed.
One time, while on line, we were ordered to advance about a thousand
yards up to a big horseshoe ridge to link up with another company. We
started out in the morning and walked all day, trying to follow our map.
Finally, about 9:00 that evening and well after dark, we reached our objec-
tive—the horseshoe ridge. It was the longest one thousand yards I ever walked.
Nevertheless, we finally got the line set up.We positioned my 3.5-inch rocket
section in the midst of a bunch of rocks, some as big as automobiles.
That night, we lay amongst the rocks, looking out toward the front as
usual. Unfortunately, the night was so black we couldn't see a damn thing.
After standing my watch, I crawled in the sack and went to sleep. But not for
long; I soon woke up to the sound of a burp gun, and it was close. For the
next few minutes we had a helluva firefight, with hand grenades, burp guns,
rifle fire, and people hollering for corpsmen.Then it ended just as quickly as
it started.
When daylight came, we were surprised to learn that the high horse-
shoe ridge we had finally reached had a big meadow in the middle of it,
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probably a mile in diameter. It appeared that the Koreans used this meadow
for grazing their cattle during the summer months. We also figured out the
Chinese apparently came up behind the company by chance, using a road
that happened to lead to our mortar section.Then they found themselves in
a firefight, and they were probably as surprised as we were.We killed several
Chinese soldiers, but four or five marines were wounded.
Daylight also brought another revelation. Right out in front of the area
my section was set up to defend was a sheer cliff that dropped off some two
hundred to three hundred feet. If during that dark night I had walked just
ten or fifteen feet straight forward from my position, I would have fallen off
this cliff to my death.
One day we were ordered to assault a hill about a thousand yards from
our position. While we were waiting for the artillery to begin its barrage in
preparation for our assault, we watched the Chinese moving around on the
side of their hill. Just then, a marine with a sniper rifle walked up to where I
was standing. After surveying the scene, he said, "You know, I think I'll see if
I can't just scatter those guys." For his target he selected two Chinese soldiers
sitting on the edge of a foxhole, eating. He laid down on the ground, propped
up his rifle on a sleeping bag, got his windage, and fired. The bullet hit low
and to the right, but the two Chinese soldiers just kept right on eating.The
marine adjusted his sights and cranked off another round. The bullet was
high, but this time he got their attention. The Chinese soldiers dived into
their foxhole and disappeared from view. Finally, after a long wait, the two
Chinese emerged again, and the marine took aim and fired another shot.
This time one of the soldiers fell over backwards and just laid there. Later, a
corpsmen told me the bullet severed the spinal column of the Chinese sol-
dier. He probably died instantly
At about the same time, our artillery began to soften up the hill in
preparation for our assault. After a forty-minute barrage, the assault platoon
launched its attack on the hill, while my 3.5-inch rocket section sat on our
side of the hill and watched. Our guys took the hill without a fight; for some
reason the Chinese had hightailed it out of there when the artillery hit. We
never understood why. When we moved up, we discovered the Chinese
foxholes were actually outlets to a large bunker and tunnels on the back side
of the hill. Their positions were strong, and they could have put up a vigor-
ous defense.
Another time, we assaulted a large wooded hill and ran into some real
problems. When our troops reached the top of the hill, they were pinned
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down by heavy enemy fire. At the time my section was providing supporting
fire. About forty yards from our position, three marines were taking cover in
a depression and were calling for a corpsman.A corpsman jumped up and
tried to reach them, but he got hit about halfway there.Then another corps-
man, a big black guy about six-foot-six, took off running and dodging bul-
lets while we gave him cover fire. He made it to the three marines, and after
giving first-aid he stood up and shouted,"Hey, I'm coming back. Cover me."
So we laid down another field of fire.
The corpsman then grabbed two of the wounded marines by the collar,
one in each hand, and started moving back to our lines. Somehow he made it
and dove over the edge right beside us. He stood there talking while we
checked the wounds of the two guys, and all of the sudden this big corpsman
just collapsed. He had been shot three times and still managed to drag those
two guys back to our positions. It was an amazing act of courage. Unfortu-
nately, I never saw the big guy again or heard what happened to him.
While all of this was going on, we started receiving a heavy barrage of
120mm mortar fire, and a guy standing right next to me got hit in the neck.
I immediately put a battle dressing on his neck, and then we started receiv-
ing rifle fire. One of the new recruits ran up to me and shouted, "Muley,
Muley, what are we going to do?" I turned to him when—CRACK—a
bullet hit right above his eye and blood gushed everywhere. He fell right flat
on his back. A corpsman pitched me a battle dressing, and I wrapped it
around his head as well as I could. I really figured he was dead, however,
having been shot in the head like that.
A rifle team was dispatched to clean out the Chinese who had been
shooting at us, and then a strange thing happened. When the team got into
position, for some reason the Chinese just threw down their weapons and
surrendered. So now we had prisoners, about five of them.
After this, things began to quiet down, and the choppers came in to fly
out the wounded. We helped carry them down the road for evacuation.
Unbelievably, the kid who had been hit in the eye was still alive; the projec-
tile had gone between his helmet and eye and lodged in his skull. He not
only survived, he later rejoined our company.
When I reflect back on that incident, I find it amazing that the human
body can be so fragile at one time and so resilient at another. On the one
hand, there was this kid who survived after being shot in the head. On the
other hand, there was this other kid who was shot in the arm—a seemingly
minor wound—and died. It doesn't make any sense. But then, war doesn't
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make any sense. Combat is very difficult on the individual and totally un-
natural. You're always waiting for your turn, wondering when you're going
to get it or when your friend is going to get it. You worry about getting
wounded, especially the kind of wounds that handicap you for life. It seems
like you're always busy, always nervous, and always tired because you never
really rest properly. Even in reserve, you don't really rest; you're still waiting
for something to happen.
One thing never changed in Korea—the hills.They all looked about the
same, and there was always one more we had to take. Once, when trying to
take a hill and the assault platoon got pinned down about two-thirds of the
way to the top, my 3.5-inch rocket team was called to take out an enemy
bunker set up with a machine gun.We made our way up the hill and through
the trees to a position about five hundred yards from the bunker. We fired
one round, and it landed about twenty feet short. We reloaded and prepared
to fire again when a mortar shell hit in the tree directly over my head and
showered my rocket team with shrapnel. The man directly in front of me
was hit in the throat, and another man was hit in the arm real bad. I held a
battle dressing tightly against the throat of the one guy to slow down the
bleeding.Then a corpsman removed the battle dressing and had me hold the
guy's jugular vein with my fingers while he applied a clamp. After he tied the
two ends of the jugular vein together with stitches, the bleeding stopped,
and the corpsman went on to the next guy. Meanwhile, the assault platoon
managed to take the hill and the firing stopped. We helped evacuate the
wounded down to the road, where a chopper could pick them up. Some-
how, the guy who had been hit in the throat survived.
Fortunately, we did not experience combat everyday.We had good times
in Korea as well as bad. When we were in reserve, we frequently played
catch, wrote letters, read books, and rested. We usually had a couple of hot
meals a day, and when the PX truck came by we could buy gum, candy bars,
shampoo, writing tablets, and stuff like that.
One afternoon, when returning from a patrol, we came across an army
jeep a mile or so from our company area. Since the engine was cold, and we
couldn't get any response when we yelled, we all piled in the jeep and drove
it down the hill to our company.We showed it to the captain, who told us to
take it to battalion headquarters. First, however, he told us to use it for a
water run, which we did.
We had filled up the water cans and started back when three soldiers
came walking up the road. They were madder than hell; we had their jeep.
The Chosin Reservoir: A Marine's Story 113
They had been on a reconnaissance patrol and had driven the jeep as far up
the hill as they could go before striking out on foot.We explained the situ-
ation as best we could, and they agreed to our request to take the water back
to the camp before returning the jeep. So we unloaded the water cans and
returned the jeep as promised. They took off in it but had only gone a few
hundred yards when the damn thing ran out of gas. Those army guys were
really pissed off; if there hadn't been so many marines, I think they would
have come after us.
Another time, we were returning from patrol when a Korean, dressed in
civilian clothes, jumped out from behind a tree. We held a gun on him, but
the Korean turned and ran away, so one of our guys shot him.Then we made
an interesting discovery—the Korean was not a "he" but a "she." She also
had an American-made walkie-talkie with her, wrapped in a baby blanket,
which she dropped before trying to run away. She could easily have been
calling in artillery or reporting troop movements.This is a good example of
why we went out on patrols, even when in reserve.
Not long before I left for Korea, my father sent me a .38 caliber pistol,
but without bullets or a holster. I tried to buy bullets in the PX, both in the
States and in Japan, but with no success. So I arrived in Korea with this
beautiful pistol but no bullets. Finally, our air officer, a big red-faced Irishman,
gave me six rounds. I loaded that sucker and carried it in my pocket all the
time I was up in the Chosin Reservoir area.When I got to Masan, I found an
old .45 holster that I modified to fit the .38 so I was able to carry it on my
hip. Then I wrote my wife and asked her to find a way to send me some
bullets. She did it by sending me a goodie box and wrapping each bullet in
a piece of candy or a cookie. I might get six or eight rounds with each
package. The other guys all knew they could eat my candy, but if they came
across a bullet, the bullet was mine.
I slept with that pistol every night I was in Korea. It became a bed-
partner for me, just like a teddy bear for a kid. I couldn't go to sleep without
my pistol, even when we were in reserve.The pistol provided me with com-
fort and warmth. I brought it home with me, and I still have it. And it still
gives me comfort and warmth.
We could never get enough mail from home, but unfortunately, it gen-
erally came in bunches. One time, the seven guys in my section received a
total of twelve packages from home all on the same day. The cookies and
cakes were a bit crumbly, but we feasted on them anyway.
One new guy in our unit corresponded with eleven different girls at the
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same time. Naturally, he was the envy of everyone because we all thought he
was a real lover. He would write one letter, then copy it ten times, perhaps
changing a date or an incident. He mailed at least one set of letters a week,
and sometimes two. After about six weeks in the company, however, he
started receiving "Dear John" letters. And after about two months, the only
letters he wrote were to his mother and father. He actually became the joke
of the company.
Toilet paper was almost always in short supply. A few sheets came with
our C rations, but generally not enough to meet our needs. One guy must
have said something to his wife about the shortage, because he started re-
ceiving letters written on toilet paper. Very practical. If he carried his letters
around with him, they could serve a very useful purpose in the end.
Nobody likes to talk about "friendly fire," but we worked so closely
with the aircraft, artillery, and tanks that it was understandable that accidents
occasionally happened. I once saw a tank shell kill two marines and wound
three or four more trying to knock out an enemy machine gun bunker.
Apparently the tank commander didn't know some of our troops were holed
up in a depression near the bunker. We tried to take every precaution to
prevent this sort of thing, but sometimes it still happened.
About a month before I was scheduled to leave Korea, the company sent
me and a couple of other combat veterans back to the rear area for safekeep-
ing. Our primary job was to direct the Korean work trains carrying food and
supplies up to the lines and back. Normally it took about a day to make the
round trip, and we did a trip every other day Sometimes we had as many as
150 Koreans in a group.We usually had one marine at each end and a couple
in the middle to keep the group together.
On our days off, we would write letters, play cards, toss the football, or
whatever. I spent hours sanding, cleaning, and polishing a Russian carbine I
had taken from a captured Chinese soldier. When I finished it, the rifle was
absolutely beautiful, but I never got home with it. Somebody stole it from
my tent the day before I was scheduled to rotate. I was really pissed.
On November 11,1951,1 started for home.The day I left the battalion,
I went around and shook hands with everybody I knew. Five of us from the
company were all leaving at the same time. When we got to division head-
quarters, we discovered there were a number of fellows going home from
the first replacement draft, many of whom we knew. My friend Bill Burkett
was there, the guy I had gone to high school with back in Oklahoma City.
We also served in the reserve together, and we were on the same ship com-
The Chosin Reservoir: A Marine's Story 115
ing back from the Chosin Reservoir fighting. He had been promoted to
sergeant and didn't even know it until someone read his name from the
rotation list as "Sergeant" Bill Burkett. Then he was put in charge of the
group because he held the highest rank.
They drove us down to the coast in trucks, put us on board a landing
craft, ferried us out to a Victory ship, and carried us back to Japan. There
must have been six to seven hundred of us going home at the same time.
When we arrived at the dock in Kobe, Bill and I learned that our seabags,
which had been placed in storage while we were in Korea, had been lost.
The only clothes we had were those on our back and a few changes of socks
and shorts. Fortunately, we got enough stuff from the other guys to get us
home with changes of clothing everyday.
We came home like we went over, by ship. The trip was supposed to
take about eleven days, but it took fifteen. We finally docked at San Diego.
There was no fanfare; the only people at the dock to see us come in were
families and girlfriends. My wife, Betty, couldn't come because she didn't
have the money to travel.
We were taken from the ship to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in
San Diego, where we received new orders and new uniforms.We filled out
forms that gave us three choices for our next assignment. I don't know why
they bothered with this because the orders were already made out.
Bill and I were both assigned to Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. I got
sixteen days travel time and thirty days leave.We also got all our back pay the
day before we left San Diego, which in my case was $517. Since Bill's folks
had driven out to see him come in, I was able to ride back to Oklahoma
City with them. We arrived on December 3, and my birthday was on De-
cember 4. What a wonderful birthday present it was for me to be home.
Betty had managed to save some money while I was in Korea, so we
were able to buy a car—a 1951 Chevrolet. When it was time to leave, we
drove it to North Carolina.
On January 16,1952,1 reported to Camp Lejeune, and they assigned me
to a weapons company. A short time after I arrived the major called me into
his office and tried to persuade me to reenlist. After noticing I was eligible for
promotion, he asked,"If I got you a sergeants stripes, would you stay over?"
My reply could not be misunderstood. "No sir! I've had all the Marine
Corps I want, and I don't want any more."
At that point, the major became real hostile. "Then get yourself out of
my office! I don't ever want to see you again," he snarled.
116 Voices from the Korean War
A few days later, about twenty of us due to get out were called to attend
a meeting, where two staff sergeants harangued us about reenlisting. They
told us about how difficult life would be on the outside; unemployment was
high, jobs were hard to find, prices had gone up, and people didn't care
anything about the GIs coming back from Korea. Then they talked about
how great life was in the Marine Corps and all the advantages we'd have.
When the sergeants were finished talking, they announced, "All of you
that's going to reenlist, we want you to go over to this next room.The rest of
you, we want you to stay right here."
The group split about fifty-fifty. One of the sergeants then came around
and asked each one of us individually why we were not going to reenlist, and
then he'd give his little spiel about the mistake we were making.
When he got to me, I said,"I've had all the Marine Corps I want. I don't
want anymore.There's not any living way I would reenlist!" After that, he
didn't ask me any more questions.
About January 29, 1952, after receiving my orders, it was time to head
back for Oklahoma City and civilian life. I joyfully packed my bag, said my
goodbyes, and Betty and I hit the road in our new 1951 Chevrolet.We drove
straight through, arriving in Oklahoma City around February l.We're still
here.
Chapter 13
The Chosin Reservoir
A Chinese Captain's Story
During the CPVF's second offensive campaign, between November 25 and Decem-
ber 24, 1950, its Ninth Army Group, which included the Twentieth, Twenty-sixth,
and Twenty-seventh Armies, attacked the UN forces led by the U.S. First Marine
Division and U.S. Seventh Infantry Division. Although the Ninth Army Group
scored a major victory of the CPVF during the three-year war in Korea when it wiped
out the entire Thirty-second Regiment of the Seventh Division, it suffered a terrible
toll both from the battle and from the cruel Korean winter. Consisting of about one
hundred thousand frontline troops, the Ninth suffered more than forty thousand casu-
alties, and about one-half of these were from frostbite.The following story by Captain
Wang Xuedong describes several CPVF engagements with the First Marine Division
and the hardships endured by the soldiers, which so characterized the fighting in the
Chosin Reservoir.
Captain Wang Xuedong
First Company, 172nd Regiment, Fifty-eighth Division,
Twentieth Army, CPVF Ninth Army Group
THE PLA NINTH Army Group became the CPVF Ninth Army Group in
mid-October 1950. It was stationed in Southeast China as the CPVF re-
serve. In early November, the army group received its order to move north.
It began to transport its three armies, theTwentieth,Twenty-sixth, andTwenty-
seventh, by railway from Southeast to Northeast China on November 7.
The CPVF situation in Korea became critical in November. After the
CPVF's first offensive, in late October, the UN forces prepared an all-out
counteroffensive scheduled for late November. General Douglas Mac Arthur
118 Voices from the Korean War
promised his soldiers they would be "back home for Christmas" after this
largest and final offense.
The UN Command positioned its Eighth Army on the western front
with 130,000 troops. The CPVF had 230,000 men there, and clearly out-
numbered the UN forces in the west by a ratio of 1.75 to 1. On the eastern
front, the UN forces consisted of 90,000 men in its X Corps. The CPVF,
however, had less than 20,000 men (two divisions of the Forty-second Army)
in this part of North Korea.
In November, the X Corps rapidly advanced north along the eastern
coast toward the Yalu River and Kanggye, the wartime capital of North
Korea after Kim II Sung withdrew his government from Pyongyang on
October 19. It appeared the X Corps would drive Kim and his government
out of North Korea and cut off the CPVF from behind.
On November 5, Chairman Mao approved the request for reinforce-
ments by Marshal Peng Dehuai, CPVF commander in chief. Mao ordered
the Ninth Army Group to enter Korea immediately. The task of the Ninth
Army Group, 150,000 strong, was to stop the X Corps on the eastern front.
During the army group's long railway journey from the Changjiang (Yangtze)
River to the Yalu River, General Song Shilun, commander of the Ninth
Army Group, gave his orders to the army commanders on the train.
Following General Song's orders, on November 17 the Twenty-seventh
Army crossed the Yalu River from Ji'an (Chi-an) as the first wave of the
army group. On November 19, the Twentieth Army crossed the Yalu River
from Linjiang (Lin-chiang) as the second wave.The Twenty-sixth Army tem-
porarily stayed at Linjiang as the reserve and waited for promised Russian
weapon and equipment shipments in order to replace the army group s old
Japanese-made weapons.
The Twentieth Army included the Fifty-eighth, Fifty-ninth, and Sixti-
eth Divisions. On November 19, my division, the Fifty-eighth—the army's
vanguard—began to march at full speed across North Korea from west to
east toward Kanggye. By November 21, after we had marched about sixty
miles, we reached Kanggye.The division's three regiments, the 172nd, 173rd,
and 174th Regiments, continued our southeastern movement toward Chosin
(Changjin) through the mountains.
There were some unexpected problems during our first week in North
Korea. We were clearly not adequately prepared for such a huge offensive
assignment.
First, the logistic services failed to keep up with the movement of our
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combat troops.We were hastily thrown into combat without good prepara-
tion, and had serious breakdowns in our supply and transportation systems.
We had to take with us whatever we needed, or whatever we could carry on
our shoulders. When our regiment ran out of food, we had to trade our
blankets, towels, and even medicines with local Koreans for their rice, corn,
and vegetables.
Second, the cold winter hit our troops very hard. The commanders did
not have any idea about how cold the weather would be in North Korea.We
had not been issued our winter clothing when we entered Korea; we lacked
gloves, caps, and even winter shoes. We came from Southeast China, where
the average annual temperature is about 72 degrees Fahrenheit. When we
left our homes in early November, the temperature was about 60 degrees.
Two weeks later, in North Korea, the temperature had dropped to below
zero. Many soldiers caught colds and could not keep up with their regi-
ments. Our division lost seven hundred men during the first week due to
severe frostbite.
Third, transportation became another serious problem. To conceal the
southeastern movement of more than one hundred thousand men, the two
armies marched 120 miles through mountains and forests in the cold winter
with heavy snow and without trucks. In these conditions, it was impossible
for the army to move with any kind of speed. The divisions artillery battal-
ion, for example, had some horses that refused to walk on the snow-covered
narrow pass along the cliffs. It was just too slippery and dangerous.The men
came up with the idea of laying down their comforters on the cliffs to cover
the snow and ice. The idea worked, and they led their horses safely through
the pass.
We were behind schedule. On November 25, the CPVF General Head-
quarters ordered the army group to launch its attack in the east, when the
CPVF began its second all-out offensive campaign. But the Ninth Army
Group Headquarters had to ask the General HQ for a two-day delay since
its armies were not yet in position to attack.The General HQ approved the
Ninth HQ's request for a delay.
Two days later, during the evening of November 27, the Ninth HQ
ordered a general attack, which centered on the Chosin Reservoir along the
eastern front. The attack force consisted of eight infantry divisions which
made use of some very successful tactics during the first night attack.
First, the Ninth Army Group achieved a big surprise since its entry into
North Korea had remained undetected for ten days. The U.S. First Marine
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Chinese commanders plan an attack on the UNF at the Chosin Reservoir, November
1950. (Courtesy of Wang Xuedong)
and Seventh Infantry Divisions, the main strength of X Corps, were travel-
ing in one column along one small mountain road and stretched out over
fifty miles. Surprised and unprepared for such a large-scale attack, X Corps
had been broken down into five sections by the next morning. They were
separated by the CPVF troops at Ryutam-ri (Yudam-ri), Sinhungri
(Chinhung-ri), Koto-ri, Hahwaok-ri (Hagaru-ri), and Sachang-ri.
Second, in order to destroy as many enemy regiments as possible—rather
than to simply push them back into South Korea—the Ninth Army Group
purposely concentrated a total of one hundred thousand men. The UN
forces engaged in the Chosin Reservoir fighting consisted of about forty
thousand troops.
Third, we were able to surround the separated UN units.The Twentieth
Army surrounded part of the First Marine Division at Hahwaok-ri from
three directions.
To our surprise, however, superiority in numbers and quick encircle-
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ment did not bring us a victory. Even though we were able to trap the First
Marine Division and cut it into smaller pieces during the first night, we
could not destroy the division.
On November 28, the Fifty-eighth Division employed its three regi-
ments to attack the divided and surrounded U.S. Marines at Hahwaok-ri.
The battle turned out to be extremely fierce and difficult.The marines were
indeed the toughest fighting unit among the UN forces. After being divided
and surrounded, they immediately formed defensive perimeters at three places
with the help of their tanks. They also constructed a makeshift airstrip for
resupply of ammunition and winter equipment, as well as for shipping out
their wounded. They were able to hold their ground with their superior
firepower and air cover. They exhausted our repeated attempts to annihilate
their companies and smaller units.
On November 29, the marines launched counterattacks in order to break
our encirclement and to connect their scattered units. Our 172nd Regiment
held the highest hill, the key point of the Fifty-eighth Division's line. The
regimental commander gave me an order to position my First Company on
the middle of the hill.
Shortly after noon, the marines attacked our first line of defense at the
bottom of the hill, which was held by the Third Company. I never saw
anything like the marines' combat moves before. When our defense stopped
their charge, the marines just dug in instead of retreating all the way back to
their original positions.They stayed wherever they were stopped, waited for
reinforcements, and then charged again. With each charge they came closer
to our position, until they were no more than two dozen meters away. After
nearly four hours of heavy fighting, the Third Company lost its position, its
captain, and most of its soldiers.
My company now held the first defense line. About 5:00 P.M. the Ameri-
can artillery began to shell our positions, followed by a charge in the center
of our line by more than two hundred marines. Thanks to the hill and the
rocks, we had strong positions in the middle of our line and we defeated the
marines' charge. And thanks to the early darkness of the winter, at about 7:00
P.M. the marines retreated.They did not intend to charge the hill again that
night.
Night at the Chosin Reservoir belonged to us. On November 29, our
172nd Regiment launched a night attack against the marines. Our regiment
recovered some of the positions we lost to the marines during the day, but
we were unable to break through their lines before dawn. Next morning,
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The 172nd Regiment, Fifty-eighth Division, CPVF Twentieth Army attacks the First
Marine at the Chosin Reservoir, November 1950. (Courtesy of Wang Xuedong)
the marines retook the positions with well-organized counterattacks, strong
firing power, and air support.
The battle at Chosin swayed back and forth, but the fighting was always
intense. During the three days of fighting, the 172nd Regiment suffered
very heavy casualties. Our battalion ran out of ammunition, and we received
less than half of our daily ration of food. Also, the temperature dropped to 20
degrees below zero. My company was nearly disabled due to combat casual-
ties and frostbite.
On November 30, the Ninth HQ changed its plan. Instead of attacking
the First Marine and Seventh Divisions at the same time, it decided to con-
centrate its attacks on the Seventh Infantry Division first at Sinhungri.This
time the offensive force was much stronger. The Ninth Army Group orga-
nized all of its own artillery units and two divisions of the Twenty-seventh
Army (the Eightieth and Eighty-first), about twenty-five thousand strong, to
attack the three thousand men in the U.S. Seventh Division s Thirty-second
Regiment at Sinhungri.
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Having suffered heavy casualties and exhausted our supplies of food and
ammunition, our Twentieth Army was supposed to be relieved by the Twenty-
sixth Army, which had been in reserve. The Twenty-sixth Army, with fresh
troops, was assigned the job of eliminating the U.S. First Marine Division at
Hahwaok-ri.
But the Twenty-sixth Army never made it to Hahwaok-ri. On Decem-
ber 1, when the Twenty-sixth Army was still about fifty miles away from
Hahwaok-ri, the marines broke through our Twentieth Army's encirclement
and began their retreat to the south. Unable to stop the marines, our Twen-
tieth Army was ordered to slow down their retreat and stay with them until
the Twenty-sixth Army had a chance to catch up and destroy them.
For the next eleven days, the remnants of the Twentieth Army harassed
the marines with small-scale attacks.We would ambush them, hit them hard,
and then run. During the night, we set up roadblocks in order to stop or
delay their southward withdrawal. During the daytime, however, the ma-
rines broke our roadblocks and moved south about five to ten miles every
day. They traveled on the road while we stalked them in the mountains
along both sides of the road.
I had only eighteen men left in my company. On December 5, my
company had to combine with two other companies to make a new com-
pany. Even though we did not know each other very well, the tough fight
and hardships brought us closer together quickly. We shared our food, and
we cut up our blankets and gave them to those who suffered from frostbite.
The men wrapped their cold, injured hands and feet with our blanket pieces.
We thought we could get some supplies, at least some food, left behind by the
marines when they pulled out of Hahwaok-ri. But they burned everything
before December 7, the day the last marine unit evacuated Hahwaok-ri.
On December 12, the U.S. First Marine Division met the U.S. Third
Infantry Division at Hamhung.The Chinese Twenty-sixth Army never man-
aged to catch up and engage the marines, who kept moving southward until
they reached the coastal city of Hungnam. On December 24, the First Ma-
rine Division left North Korea at Hungnam Harbor and sailed for Pusan.
Following this setback, the CPVF General HQ ordered the Ninth Army
Group to disengage and stop the fighting with X Corps. Since the northern
mountains end near Hamhung areas, the UN forces could take advantage of
their tremendous firepower and mobility on the plains.They also had better
air and artillery cover and uninterrupted supplies along the coastal areas.We
had to give up our hard pursuit.
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We had our own problems. First, we were unable to pursue retreating
UN troops because of our unmotorized infantry and lack of supplies. The
Twenty-sixth Army delayed their movement because they had to wait for
their food and ammunition.We had thought we could collect grain from the
local Korean people and ammunition from retreated enemy positions. We
were wrong. The Chosin Reservoir area was very lightly populated and
could not feed a large force with more than one hundred thousand men.
Second, the Ninth Army Group from South China was not prepared for
a cold winter battle in North Korea. The Ninth had more than forty thou-
sand casualties (out of one hundred thousand frontline troops) during its
first battle (from November 17 to December 21, 1950). One half of the
casualties were from frostbite. For the next three months, the entire Ninth
Army Group became a giant field hospital for its wounded and severe frost-
bite soldiers. The army group was virtually disabled and unable to fight a
major engagement until the late spring of 1951.
Third, as the CPVF began to strike south, the tactics of "divide, encircle,
and destroy" began to lose effectiveness. Although successful at first, the UN
forces rapidly adjusted to these tactics. Also, as our supply lines became ex-
tended, the damage to our logistical efforts caused by UN air strikes became
increasingly heavy.
For all of these reasons, the Ninth Army Group managed to drive the X
Corps south of the 38th Parallel, but it fell short of the original plan of
annihilating two divisions of X Corps. By the end of 1950, the badly de-
pleted army group was ordered to return to the Chinese—North Korean
border for its replenishment and reorganization.
Part Four
On the Front Lines
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Chapter 14
The Hwachon Reservoir Fighting
In early June 1951, only a few weeks before the beginning of the peace talks, General
Van Fleet ordered the Eighth Army to advance on a limited front to consolidate the
UN positions (Operation Piledriver). A squad leader at the time, Staff Sergeant
Charles Bielecki describes the fighting that took place in the Hwachon Reservoir area.
At one point, when he felt a push from behind during the fighting, Sergeant Bielecki
discovered he had been hit by the body parts of a Chinese soldier. During the action on
June 5, the company's first sergeant, Master Sergeant Ben Wilson, won the Medal of
Honor for killing thirty-four Chinese soldiers. Sadly, when the fighting concluded a
few days later, Sergeant Bielecki was the only member left from his original squad,
which had fought in the Chosin Reservoir. All the rest had been killed or wounded.
Staff Sergeant Charles M. Bielecki
/ Company, Thirty-first Infantry Regiment,
Seventh Infantry Division
ABOUT 3:00 P.M. on June 5,1951,1 (Item) Company was ordered to attack
in the Hwachon Reservoir area, which was located in central Korea, north
of Chunchon and a little south of the 38th Parallel. Our mission was to take
a hill, the largest hill in the area. We began our attack in a valley and started
the long climb up the hill.
At the time of the attack, I was the squad leader for the Third Squad in
the Second Platoon. We started up the hill while our artillery bombarded
the enemy positions. After we had gone about a quarter or perhaps halfway
up the hill, the order came down the line to fix bayonets and, moments later,
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to open fire. By this time our artillery fire had lifted, but we still had not
received any enemy fire. It looked like the attack might be a cakewalk.
When we approached the Chinese trenches, however, the real battle
began.The fighting was hard, but somehow we managed to take the first line
of trenches. We found dead and wounded Chinese all over the place; it was
very sad. Most of their wounds were head wounds, because the trenches
protected other parts of their bodies from our fire.
When we passed beyond the first line of trenches, members of my squad
suddenly warned me about an enemy soldier nearby, one that I didn't see. I
turned to my left and, sure enough, there was a Chinese soldier about fifty to
sixty feet away. I fired and hit him eight times. When we came to a second
line of trenches the fighting became even more intense. The Chinese hit us
with everything they had, especially hand grenades, which they threw by the
buckets. Fortunately for us, many of their grenades were duds, or I probably
wouldn't be around today.
As we approached the second trench, heavy fighting continued, but we
did force the Chinese to retreat. During the battle, I looked up at the hori-
zon and saw a rugged-looking figure coming over the top of the ridgeline.
When I raised my rifle to fire, the soldier yelled out, "Don't shoot, it's me,
Monterosso, don't shoot." Fortunately, I did not. Corporal Monterosso, who
was in the Second Squad, had an amazing story to tell. He told us that
somehow his entire squad got up on the hill ahead of the rest of us and
found themselves surrounded by Chinese soldiers. All of the other members
of his squad, including his squad leader, were killed. His squad leader, he said,
had his head blown apart by small arms fire. As for himself, he had been
literally blown into the air, probably by a grenade. When he landed, he had
lost his rifle, his helmet, and didn't have the foggiest idea which direction to
run. Fortunately, Monterosso chose the right direction, toward our lines, but
he was in pretty bad shape. He had been shot in the leg, he was scared to
death, and his clothes were torn and just hanging on his body. The medics
evacuated him, and he returned to duty several months later.
While we had reached the crest of the hill and had driven the Chinese
back, we soon discovered we had not finished the job—there were Chinese
soldiers all around us. That's when Master Sergeant Ben Wilson went into
action. Sergeant Wilson was our first sergeant, and normally first sergeants
hang around the company commander a little behind the front line. Ben,
however, was not the kind of soldier to hang back when fighting was going
on; he had to be in the middle of it. Once the fighting started, he became
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another Sergeant York and took on the entire Chinese army. He shot Chi-
nese, he bayoneted Chinese, and he picked up Chinese grenades and threw
them right back at the enemy. Later, another soldier told me he even killed
seven Chinese soldiers with a trenching tool, an amazing feat. Altogether,
Master Sergeant Wilson was credited with killing thirty-four Chinese sol-
diers on June 5. Fortunately, his heroic efforts did not go unrewarded, and he
later received our nation's highest award, the Medal of Honor.
Another soldier, Staff Sergeant Frank Monfetti, the Fourth Squad leader,
was badly wounded on the hill when he got caught in an open area with no
cover. The first medic who attempted to save him was fatally wounded. The
second medic, after crawling on the ground, finally reached him and man-
aged to drag him back to our line while we gave covering fire. After we got
Monfetti to a safe place, we discovered he had been hit sixteen times. Unfor-
tunately, Frank died about 10:30 the next morning. He was a good friend of
mine and a very nice guy.
We also lost our platoon leader, Lieutenant Tally Bugs Sheppard, an-
other nice guy. Lieutenant Sheppard was a small town boy who, with his
family, had a general merchandise store in Ohio. He was always talking about
going back home to his business and his family. Another soldier, Private First
Class Barney, received a nasty head wound and had to be evacuated. Some-
how, Platoon Sergeant Bill Rowland managed to keep us all together, which
was essential, because there were still plenty of Chinese on the hill.
One time, during the fighting, 1 had an experience I will never forget.
Suddenly, I felt as if someone had come up behind me and pushed me, or
put a forearm in my back, but when I turned around there was nobody
there. Then I looked on the ground. I saw the arm and shoulder of a man;
this is what had "pushed" me in the back a few seconds earlier. I don't know
how this happened, but I assume the soldier received a direct hit by an
artillery or mortar round. I am sure he was Chinese.
The fighting on the hill went on, with much of the combat being hand-
to-hand, or at distances of no more than fifteen or twenty feet. At times it
was total chaos; we were confused, and I think the Chinese were equally
confused. The fighting on June 5 cost us a number of good men, including
most of our officers and NCOs.
About one hour into the battle, a ROK unit arrived on the hill to give
us some much needed support.The ROK soldiers all wore yellow scarfs, and
each had a big yellow insignia on his helmet. Unfortunately, before the ROKs
reached the crest of the hill and got into position, the Chinese sent up four
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red flares, their signal for a counterattack, and started blowing their bugles.
When the ROKs saw the flares and heard the bugles, they just took off down
the hill, all of them. Fortunately, we had just been supplied with ammuni-
tion, which we desperately needed. Most of us had either been out or very
nearly out.
Captain Smick, our company commander and a WWII veteran, was
severely wounded during the fighting, along with his runner, and First Lieu-
tenant Willard took over the company. Incoming artillery and mortar fire
continued to pound the hill while a strong Chinese force attacked our posi-
tions. Lieutenant Willard decided that if we tried to hold the hill we would
only be slaughtered, especially since the ROKs had bugged out. He gave the
order to "back off the hill," but added, "I don't want anybody turning and
running." So we backed off the hill as masses of Chinese soldiers poured
over the ridgeline and took over our positions. Some of the guys actually did
turn and run, despite Lieutenant Willard s order, but most of us kept firing
our weapons as we retreated. That same evening we dug into a hill nearby.
We remained there for the night, very quiet, because none of us were in a
talking mood.
For the next several days we just held our positions, rested, and got ready
for the next attack. We also received supplies and replacements. The attack
came four days later, on June 9. By this time, I had been promoted from
squad leader to assistant platoon sergeant. Sadly, I was the only one left in the
squad I had served with in the Chosin Reservoir.The others had either been
killed or were wounded and had to be evacuated.
Again we attacked, and again Master Sergeant Ben Wilson took on the
entire Chinese army by himself. On June 5 he had been just warming up for
June 9.This time, he took out about forty-two Chinese soldiers, using noth-
ing more than his rifle, bayonet, and grenades. Somehow he managed to do
all of this without receiving a serious wound. Since no one can receive the
Medal of Honor twice, he received the Distinguished Service Cross for his
action on June 9. Incidently, we did finally take the hill on the second day.
Most of the hard fighting took place on June 9; the next day it rained pretty
hard, and the Chinese just took off.
Reflecting on these events years later, I think we could have used more
artillery support before we attacked, and perhaps an air strike would have
been helpful. But there was no way the Chinese were going to give up that
hill without some serious man-to-man fighting.
Chapter 15
Life on the MLR
This marine, Private First Class Bruce Lippert, provides few details about combat
operations in Korea; yet, he was wounded twice. He does, however, provide a glimpse
of what frontline soldiers had to endure, such as the cold and the rats. Once, while on
guard duty and physically exhausted, he pulled the pin on a grenade and held it in his
hand to keep awake.
Private First Class Bruce D. Lippert
C Company, Fifth Regiment, First Marine Division
ON MARCH 2,1952, we left San Diego for Korea on the Rego. We arrived
in Korea and disembarked on March 27. Almost immediately we found
ourselves on a train headed for the front, and then on a truck to our unit. I
was assigned to Charlie Company, Fifth Regiment, First Marine Division.
My job—machine gunner.
By the time I arrived in Korea both the Communist forces and the UN
forces had dug in, and the lines had stabilized in what had become a war of
the trenches. This was supposed to be a quiet war, just a "police action," as
President Truman called it. For a quiet war, there seemed to be a lot of
mortar and artillery shells dropping on us from time to time. On occasions,
like when we were at Bunker Hill, the fighting was really tough, and we
found ourselves engaged in hand-to-hand combat.We lived in the trenches
with the rats, which were some of the largest I had ever seen. Most of the
time we spent on guard duty or some work detail.We slept in bunkers made
of timbers and sandbags, which were built right in the middle of the trenches.
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Back slope of the MLR, Punchbowl, early 1953. (Courtesy of Richard Peters)
Only our shoes came off when we slept; we kept our clothes on night and
day, for weeks at a time. Bathing consisted of washing with warm water in a
helmet liner, except when we were trucked back to the rear for "Little R&R."
On those occasions, about once a month, we could take a shower, get clean
clothes, and even do a little shopping at the PX.
Like everyone else who served in Korea, I have a lasting memory of the
cold. We wore heavy parkas, thermal "Mickey Mouse" boots, and all kinds of
other stuff, but I still couldn't get warm during the winter months. At the
same time, I found the summer heat oppressive, mostly because of the high
humidity.
During the night, the Chinese repeatedly blew their bugles, even when
they had no intention of attacking our lines. It was just one of their gim-
micks to make us jumpy At Christmastime in 1952, they even played Christ-
mas carols over their loudspeakers, to make us homesick I presume.We heard
"Silent Night" and all the other well-known carols drifting out over no-
man's-land while freezing our butts off thousands of miles from home.
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A view from the American MLR looking toward the enemy lines, Punchbowl, early
1953. (Courtesy of Richard Peters)
One thing never changed—we were always dead tired. If we weren't on
guard duty, we were repairing bunkers or doing some other damn detail.
There were times when I think I would have given six months' pay for one
night in a soft, warm bed. Once, when I was totally exhausted and afraid I
would fall asleep on guard duty, I actually pulled the pin on a grenade and
held it in my hand. I don't really recommend it, but I didn't fall asleep.
I was wounded twice in Korea, the last time in the chest. After a heli-
copter ride and some emergency medical attention, they put me on a hospi-
tal ship and sent me home. I arrived at Treasure Island in March 1953, delighted
to be home. I'm proud to have served my country, but this was not an
experience I would want to repeat.
Chapter 16
A BAR Man's Story
It is generally recognized that one of the most dangerous jobs in the infantry was to
operate a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR). The following soldier, Sergeant Albert
Snyder, did just that prior to becoming a squad leader. Arriving in Korea in April
1951, he saw action during the final months of UN offensive operations, just before
the conflict became a stalemated war of the trenches. He also witnessed the implemen-
tation of the army's new policy of integrating all black units into regular army units, a
policy that sometimes led to racial incidents. After returning to the U.S. in 1952,
Sergeant Snyder experienced a warm welcome from a perfect stranger, a contrast to the
indifference experienced by most Korean War veterans when they returned.
Sergeant Albert Snyder
I Company, Thirty-first Infantry Regiment,
Seventh Infantry Division
IN 1950,1 was a twenty-three-year-old single man living in Cumberland,
Maryland. In the eyes of my draft board, that made me just right for the
army. I entered the army in November 1950, and after training at Camp
Pickett,Virginia, I found myself on the USS General A.E. Anderson headed
for Korea. When the ship pulled out of the harbor near Camp Stoneman,
California, an army band on the dock played "So Long It's Been Good to
Know You." When we arrived in Yokohama another army band on the dock
played "If I Knew You Were Coming I'da Baked a Cake." After processing at
Camp Drake, we took a train to Sasebo in southern Japan, then some type of
ferry to Pusan, where we disembarked. Next, we climbed aboard a Korean
train with straight-back wooden seats that took us north to Chechon, and
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we were practically at the front. After a truck ride, I wound up in I (Item)
Company, Third Battalion, Thirty-first Regiment, Seventh Division. It was
early April 1951.
At the time I arrived, Item Company was about 75 percent of its regular
strength, due to the terrible losses it suffered at the Chosin Reservoir in late
November and early December 1950. Only about 20 percent of the men
that had been on the Item Company roster in mid-November 1950 were
still with the company. When I got there in April, the company consisted of
Regular Army (RA) personnel transferred from the First Battalion, WWII
reservists (ERs) that began arriving in late December, and draftees that were
just beginning to arrive.
I was assigned to the Second Squad, Third Platoon, which at the time
consisted of only three members—Sergeant Ortiz, the squad leader; Corpo-
ral Harold Newcombe, the BAR man; and Private First Class Glenn Black,
a rifleman. Ortiz and Newcombe had transferred from the First Battalion.
Private First Class Black had been wounded in the Chosin Reservoir fight-
ing and had just returned from a hospital stay in Japan.
In mid-April, a few days after I arrived, two men in Item Company
were seriously wounded during a firefight with enemy troops. I wasn't in-
volved in the firefight, but Harold Newcombe and I were assigned to ac-
company the two wounded men and four Korean litter bearers as an armed
escort against enemy guerrillas operating in the area. Actually, to expedite
the trip to the battalion aid station, we became litter bearers when the Kore-
ans bearers became exhausted. One of the men had a very visible back wound,
and the company medics had lashed him face down on the litter.The terrain
was very rough, and I found the job of serving as a litter bearer utterly
exhausting. About halfway to the aid station, one of the wounded men kept
moaning and muttering, "Please, please, please." When we finally arrived at
the aid station both men were still alive, but unconscious. I didn't know
either man, but to this day I wonder if they made it.
By mid-May 1951, enough replacements had arrived to bring Item Com-
pany up to almost full strength. Sergeant Ortiz had the luxury of commanding
a squad consisting of eight men (a squad at full strength had twelve). The new
men in the Second Squad were Private Andrew McLaughlin, Private Donald
Queen, Private Jasper Tobey, Private Arthur Lancaster, and myself.
In early June, Item Company was engaged in heavy fighting in the
Punchbowl area at Hwachon-Myon, near the Hwachon Reservoir.We man-
aged to drive the Chinese out of their first trench line, but unfortunately, a
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Corporal Albert Snyder, I Company, Thirty-first Regiment, Seventh Division,
operating the BAR on Hill 1073, October 1951. (Courtesy of Albert Snyder)
member of my squad, Private McLaughlin, was killed in the fighting, and
Privates Queen and Lancaster were wounded. I didn't fare too well myself.
At the time, I was the BAR man for the squad and was carrying a ton of
ammunition. When I jumped into one of the empty Chinese trenches, my
foot accidently landed on an unexploded American grenade. Somehow, per-
haps because I was so weighted down with ammo, I severely sprained my
ankle and had to be evacuated. After hobbling down to the aid station by
myself, they took me by ambulance to a MASH unit, and eventually to an
army hospital in Japan. I returned to Item Company in late July, after an
absence of about seven weeks, but with no Purple Heart. No skin was bro-
ken, so I guess I didn't qualify.
In late September 1951, Item Company occupied a hill we knew as
"Hill 1073." Frankly, I don't even remember where we were at the time; the
hills in Korea all looked the same to me anyway. When we started up the
long trail to the top, we discovered enemy mortars had zeroed in on some
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parts of the trail, which received incoming rounds periodically. About two-
thirds of the way up, a barrage came in about two hundred feet in front of
the Third Platoon. We all dove for cover, and when the barrage lifted, we got
up and ran forward. Everyone in the Third Platoon made it okay, but we
passed two dead soldiers that were caught standing up by the first rounds.
One, I learned later, was an artillery forward observer.
On October 4, our company commander, Lieutenant McGuire, led the
entire company on a combat patrol near Hill 1073. Suddenly there was a
loud explosion and someone hollered, "Look out for that log." When the
"log" landed near our squad, we discovered it was Sergeant Richardson's leg.
He was walking ahead of us and had stepped on a box mine, which blew off
his entire leg from the thigh down. His boot was still on his leg. A mortar
blast killed Sergeant Drouillard as well, a squad leader in the Third Platoon.
Several others were also wounded on the patrol.
Not long after I arrived in early April, we began to receive our first black
soldiers in the company. This was in keeping with the new policy of elimi-
nating all separate black units and integrating the men into regular army
units. While the process generally went pretty smoothly, there were some
problems.We had one with our assistant platoon sergeant, a bigot (who shall
remain nameless) from Atlanta, Georgia. While we were in reserve a black
man, Sergeant Williams, was promoted to platoon sergeant. In November,
when we moved up on Heartbreak Ridge for the second time, our assistant
platoon sergeant had to share the Third Platoon Headquarters bunker with
Sergeant Williams, and he made it clear he wasn't happy about the situation.
He would "rather go over and sleep with the Chinese," he said. When word
of this got back to Sergeant Williams and went up the chain of command,
our "assistant platoon sergeant" became an "assistant squad leader." He did
manage to hang on to his rank, but it was still a demotion.
On October 26,1951, the entire Third Platoon, led by Lieutenant Cul-
ver, went on a patrol about eight or nine hundred yards in front of the MLR,
which was strung out along the top of Heartbreak Ridge. Sergeant Telly
served as our squad leader (Sergeant Ortiz had rotated home), and I still
operated the BAR. As we approached a suspected fortified enemy outpost,
the point man, Private First Class Clyde Rampart, was hit by hail of gre-
nades and wounded. Lieutenant Culver sent him back to the MLR and
made Private First Class Willie "Frenchie" De Herrera from Colorado the
new point man. We had advanced about ten yards when De Herrera and a
black soldier who had just arrived, Private Peters, were struck by small arms
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Preparing to fire a 57mm recoilless rifle. (Courtesy of Forty-fifth Infantry Division
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fire and grenades. Both fell seriously wounded. To bring supporting fire on
the outpost, Private First Class Roland Wakenight and his assistant gunner,
Private First Class Freed, set up the machine gun on a small knob about fifty
yards from the enemy positions. At the same time the platoon came under
rifle fire from enemy snipers.
While the platoon was pinned down by enemy fire, Private James Sevier,
who was only seventeen years old and married, exposed himself to enemy
fire by making three attempts to reach Private First Class De Herrera, who
lay wounded just over the crest of a hill. On the first attempt Private Sevier
was beaten back by heavy small arms fire; on the second attempt he was
thrown back by a concussion grenade. Finally, on the third attempt, he made
it over the hill and found De Herrera, but he had already died from his
wounds. Private Sevier lifted De Herrera s body over his shoulder and car-
ried him back over the crest of the hill, where he got help from others. For
his bravery under fire, Lieutenant Culver recommended Private Sevier for
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the Distinguished Service Cross. It never came through, however, and I never
learned the reason.
After our machine guns and 57mm recoilless rifle had silenced the snip-
ers, the rest of us in the platoon stormed the hill and took the enemy out-
post. Then we recovered our dead and wounded and pulled back to the
MLR. In addition to De Herrera, we lost Wakenight, Freed, and West, and a
number of others were wounded.
In late January 1952, the Thirty-first Regiment was deployed on a series
of connected ridges in the very rugged mountain terrain near Heartbreak
Ridge. By this time, I had been promoted from BAR man to squad leader
(the sergeants stripes came a few weeks later).There were rumors that the
regiment was going to be relieved shortly. When this happened, it was the
usual procedure for the relieving unit to send an advance party a few days
before the switch took place. My two-man bunker was located in a position
that commanded a strategic view of the enemy positions about fifteen hun-
dred yards away across a valley.
One sunny afternoon, when the temperature warmed up to about fif-
teen degrees above zero, the Third Platoon leader, Lieutenant Kleinfield,
escorted what I assumed was an officer from the rumored relief unit to my
bunker and adjoining trench. While the "officer" didn't have any bars or
insignia on his outer garment, that wasn't at all unusual for officers on the
front lines.They remained in the trench for about forty-five minutes observ-
ing the enemy positions, which at the time were receiving fire from our
75mm recoilless rifle team. I also noticed that the soldier without insignia
seemed unusually relaxed and nonchalant for an infantry officer or a high
ranking noncom. He needed a shave, wasn't wearing a helmet, and wasn't
carrying a weapon—all very unusual.
The next day, while I was in the chow line on the reverse slope, I saw the
sloppy "officer" again, about four or five men ahead of me. Only then did I
learn from one of the other guys in the line the name of this mysterious
person. It was Bill Mauldin, the famous World War II cartoonist and creator
of "Willie and Joe."Two or three days later Mauldin accompanied Lieuten-
ant Kleinfield and a reinforced squad from the Third Platoon on a routine
night ambush patrol. I guess he wanted to get the feel of combat for his
cartoons and stories.
In January 1952, a patrol from Item Company was ambushed and sev-
eral men were killed and wounded. Two bodies were left out in no-man's-
land until the next night, when they were recovered by a patrol of volunteers,
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including Jim Sevier and Clyde Rampart from the Third Platoon. Later,
Rampart told me the dead GIs had been stripped of their boots and most of
their outer garments, and were frozen stiff in awkward positions. As a result,
they were very hard to handle, and there was a lot of slipping and falling
before they got the bodies to the MLR.
Finally, after about ten months in Korea and thirty-six points, on Febru-
ary 4,1952,1 left Item Company on rotation back to the States. I went home
the way I arrived, by boat.We started at Inchon, disembarked at Sasebo, then
boarded the Pvt. Sadao S. Munemori for Seattle. I flew by commercial airline
from Seattle to Camp Meade, Maryland (now Fort Meade), which was close
to my hometown of Cumberland, Maryland. It was great to be home again.
While I think most Korean veterans were generally received with indif-
ference by the public when they came home, I did have one very pleasant
experience. Not long after arriving at Camp Meade for processing, some of
us with passes decided to go into nearby Baltimore and visit Baltimore's
famous "Block." After spending some time at the Hi-Ho Club, someone
unknown to us picked up our bar tab. I figure it was probably some old vet
who recognized our ribbons and knew we were Korean War veterans. Re-
gardless of who the person was, it was a nice gesture, and it left us with a
good feeling.
Chapter 17
First Combat
This story is about a WWII veteran sergeant, experienced and knowledgeable in all
forms of small arms combat, and a totally green private first class (one of the authors of
this book), who faced an enemy attack for the first time. The story reveals the value of
combat experience as the sergeant calmly tries to tell the nervous private what he
should do in reacting to the attack. This brieffirefight is also typical of the kind of
fighting that took place after both the Communist and UN forces had ceased major
offensive operations. In this skirmish the Chinese aimed only at getting into the UN
trenches, killing as many GIs and ROK soldiers as possible, and returning to their
own lines; it was not their intent to capture and hold the UN positions permanently.
Nevertheless, such minor engagements, when repeated many times across the penin-
sula over a period of many months, claimed thousands of lives on both sides.
Private First Class Richard Peters
A Company, Fifth Regimental Combat Team
SOMETIME LATE IN March 1953, we received our orders to go back on
the hill, somewhere in the Punchbowl area. I was in the Fourth Squad,Third
Platoon, A Company, Fifth RCT, and had been in Korea only since January.
While I had been on the front line before, I had yet to see a Chinese soldier
or experience any real combat.
We reached the top of the hill after a tough climb, and Corporal Boucher,
our squad leader, showed us our guard positions. I stood guard on the last
post on our right flank, only about fifteen or twenty yards from the next
unit. The next unit, however, was a ROK unit. At the time I attached no
particular significance to this, but Sergeant Riewe, our platoon sergeant,
The U.S. Eighth Army Front Line, October 31,1952. Source: Department of the Army, United States Army in the Korean
War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), Map V.
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certainly did. He knew our positions before we left for the hill, and had
predicted that we were likely to take a hit this time.
In general, I was never very fond of sergeants, but Master Sergeant Riewe
was an unusual and remarkable sergeant in many ways. He was totally in
charge of the platoon, and while he could roar like most sergeants, he sel-
dom found it necessary. Even if he spoke softly, his voice exuded authority.
He commanded much fear from those below his rank, and respect from
those both below and above him.
Normally, as a private first class, I would have had little contact with a
platoon sergeant like Sergeant Riewe. We had just finished about six weeks
in reserve, however, where we trained, dug drainage ditches in the company
area, and all the other pleasantries reserved for army privates. By chance,
Sergeant Riewe chose to bunk with the Fourth Squad, and my cot hap-
pened to be very near his in the squad tent. For this reason I came to know
something about him as a person, as well as a sergeant. He liked to chat,
which we often did at night before slipping into our sleeping bags. He fre-
quently talked about his experiences in WWII, the army in Korea, and some-
times just life in general. He was better read than most sergeants, and enjoyed
conversing about history and similar subjects. This appealed to me since I
was a bookish person with some college, but I was also totally unencum-
bered with the slightest trace of soldierly qualities, and furthermore, had no
particular desire to acquire them. Sergeant Riewe, I think, saw me as some-
thing of a challenge; if he could make a soldier out of me he could make a
soldier out of anyone.
In every way, Sergeant Riewe was the epitome of the ideal combat
soldier. Physically tough, tall and straight as an arrow, he carried not one
ounce of fat. His knowledge of small arms weaponry was so thorough he
frequently gave demonstrations in training sessions for other units.Trained as
a paratrooper, he had seen action during many of the major battles ofWWII,
including Bastogne. Highly decorated, he had received every major decora-
tion awarded by the army except the Medal of Honor, plus a number of
decorations from foreign governments. He was actually a German, but for-
tunately he fought on the Allied side. We used to joke that if he had fought
on the German side the Allies might have lost the war.
Sergeant Riewe saw soldiering as a necessary and noble profession, one
that required courage and a deep commitment. Career soldiers who lacked
these qualities, and who took advantage of their rank to ensure their per-
sonal comfort, were often the targets of his sharp tongue. Soldiers were
Private First Class Richard Peters, Fifth RCT, Punchbowl, early 1953.
(Courtesy of Richard Peters)
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supposed to fight, not perform some cushy job well behind the lines. I always
suspected Sergeant Riewe was one of those rare individuals who actually en-
joyed the thrill of combat, although that might be going too far. He expected
much from the officers, and he could be very critical of them if they failed to
live up to his standards. One evening he told the story of how he once went all
the way through Officers Candidate School, graduated at the top of his class,
and then informed his superiors on graduation day he had decided to remain
a noncom. It's a crazy story, but somehow it kind of fits Sergeant Riewe.
Even more than the others, I think Sergeant Riewe had a real problem
adjusting to the "limited" war in Korea. He wanted to fight to "win," like in
WWII, but by 1953, the Korean War had become a stalemated war of the
trenches, fought according to rules made in Washington. He also disliked the
rotation system, which permitted soldiers to return home just about the time
they had learned to perform their jobs with proficiency. Sometimes he would
compare the army in Korea with the army in WWII, but always with a melan-
choly tone in his voice.
All of this chitchat ceased, however, once we went back on the hill in
late March. Everything went pretty smoothly the first night on line, although
I do remember pulling about nine hours of guard duty, which was a record
for me. Very quickly, however, we discovered a problem, especially to Ser-
geant Riewe. The ROKs on the right flank of the Third Platoon frequently
moved back and forth in the trenches between their positions and our posi-
tions, apparently for no particular reason. Sergeant Riewe would have none
of this, and he had barbed wire stretched across the trench between our last
guard post and the first ROK guard post. It served its purpose, and the
ROKs remained in their own sector.
Life in the trenches for the next ten days or so was pretty routine. We
received incoming mortar rounds on occasions, but nothing very heavy. The
Fourth Squad bunker, however, built right in the trench, was a disaster. It
leaked like a sieve, the commo wire beds were too short for us to stretch out
fully, we couldn't stand up without bending, and the place was lousy with
rats. Sergeant Riewe immediately proclaimed the facility unacceptable and
ordered the construction of a new bunker. Since the Fourth Squad would
occupy it, we got to build it. Unfortunately, all the trees in the area had been
cut down or blasted away by shell fire, so we had to haul our timbers from
the main supply road, a considerable distance away. We needed the new
bunker, but we didn't find building it a whole lot of fun, especially after
standing guard duty at night.
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The rat problem was not so easily solved; rats were naturally attracted to
the bunkers for warmth and food. They were both numerous and huge, and
they scurried about the bunker as if they owned the place. Whenever we saw
a rat we grabbed our bayonets and tried to stab it, but we were arguably
more dangerous to each other than to the rats. Only Junitz, a steeplejack
from Chicago, had success. While on guard duty one day, I heard a piercing
yell. It was Junitz; he had just stabbed a rat and wanted everyone in the
battalion to know it. I think this was our only kill, making Junitz a kind of
local hero.
Since all the action was at night, daytime guard duty was about the
easiest duty we pulled. There really was little to do except to stare out into a
bleak and treeless no-man's-land and wish we could be somewhere else.
Frequently, air force jets provided a nice show and helped relieve our bore-
dom by dropping napalm bombs on the Chinese MLR. Once in a while, I
pulled a paperback out of my pocket, but only rarely. Sergeant Riewe had no
appreciation for this sort of thing.
After about two weeks on line, we still had not received the hit that
Sergeant Riewe had predicted, but we did have plenty of noise. Our artillery
fired day and night, the ROKs rattled their machine guns incessantly for no
particular reason, and the Chinese in the valley blew their bugles during the
night, but did not attack. So far the Fourth Squad had even escaped going
out on patrol, although the same could not be said for some of the other
squads in A Company. Then, about 3:00 one night in early April, the Chi-
nese attacked.
At the time of the attack I was on guard at my usual post, the one next
to the ROKs. I thought I saw movement, directly to my front, but I wasn't
certain so I didn't report any thing. There had been a number of false reports
of attacks called in, and I didn't want to test Sergeant Riewe s patience with
another false one. It also concerned me that neither Junitz on my left nor the
ROKs on my right gave any indication that they saw anything. Perhaps I had
been wrong.
After waiting and watching a few more minutes, however, I saw more
movement, around forty yards directly to my front. Fortunately, there was a
good moon that night, and this time I clearly saw four or five men dressed in
white snow suits moving slowly up the hill. They would crawl forward,
pause for a short time, then move forward again.They were headed straight
for my post, and I began to get pretty nervous.
As instructed when we saw enemy soldiers, I called the Third Platoon
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CP and talked to Sergeant Riewe. At first he seemed dubious, and asked me
if I was certain about the Chinese. When I convinced him they were real, he
proceeded to give me instructions in a very clear and calm voice. When I
suggested throwing grenades, he even reminded me to get the grenades
ready by squeezing the pins together. Then I saw more movement and I told
Sergeant Riewe I had to hang up. He promised to be in the trenches promptly.
By this time the Chinese had moved closer to our MLR, probably no
more than twenty-five yards from my guard post. I thought that was close
enough, especially since no one else seemed aware of their presence, so I
threw an HE (high explosive) grenade. It landed on target, exploded, and the
Chinese dropped to the ground. For the next several minutes they remained
in place, or at least I didn't see any more movement.The grenade, I thought,
would surely alert Junitz, only about fifteen yards to my left, or the ROKs on
my right, but it did not. I remember trying to warn Junitz in a kind of loud
whisper, but he never heard me. (He had a hearing problem, probably the
result of his job as a steeplejack.) And the ROKs, who normally fired at
everything, were as quiet as church mice. I felt very alone.
More than anything else, I wanted to "light up" the area so that I could
share my problem with the others. I could have tossed a flare for that pur-
pose, but instead I threw a WP (white phosphorous) grenade. At that mo-
ment I could not actually see any Chinese soldiers, so I just threw it where
they had dropped to the ground a few minutes earlier. The WP grenade
worked well, and for a few precious seconds the area lit up nicely
Then came the big surprise. Instead of the four or five Chinese soldiers I
had reported to Sergeant Riewe, about twenty to twenty-five suddenly jumped
to their feet. They moved up the hill and to my right, toward the ROK posi-
tions, but not unnoticed. Now everyone saw them and the entire front opened
up. Both Junitz and the ROKs blazed away with their machine guns.
My first instinct was to throw more grenades, but then I messed up. I
had not yet taken the time to squeeze the pins together, as Sergeant Riewe
had advised me to do only minutes earlier, and the pins didn't pull out as
expected. Instead of fighting the problem, I grabbed my M-l rifle and emp-
tied two clips before they were out of sight. The heavy firing lasted only a
minute or two, and then it was all over. By this time Riewe had arrived, and
he immediately called in mortar and artillery fire as the Chinese fell back
into the valley. I heard later he was pretty upset that no one had set off the
napalm drums placed in front of the MLR.
Nothing really happened during the remaining hours of the night, but I
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think we were all pretty jumpy and afraid that something might happen. I
actually learned nothing from the other guys until I got off guard duty,
about daylight. Even then I got only brief reports because my squad leader,
Corporal Boucher, told me I was going on Little R&R and must leave
immediately. This came as a total surprise because another guy in the squad
had been scheduled. As a result I spent the entire day several miles behind
the line, where I showered, loaded up on candy and cookies, and just took it
easy. The war suddenly seemed far away.
On the way back, we ran into a late snowstorm, and the truck driver
slowed down to a crawl. It was about 10:00 P.M. before I rejoined my squad.
Only then did I learn the details of what had really happened the night
before. Altogether we had recovered the bodies of only three Chinese sol-
diers. I had expected more, but they may have taken some of their dead or
wounded down the hill, especially after the first grenade exploded. A map
that Boucher removed from one of the dead soldiers indicated they had
intended to hit the ROK positions on our right, but had missed by a few
yards.They knew, however, the ROK and American units joined together at
this point, which is why they chose it to attack.
What I learned next came as a shock. The Chinese had actually pen-
etrated the ROK trenches and killed a ROK machine gunner. More serious,
from my perspective, one of them was cutting on the barbed wire Sergeant
Riewe had installed near my guard post that separated the American and
ROK positions. Although the wire was only about fifteen feet from my
guard post, a bend in the trench prevented me from seeing it. Besides, I was
concentrating on the Chinese in front of me. It really hadn't occurred to me
some of them could have made it into our trenches. Fortunately for me, a
ROK soldier shot and killed the Chinese soldier while he was cutting on the
wire. Had the wire not been there, the Chinese soldier would have moved
quickly through the trenches and almost assuredly surprised me from be-
hind. I suddenly found myself grateful both to the ROKs, for killing the
Chinese soldier, and to Sergeant Riewe, for having the foresight to install
the wire. He may have intended it as a barrier for the ROKs, but it also
worked for the Chinese. Sergeant Riewe may very well have had this in
mind as well.
Although I remained in Korea until after the truce, I never again fired
my rifle at an enemy soldier. A short time after this action took place, I was
unexpectedly transferred to First Battalion Headquarters Company (prob-
ably because I could type), and my life as a frontline soldier came to an end.
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At the time I was pleased with the transfer, but in the weeks ahead, I felt an
unexpected sense of guilt over leaving a line company for the relative safety
of a job at battalion headquarters company. I attribute most of this to Ser-
geant Riewe, whose lectures on soldiering still rang in my ears; he thought
everyone should be in the trenches. I never felt quite guilty enough to vol-
unteer for a line outfit, however, although I did think about it from time to
time. Perhaps it s just as well. On June 12, just a few weeks later, A Company
suffered nearly 60 percent causalities in one night defending Outpost Harry.
Chapter 18
Outpost Harry
Between June 10 and June 18, 195 3 Just weeks before the end of the war, the Chinese
made a determined attempt to take Outpost Harry, one of a series of outposts in the
central section of the front. The defense of the outpost was assigned to the U.S. Third
Division and its attached units, the Fifth RCT and the Greek Expeditionary Force.
Although the battle is unknown to most Americans, the intensity of the fighting equaled
the most bitterly fought battles of the war. Each night a single company defended the
outpost but suffered such high casualties (59 percent average) that on the following night
it would be replaced by another company. The battle is typical of the kind of fighting that
took place toward the end of the war, when the Chinese increased the frequency of their
attacks, mostly against outposts, primarily for the purpose of strengthening their bargain-
ing position in the peace negotiations. In the following story, Private First Class James
Davis arrived in Korea just in time for the fighting on Outpost Harry, a battle in which
he was severely wounded. The reader will notice he has nothing but praise for the doctors
and nurses who cared for him during his recovery.
Private First Class James "Red" Davis
E Company, Fifteenth Infantry Regiment,
Third Infantry Division
IN MAY 1952,1 graduated from a small country high school near the town
of Mount View, in southwest Oklahoma. At the time, I had lived my entire
life in a farming community with my mom and dad, plus my three brothers
and three sisters. I had no idea how much my life would be changed in the
next two years by the war in Korea.
I spent the summer working on the farm as usual, but by fall, I was ripe
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Evacuating a wounded soldier, Punchbowl, early 1953. (Courtesy of Richard Peters)
for the draft.Then one day I received my draft notice, and on October 23,
1952, I was inducted into the army. After basic training at Camp Roberts,
California, the army shipped me to Korea, where I arrived in May 1953.1
was assigned to the Fifteenth Regiment in the Third Infantry Division.
Actually, the Korean War was nearly over, although there was no way we
could have known this at the time. For the past year or so, both sides had
pretty well stayed in their trenches, and the fighting was seldom on the front
pages of the newspapers. The truce negotiations had been on and off so
much nobody paid much attention to them. As it turned out, the negotiat-
ing teams were actually getting close to an agreement by the time I arrived
in Korea. At the same time, the fighting had actually picked up. Most of this
fighting took place on "outposts," ugly, treeless hills and mountains located
well in front of our Main Line of Resistance (MLR) .While the Communists
lost thousands of men trying to capture these outposts, we also lost of lot of
men trying to defend them.
Outpost Harry was typical of these outposts, and the Third Division was
assigned to defend the hill. I arrived in Korea just in time for the battle,
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which was one of the most intense of the entire war (even though the war
had only a few months to go).
Outpost Harry was located pretty much in the middle of Korea, in the
area known as the Iron Triangle. The hill is nearly 1,300 feet high, greater
than any of the other hills we controlled in the area, and commanded a good
view of the enemy terrain and attacks on our frontline positions. Unfortu-
nately, the Chinese forces held the highest ground, called "Star Hill," about
350 yards from Outpost Harry. So when we were on Harry, the Chinese
were looking right down our throats.
When I arrived at the Third Division MLR in May 1953,1 could easily
see the outpost to the north of our line. A short time after I arrived, I was
assigned to one of the units on Outpost Harry. Right away I met my ser-
geant and my lieutenant, a Lieutenant Brown. I will never forget what Lieu-
tenant Brown said to me that night: "We will hold this hill at all costs, even if this
means your life. If you run, I will shoot you or someone else will."
That was my introduction to Outpost Harry. At the time, I thought this
was pretty strong talk on the part of the lieutenant, but I wanted to live and
stay around awhile, so there was nothing to do but listen and obey orders.
My first stay on Outpost Harry lasted about ten days and nights, just
before the Chinese attacks began. During this time, I remember the Chinese
playing loud western music over their loudspeakers, and some gal in a sexy
voice pleading for us to come over to their side, where, she promised, "We
have beautiful girls and maids and you will never have to work again." We
had no hot meals, only C-rations from tin cans, but I did learn to like fruit
cocktail. Sleep was hard to come by, maybe two hours out of twenty-four,
and then only during the day. And since it rained day and night, the trenches
were full of mud and water. While the Chinese made no major effort to take
the hill during this period, as they would a few days later, they dropped
plenty of artillery and mortar rounds on us. I had two lucky near misses.
One Chinese mortar round left two holes in my helmet and another tore up
my flak jacket. But since my skin was barely nicked, no Purple Heart. I didn't
complain.
After ten days on Outpost Harry, I went back to our MLR, where duty
was more routine, working on trenches and stuff like that. But we did man-
age to get a little more rest. I also remember we got fried eggs for break-
fast—what a treat!
The real battle for Outpost Harry began during the night of June 10,
1953, when the Chinese mounted a major attack on the hill. At the time I
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was still on our MLR, but not for long. Within hours I found myself and
about a dozen other GIs in a half-track headed for the hill. It was only about
a mile from our MLR to the backside of Harry, but it seemed much longer.
Perhaps the incoming mortar rounds had something to do with this.
Once we had reached the top of Outpost Harry, we were thrown im-
mediately into the battle as a part of E Company. Earlier that night, huge
numbers of Chinese soldiers had attacked the hill, and some of them had
managed to get into our trenches. The fighting was bitter hand-to-hand
combat, and it went on all night long.There were wounded and dead bodies
everywhere—a very chilling experience. I remember hearing one of our
wounded men calling for "Mom" in a low, weak voice, but we couldn't help
him because the place was crawling with enemy soldiers.
Finally, by daylight on the morning of June 11, we had managed to push
the Chinese off the hill, or so we thought. Then suddenly, I saw an enemy
soldier emerge from a bunker, probably no more than fifteen feet away. For-
tunately, I got off a quick shot with my M-l and he dropped to the ground.
But we knew there could easily be other Chinese soldiers nearby. So, with
three other GIs, all volunteers, we searched the trenches and bunkers look-
ing for more Chinese still on the hill. Mortar shells landed all around us, but
somehow none of us were hit. Finally, we came to an old bunker that seemed
to be secure. But we were wrong; the Chinese opened up with an automatic
weapon. Bullets went everywhere, and some of them hit the femur of my
right leg two times and ricocheted around the bone. Miraculously, the bul-
lets did not break the bone.The doctor told me later that he couldn't under-
stand how I managed to take the hit and escape without a broken leg.
While I was lying on the ground bleeding and hurting, my buddies tied
a tourniquet on my leg and at the same time watched out for enemy sol-
diers. Although the Chinese kept dropping mortar rounds, some of which
landed very close, the guys never left me until a medic had arrived.This took
awhile, because the first medic who tried to reach me got hit and didn't
make it. Later, two other medics were sent to pick me up, and they finally
reached me, despite having to go through heavy sniper fire. They put me on
a stretcher and began the tough job of getting me to a safety zone. On two
different occasions the sniper fire was so heavy I begged them to put me
down and run for cover.They actually did this at times, but they always came
back to pick me up. Finally, the medics got me down the hill and put me in
a jeep for transportation to an aid station. As the jeep pulled away I remem-
ber seeing a tank that had been knocked out with dead crew members
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Medics carrying stretchers and dressed in white outer clothing, commonly worn
when snow covered the ground. (Courtesy of Forty-fifth Infantry Division Museum)
scattered about. Mortar rounds kept coming in as we moved along, some
hitting the road, but we finally made it to a safe place behind the hill.When
they lifted my stretcher from the jeep I heard a captain tell the medic who
had brought me out not to go back to the hill; it was just too dangerous.
What followed I will never forget. The medic, without hesitation, ignored
the captain's orders, climbed back in his jeep, and headed back to Outpost
Harry to bring out more wounded soldiers. I never knew him nor learned
what happened to him; he could very easily have been killed. But I hope
with all my heart that he made it out of Korea okay. To me, he was a hero.
Next, they piled a bunch of us who were wounded into a truck and
hauled us off. After a short ride, I remember finding myself in a tent sur-
rounded by wounded soldiers and medical workers of all types. The doctors
looked over my wounds, gave me medication and emergency help, and put
me on a hospital train for treatment at an army hospital somewhere in Ko-
rea. By this time I had lost consciousness, so I really don't remember much
about anything.
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At the army hospital the doctors discovered I had gangrene in my leg.
"Get this man to a hospital in Japan—now!" one of the doctors said. So the
army moved me again, this time by air, to another hospital on one of the
islands south of the Japanese mainland. I had emergency surgery almost as
soon as I arrived. I recall how much my body was beginning to stink as a
result of the gangrene. Fortunately, the surgery went okay, and I recovered in
the peaceful environment of a hospital. During the month or so I spent in
the hospital, I saw dozens of doctors and nurses work many long hours to
take care of the sick and wounded. They were very dedicated people, and
they proved their love and kindness toward their patients many times and in
many ways.
While in the hospital I had lots of time to think, and many thoughts
entered my mind about the war and my experiences.Why is it, I wondered,
that young men in the prime of life have to die fighting wars in far-off places
trying to kill people they don't even know. I thanked the Lord for His pres-
ence through it all and for delivering me safely.
When I finally recovered from my wounds enough to return to duty,
the army sent me to Sendai, Japan. There I was assigned to a military police
unit and placed on limited duty. I spent the remainder of my army time
there, mostly answering the phone and keeping a log book. The job was
pretty routine and even boring at times, but after Outpost Harry, I didn't
complain.
Chapter 19
A ROK Lieutenant Survives
the Bloody Ridges
Lee Chan Shik was born in Gansuh-gun, Pyongannam-do Province, in northern
Korea. He emigrated to South Korea after the liberation in 1945. After the Korean
War broke out, he joined the ROK Army as a student volunteer and was commis-
sioned a second lieutenant in 1951. During the war, he served as a platoon leader in
the Fifth Infantry Division of the ROK Army. He retired from the army in 1981 as
a brigadier general and is one of South Korea's most decorated war veterans. Lieuten-
ant Lee's story is notable for its emotionalism, his eagerness for combat, and his
absolute determination to set an example of bravery for his men.
Lieutenant Lee Chan Shik
Eleventh Company, Third Battalion, Fifth Infantry Division, ROK
Army
IT WAS AUGUST 1951, the second year of the war. The regiment would
move toYanggoo for an operation to drive the Chinese troops off the strate-
gic Hill 983 (the Sooribong).The roar of artillery in the distance was be-
coming louder by minutes as if it foretold the coming battle.
Captain Jung addressed his officers. His words were simple and direct.
"Until now we undertook operations in tandem with the U.S. Army units.
But this operation is for the Thirty-sixth Regiment alone. We should re-
member that how we do in this battle will reflect on the honor of the entire
ROK Army.
"Lieutenant Lee, I know this is your first battle as a platoon leader. The
first battle is most important to any officer. If you are not successful in the
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first battle, you are likely to experience more frustrations later." Most likely,
the CO's advice was based on his own experience as a rookie.
"The PLA unit we are facing is known to be one of the best," Captain
Jung continued. "We believe that its position is well fortified and surrounded
by extensive minefields. In combat, you can't afford to be timid, but neither
can you afford to be too reckless either. Don't put your men in danger unless
it is absolutely essential. Remember the simple fact that they are all precious
sons to their parents." After stating more details of the operation, he em-
braced each of us one by one.
On August 16,1951, the company moved to the regiment's main line of
resistance (MLR) to undertake preparations for the attack. The main hill,
Hill 983, was connected by ridges to a number of other hills (731,773, 852,
935, and 940).The formation was highly advantageous to the defenders but
posed a major challenge to an attacker.
For the last two months, Chinese troops had worked hard to fortify
their position on the ridge. The Chinese considered the ridge strategically
important, and placed a high priority on defending it. The loss of the ridge
would allow us to put their main supply routes under our effective surveil-
lance. The defense of the hill was the joint responsibility of the Chinese
troops, who had established their field of fire at the middle point between
Hills 983 and 940.We estimated the Chinese had deployed five battalions in
the area. Our Sixth Division (a reserve of the ROK Fifth Corps) moved to
the rear with orders to be ready for immediate intervention when needed.
The Chinese had built a fan-shape system of trenches and bunkers. Some
feed trenches and bunkers had covers of large logs. For key locations they
built bunkers fortified with concrete.
At the MLR, Captain Jung maintained his customary calm and'confi-
dence. After conveying to us the encouragement of Colonel Hwang, the
regimental commander, the captain took all of his platoon leaders to a low
ridge that faced Hill 983 directly. There he further discussed our assault
methods.
"We must take that hill!" the captain told us.When I first saw the
Sooribong on August 16,1 couldn't help but think how dignified it looked.
I even thanked God for giving us such a good-looking hill. Inevitably, my
thoughts drifted back to my hometown....
My hometown is Pyongannam-do Province, Gansuh-gun, Bansuk-myun,
Hasa-ri in northern Korea. My family was fairly well-off and one of the
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best-known Christian families in the region. Both my grandfather and fa-
ther were active in their church and the independence movement. Naturally,
the family had to endure harsh treatment from the Japanese colonial gov-
ernment. When the Communists replaced the Japanese after the national
liberation in 1945, we suffered even worse oppression. My father chose to
move to Seoul in South Korea and start anew.
After the war broke out, I fled along with ten high school classmates to
the south and voluntarily joined the ROK Army. On August 1, 1950, I
entered the army's noncommissioned officer's school in Gujeri. Within a
few weeks I was a squad leader for the Sixth Company, Thirteenth Regi-
ment, Eleventh ROK Division. As a leader of an eight-man squad, I fought
virtually nonstop against Communist guerrillas in the southern provinces.
Around the end of October, a guerrilla force attacked the Sixth Company.
The captain immediately ordered the company to counterattack. I led my
squad to the enemy position against heavy small arms fire. Our relentless
dash eventually forced the enemy to retreat. Pursuing the guerrillas, we killed
sixteen and captured two, while we suffered only two light injuries. From
this early encounter, I learned that the best way to defeat the enemy is a
bold, focused attack. During the next few months, my squad scored many
small and large victories, which made me quite well known in the battalion.
In early March 1951, Major Rho, the battalion commander, summoned
me to his office. I had no idea what he had in mind.
"You have good potential for an officer. I believe you are too good to
remain a squad leader. I want you to report to the divisional headquarters in
Namwon and take the examination to become an officer."
I was surprised by Major Rho's official recommendation because it was
so sudden. Nonetheless, I had no objection whatsoever. After passing the
examination, I was transferred to the Army Comprehensive School, a war-
time service academy for the ROK Army. I knew well the reason why pla-
toon leaders were called cannon fodder. Yet, I was superbly confident of my
own ability in combat.
The Army Comprehensive School's training was rough and hard, which
could be expected, because we had so much to learn about becoming a field
officer in such a short period of time. It was so demanding that even I
struggled, although I had a larger and stronger body than the others as a
result of my high school boxing career.The program included rifle and weapon
training, and various combat courses. On July 21, 1951, after four months'
training, I was commissioned a second lieutenant in the ROK Army.
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After receiving my commission, I made the following resolutions: (1) I
will lead in front of my men whenever an assault is made; (2) I will com-
mand at the weakest point when we are in defense; (3) I will never abandon
the position unless ordered to do so; (4) I will carry out the mission objec-
tive no matter what; (5) I will never abuse my men; (6) I will never forget
that a victory requires an act of close fellowship. These resolutions were
based on my experiences as a squad leader.
Twenty classmates and I were ordered to report to the Fifth Division. By
this time the front lines were pretty well fixed and the war had become more
stationary. The fighting had become much more intense, particularly for
platoon leaders.There were rumors that officer candidates were to be called
up for duty even before their training was completed. While it might appear
that a mobile campaign was more costly, in practice a stationary war was
more dangerous. When the armies were fighting over a hill rather than an
entire front the casualty figures became much higher. Also, the introduction
of more powerful weapons by both sides meant heavier casualties.
"We are fighting with everything we have to recover one more hill,"
General Min Ghi Sik, the division commander, addressed us. "We can't sur-
render a single square inch of land to the enemy, even if we have to fight hand-
to-hand. The division will soon move to the front for such operations."
I was appointed leader of the Third Platoon, Eleventh Company, Third
Battalion. My senior noncommissioned officer, Master Sergeant Han, and
my platoon guide, Sergeant Sul, were experienced combat soldiers. All of
the others in my thirty-two-man rifle platoon, however, were new con-
scripts with no combat experience. I tried my best to become one of the
platoon members during the training period. I made a resolution and rigidly
followed it. I did everything that my men did; I dined, slept, and trained with
the men. All my platoon members except one private were older than me.
So I had to be an officer with exemplary behavior and had to enforce the
orders and regulations strictly and fairly. After one week, I could feel that the
men were gradually opening their hearts to me.
One day, Master Sergeant Han advised me that I should listen to him if
I wanted to avoid becoming cannon fodder. He stressed that he had seen
many young lieutenants get killed in action because they did not follow his
advice.
"You must be the only one worrying about my safety other than my
parents," I replied."! really appreciate that. But you should know one thing.
I will not become a commodity lieutenant.1 Moreover, I will prove that the
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terrible nickname for our new commissioned officers is unjust and untrue. I
will make sure that no one utters those dreadful words again by showing
everybody that new second lieutenants have the guts and knowledge to beat
the enemy just like more experienced officers. Even if I become a casualty, I
will not die like a commodity. I will die like an officer and brave leader of
my platoon.You will soon find out what I am saying."
On August 16, 1951, I faced my first battle as a platoon leader. From
their positions on Hill 983, the enemy could easily observe our activities
around the town of Yanggoo. Their artillery observers would have no diffi-
culty finding our positions. On August 17,1 spent the whole day preparing
for the imminent assault. Although it rained hard all day long, U.S. bombers
still flew sorties dropping bombs over the enemy positions. The explosions
vibrated through the entire valley until it seemed the mountain would disin-
tegrate. The odor of the explosives was strong and offensive. After the air
raids, U.S. X Corps artillery commenced their tremendous barrages on the
enemy positions; it appeared the Americans were trying to kill the hill itself,
piece by piece.Trees, rocks, and debris flew everywhere. Nothing, I thought,
could survive such an intense shelling.
"What do you think, Lieutenant Lee?" the captain asked me. "It may
appear that the barrage killed all the enemy soldiers, but I assure you the
SOBs are waiting for us in their bunkers. Please remember that.
"Don't ever underestimate the enemy," the captain continued. It is bad
to be afraid of your enemies, but much worse to slight them." I had no doubt
he had learned that lesson by fighting in many battles. The artillery barrage
continued during the evening.
On August 18, our own artillery barrage commenced, using every artil-
lery unit in the corps.The shells dropped like a summer shower, not only on
Hill 983 but also on Hill 940.The artillerymen adjusted their guns to cover
the whole upper half of the hill. The enemy shells, however, kept exploding
all around us, and I began to pray earnestly. I had spent more than six months
fighting against the Communist guerrillas. But this was the first time I had
witnessed such an intense artillery duel.
Around 6:30 A.M. on August 19, with the Ninth and Tenth Companies
leading the attack, the regiment s assault on Hill 983 was finally under way.
My company, the Eleventh, remained in reserve at the MLR in full readiness
for any order. We carefully observed the progress of our two sister compa-
nies, which was much slower than expected. They had to overcome the
rough terrain and the intense enemy fire.
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By 2:30 P.M., the Ninth captured Hills 710 and 731, intermediary points
to Hill 983. Since the captured hills were only observation posts and not
their main defensive positions, enemy resistance in the area was relatively
light.
The enemy fired 82mm shells all over our area. Although we remained
in our foxholes, we still suffered casualties. I heard some faint moaning com-
ing from the First and Second Squad sectors. I ran to their positions under
the falling shells and found Private Lee badly wounded. He had been hit by
a shell fragment in his belly. Although part of his intestine was visible, he
somehow recognized me and tried hard to say something.
"I'm sorry," I said."Be strong! Don't worry about anything here.We will
take care of it." Then I summoned a medic and ordered Private Lee's imme-
diate evacuation. In the Second Squad sector, Private Kim had been hit in
his upper thigh and was bleeding heavily. I used a pressure bandage on his
wound, but it didn't work well.
"Lieutenant! Lieutenant!" His screams sounded terrible. But there were
no more medics available, and I had no way of evacuating him. I thought of
using my squad members to take him to the rear, but I needed all of them for
the attack. Still, the enemy's relentless shower of mortar barrages continued
unabated. The smell of gunpowder was oppressive, and my view was ob-
structed by gun smoke and flying dust. I tried hard to be calm, but I had
difficulty focusing and felt a sense of helplessness.
"Lieutenant . . ."Again an urgent distress call came amid the chaos.
It was Private Park, the guy who swore he would return safely to his
family. He was married, with a son. His face was badly wounded. I pushed
back one of his exposed eyeballs and then applied a pressure bandage.
"Don't worry, Private Park! They can fix you good at a hospital." I sum-
moned Sergeant Han to explore ways to evacuate the wounded, but to no
avail. I reported the casualties to the CO using the wireless. Captain Jung
rushed to us, calm and poised, in the midst of the shelling.
"Don't worry, Lieutenant. I will evacuate them in no time. Shells don't
have eyes, so they fall anywhere.The best way to save ourselves is to dig holes
better and deeper." With this encouragement, the CO returned to his post.
Shortly afterwards, civilian workers brought us some food and took the
wounded to the rear.
The powerful defense of the enemy not only held up the Eleventh Com-
pany but also the Ninth and Tenth Companies. They captured a few guard
posts, but were unable to reach Hill 983. Major Lee, the CO of the Third
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Battalion, encouraged the troops to continue the assault, but both compa-
nies were pinned down. As the offensive lost all momentum, fear and frus-
tration swept the entire regiment.To reverse the widespread fatalism, I decided
to visit my men in their holes.
"Look at me! I am neither dead nor wounded. I walk amid the enemy
shells as you can see. I am not scared at all.Just hit the ground when you hear
the shells coming. If you are scared, you can't hear the shells coming in time.
So, just relax and be ready to move quickly when shells come to you. Only
the Maker knows our fate. Be brave!" I went to every hole and said the same
thing to my men. I could see that it had an impact on them very quickly. At
dusk, the enemy ended its daylong barrage.
"Lieutenant," Master Sergeant Han yelled. "I am worried about your
safety. You don't seem to understand the danger of what you are doing. You
shouldn't forget that there are many men you have to lead."
Then Staff Sergeant Sul said to me, "Lieutenant, aren't you scared? I
know you are an officer, but shells are coming down in showers and you
don't seem to care. I have survived many battles, but I'm very scared. When
shells fall, you must lie down and not move.That's how you survive a mortar
barrage. We will soon attack their bunkers. If you do what you have been
doing, you will certainly get killed. Please do what we do, then you will
make it."
"I am grateful for your advice," I replied. "But as you observed, the
platoon is terrified when the shells are landing. How can these men fight
against the enemy's concrete bunkers? How can we cure their battle phobia?
If we're going to handle this problem, we have to do it while we are still in
reserve.To tell you the truth, I'm scared as hell, but I'm also determined to
eliminate the men's battle phobia. Please understand my intention."
"But it will do no good if you get killed by exposing yourself to the
enemy's fire," Staff Sergeant Sul said. "It is our simple wish that you should
pay more attention to your own safety."
"Thank you for your concerns," I replied. "I promise I will remember
your kind advice."
After I saw the two sergeants back to their posts, I felt content and
happy. I was lucky to have two such experienced and considerate leaders in
my platoon.
On August 20, the second day of the offensive, the Eleventh Company
was scheduled to take part in the attack. We would take the central sector,
the Ninth the left, and the Tenth the right. The three companies were to
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attack Hill 983 in a parallel formation. Our preattack barrage was as intense
as that of the first day. I thought the enemy truly remarkable to survive such
a heavy barrage.
After the barrage, our company's assault finally got under way. The ter-
rain was rough and the enemy responded with machine gun fire. In addition,
anti-personnel mines slowed our advance, and mortar shells fell everywhere.
Screams came from every direction, indicating that our casualties were get-
ting heavier. I led my platoon to the front.
"Follow me!" I shouted.
In spite of my lead, intense machine gun fire slowed the advance of my
platoon. It was very frustrating. But the slow advance was not limited to my
company. Both the Ninth and Tenth had difficulty in advancing.When I was
not able to advance, Captain Jung came to me. He remained calm and con-
fident. He did not blame me at all.
"Lieutenant Lee, we could capture Hill 983 if we could neutralize those
three bunkers.Why don't you consider organizing a special assault team?" It
sounded more like asking a favor than giving an order. I thought it was
worth a try.
"Captain, I will try it."
The CO nodded his head with satisfaction.
Then I crawled about halfway up Hill 983. About fifty meters up from
my position, I could see a machine gun window. It looked like the threaten-
ing mouth of the devil. There was another machine gun window about one
hundred meters from the first one, and a third one about 80 percent of the
way up the slope. It looked obvious to me that the first machine gun posi-
tion presented the greatest problem; it would be extremely difficult to take
the other two without taking the first.
The ridge was like the edge of a knife, thin and very steep.The approach
to the ridge was extremely narrow, allowing only one or two men at a time
a chance to climb the forty- to fifty-degree slope. In addition, the Ninth and
Tenth Companies were in danger of being attacked from the ridges. I re-
turned to my post and formulated the mission plan.
"Lieutenant Lee," Captain Jung asked, "can you do it?"
"Yes, I can," I answered pleasantly but with confidence.
"You may consider the regular approach for this attack," the CO sug-
gested. "You will need three squads, an assault squad, a support squad, and a
clean-up squad."
I accepted the CO's suggestion. Master Sergeant Han would lead the
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support squad, Staff Sergeant Sul would lead the clean-up squad, and I would
lead the assault squad. It was fair because I was the most physically fit in the
platoon. I could throw a grenade farther and climb a steep slope better than
any of the others. I assembled the entire platoon and issued the assault order.
"This victory," I told the men, "will ensure the success of not only the
platoon, but also the company, the battalion, and even the regiment. It is a
matter of honor for the ROK Army. Let's not forget that."
I found a rock large enough to cover my body about thirty meters from
the enemy machine gun window. From this position, I thought, it should be
possible to hit the enemy bunker with a grenade. I immediately ordered my
assault squad to advance.
"Advance forward!"
While the squad advanced in parallel formation, Master Sergeant Han's
support squad provided precision cover fire. At the same time, Staff Sergeant
Sul's clean-up squad did the same to the second bunker and to the ridges on
both sides. I jumped down to the cliff on my left and climbed the front slope
like a mountain climber. After about an hour of hard climbing, I was able to
reach the rock, a mere forty meters from my squad. My men could observe
my moves, but the enemy couldn't see my position, or the fact that I was
there. Staff Sergeant Han's squad fired so accurately the enemy was unable to
detect my quick moves.The Maker helped us too.The dark clouds in the sky
made it more difficult for the enemy to spot us. Now we could be victori-
ous, but only if I threw my grenades accurately.
I was so nervous I was sweating. Then I prayed for strength and courage
against the Communists and pulled the safety pins from two grenades. Al-
though I was a young man with considerable nerve, my hands trembled. I
felt the burden. I knew that I could hit the machine gun window with my
grenades easily if it were not such a pressure-cooked situation. I closed my
eyes and prayed for the last time. I had to throw the grenades while lying
down, rather than standing, and the steep slope made this even more diffi-
cult. The area was filled with surreal noise and smell. It was pure hell, the
worst of its kind. A few times U.S. tanks hit the bunker with their guns, but
they failed to take it out. There was no way to neutralize the machine guns
except to throw the grenades. Somehow the enemy sensed something was
about to happen. Their gun barrage became intense, while my platoon's
response grew weaker. I had to do it right away. I threw the first grenade into
the bunker's window, but it exploded just outside of it. I collected myself and
threw the second. In a few seconds I heard a muffled explosion. The assault
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squad dashed forward with great shouting. I threw the third grenade into the
bunker, but I had conquered the bunker with the second grenade. I rushed
to the bunker and shouted,"Long live!" as loud as I could.The assault squad
reached the bunker and answered my shouting with their "Long live!" It was
my world; I was on top of the enemy bunker and on top of the world.
Suddenly, the enemy attacked us with machine gun fire from the left
ridge. We rushed into the bunker through feed trenches. We counted eigh-
teen enemy bodies and two machine guns. All but three wounded were
dead. I ordered the evacuation of the wounded and discussed the plans to
capture the other two bunkers with Sergeants Han and Sul.
"Lieutenant Lee, well done. I am so proud of you. You are a phoenix.
Take a rest." Captain Jung embraced me with pride and gratitude.
"We will commence the attack on the second bunker immediately,"
Captain Jung continued. I reported my plan for taking the bunker to Cap-
tain Jung.
"No, no.You need some rest," Captain Jung replied. "You have finished
your mission by capturing this bunker." Captain Jung rejected my plan for
the Third Platoon to attack and ordered the First Platoon to attack the sec-
ond bunker.
We watched while the First Platoon attacked. The First had much diffi-
culty advancing, however, and suffered heavy casualties. When it became
dark Captain Jung ordered our company to form a defensive perimeter at
our current position. The Ninth and Tenth Companies both launched at-
tacks against the second bunker, but they also failed.
On August 21, in the morning, my Third Platoon received orders to at-
tack the second enemy bunker. This bunker had been surrounded by many
outposts, and the central peak was protected by an all-direction defense. It was
not the place where one-man penetration would be effective. I decided to use
the whole platoon instead. I reported my offensive plan to Captain Jung.
"I will divide the platoon into two squads," I said. "I will lead the assault
squad and Master Sergeant Han will lead the support squad."
"Good idea," Captain Jung replied. "But this time I want you to trade
roles. Master Sergeant Han will lead the assault squad." I understood why
the CO ordered the trade. He wanted to protect his platoon leaders.
"Yes Sir. This time I will lead." Han quickly obeyed Captain Jungs order.
The attack on the second bunker was soon under way. Han's assault
squad rushed forward with great energy and much shouting. But a terrible
surprise met them. It was an anti-personnel minefield. Because of the enemy's
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overnight preparation, our attack stalled. Exploding mines took feet away
from my men. I rushed to save Private Kim, who lost one foot. Although the
men tried to stop me, I was able to bring Kim back.
"Lieutenant, I am fine. I am still alive." He was bleeding profusely from
the wound.
"Kim Bok Man, don't lose your courage. I will make sure you live." To
my delight, Kim began to sing a patriotic song.
"Looking to the future, my heart is full of love for the Motherland."
Walking with only one foot, he continued singing with full volume.
Tears were rolling down from my eyes. Captain Jung also shed tears. Prob-
ably the whole platoon wept at that moment and thought only of one thing—
we had to capture that bunker.
"We have to avenge Private Kim," I shouted to my men. "Let's go. Fol-
low me." I led the assault squad to the bunker fifty meters ahead. Han's
support squad provided cover for us. I had returned to the assault squad after
Kim's injury. I was not ordered to do that. It just happened that way. When
we had gone about thirty meters, I quickly removed the safety pins from my
grenades with my teeth. Then I threw the grenades into the machine gun
window. Fortunately, one exploded in the bunker.
"Attack, forward! Follow me!" I shouted to the squad. We entered into
feed trenches and I threw another grenade into the bunker. We gained total
control of the second bunker. In a few minutes Master Sergeant Han and
Captain Jung joined us. The bunker was much more spacious than we had
expected. Moreover, it had three machine gun windows, not just one as we
had believed.They deployed two machine guns in the front and two more in
the sides.The bunker had twenty-five Chinese soldiers, including two nurses.
We were all revolted by what we found—two soldiers tied to the machine
guns by a chain and lock. They were not allowed to run away no matter
what. I felt outraged by such inhuman behavior.We quickly evacuated three
wounded PLA soldiers to save their lives. We knew they were not respon-
sible for the war. It was their Communist masters who deserved real punish-
ment.
During the attack on the second bunker, I lost two men, Private Kim
Young Sik and Private Park Ho Young. They were new recruits but always
obeyed my orders to the letter. I buried them in a spot where the sun would
shine warmer and longer. Then I led a simple sending-off ceremony for the
two brave Christians. During the worship I did not post a single guard. But
not a single bullet or shell landed around us.
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"Let's get ready for battle!" I cried loudly. We have to capture the re-
maining bunker. As far as I was concerned we couldn't leave the task to
anybody else. While moving to a more desirable staging position for the
attack, I ran into Captain Jung, who was on his knees praying. It was such a
solemn moment. We waited so we would not disturb him. Finally, I ap-
proached him and spoke to him quietly.
"Lieutenant Lee," Captain Jung responded."! have been praying for our
two fallen comrades." We saw tears in his eyes.We all silently wept again. But
the war was going on all around us.
"Please allow us to take the third bunker. It would be good revenge for
our two fallen comrades." Captain Jung answered my request by shaking his
head.
"You are too exhausted.You have done enough by taking the two bun-
kers." The CO seemed to think our platoon needed a rest. But we did not.
Moreover, we thought we couldn't rest until we had avenged the men who
had given their lives.
"Captain, we are grateful for your concern for my platoon. But we have
been successful both times. We have the best chance to do it again. If we
encounter another failure like the one we experienced it could ruin the
whole offense. Please let us do it," I begged. Captain Jung, with a rather
heavy face, finally gave us permission to take the bunker.
"I wish you and your platoon the best."
The enemy resumed its shower of shells on us. The barrage was so in-
tense I had to order the platoon into the bunker. Fortunately, the shells did
not penetrate the concrete bunker, and we were safe.
"Do you know how dangerous it will be to attack the third bunker?" I
asked my men. "If you are not sure you can do it, raise your hand and I will
assign you somewhere else." After the speech I looked at my men one by
one. Nobody wanted to be a coward.
"Will you follow me?" I asked one more time.
"Yes, we will." I was so moved by the platoon's confidence in me.
"Okay. Master Sergeant Han will lead the support squad. Again concen-
trate your fire at the machine gun windows.The assault squad will follow me
and rush the bunker the moment my grenade explodes in it."
When the barrage let up, the platoon moved out of the bunker. Han led
his squad to find the best position. Smoke rising from the bombs dropped by
U.S. planes formed a thick blanket all over Hill 983, presenting us with an
ideal cover. Our sister companies, the Ninth and Tenth, continued to attack
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even after they had been repeatedly turned back by the enemy. I led the
assault squad to a potential launching point and observed the situation for a
few minutes.
The machine gun window of the third bunker looked ominous and
threatening. I evaluated carefully the best possible route to attack the third
bunker. Due to the intense air and artillery strikes, the area was full of debris.
While some mines were exposed, there were still others that posed a serious
threat to us.There were countless craters all over, both large and small, that I
thought improved our chances of a successful attack. I immediately assigned
duties to each individual in the squad and crawled into the nearest crater.
For some reason, the defenders at the top of the bunker remained silent. I
became apprehensive over their total lack of response, and I wondered if
they were actually observing my movements. But I had the advantage of
using the craters to hide from enemy fire. Suddenly, the enemy opened up
with an intense volley, using not one but a number of machine guns. To my
great relief, they were aiming at other targets. I made good progress and
quickly reached a position about twenty meters from my own target. I sig-
naled my next move to the squad and prayed briefly but earnestly.
I removed the safety pin and threw the first grenade with all the strength
I could muster.The second grenade followed quickly. I hit the machine gun
window with both grenades. In a few seconds we heard the muffled explo-
sions in the bunker.
"Attack, forward!" I shouted and rushed the bunker.As soon as I reached
the feed trench the captain followed me.
"Good work, Lieutenant Lee. Let's go and check the bunker together,"
Captain Jung said to me with a smile.
The third bunker was the same size as the second. There was one differ-
ence; it contained thirty rotting and smelling corpses. It was quite difficult to
breathe in the bunker because of the overpowering smell. They had chained
two soldiers to each machine gun, just like in the second bunker. The bar-
barism the enemy perpetrated on its own soldiers was something I never
wanted to recall. There were more than ten enemy officers killed in the
bunker. We evacuated three wounded enemy soldiers for treatment.
A short time later, the enemy began to fire 82mm mortars on the bun-
kers. Evidently they realized that we had taken the bunkers. When I as-
sembled my platoon in the bunker, only sixteen men were left. Two were
seriously injured during the assault on the third bunker. Others had to be
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evacuated for less serious injuries.The only target left for us to take was Hill
983, known as Sooribong, which the PLA boasted was impregnable.
"We have paid such a high price to take the bunker," I said. "Let's push
one more time and take this last hill." I encouraged my men as the final drive
began. Both sides used every weapon they had to win the battle. In spite of
the enemy's desperate resistance, by making use of the craters, rocks, and
fallen trees, my platoon was able to move up to a point where we could
launch an assault on the final target.Then we were told that the Sixth Com-
pany of the Second Battalion had captured Hill 940, which was connected
to the main peak in the northeast. I was quite encouraged by the develop-
ment because the Sixth Company could help us by pressuring the enemy
from Hill 940. But before we were able to launch the final drive the regi-
ment unexpectedly sent word to us that there had been a change in the
regiment's battle plan.
The regiment decided to attack Hill 983 from the rear, while the Ninth
and Tenth Companies held the enemy at its current position. The regiment
picked our company to go around Hill 940 and attack the final target. It may
have made good strategic sense to the regiment, but it was unfair and disap-
pointing to me and the platoon.We had suffered plenty to capture the bun-
kers, and now we had to climb down and abandon them. But orders were
orders.
"I believe you are unhappy," Captain Jung said. "But we did not aban-
don the bunkers. The Ninth and Tenth companies will effectively prevent
any enemy attempt to reoccupy them. They will also remember how we
took them. Don't be too upset." After the captain had calmed us down, we
enjoyed hot soup, a bowl of rice, and a night's restful sleep.
Early on the morning of August 22, Captain Jung gave the assault order
to his platoon leaders. "Our objective is Hill 983," he said. "The enemy will
throw everything it has at us to defend the hill. The success of the entire
battalion depends on the Third Company." As soon as the order was issued,
the enemy showered us with a mortar barrage, almost as if they had been
listening to what the captain said to us.We quickly took cover behind rocks
and trees. Fortunately, we suffered no casualties.
Before attacking Hill 983, we had to take a nearby hill that would pro-
vide us an excellent staging position. I led the Third Platoon forward, ad-
vancing cautiously to test the enemy's strength. I had decided that an assault
would be too costly for us. After we had gone about one hundred meters the
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enemy resumed its mortar barrage. As shells rained down, I hid myself be-
hind rocks. One shell hit my backpack and my rib ever so slightly.Then it hit
the ground right in front of my nose. It was a dud. If it had been live I would
have been blown into a thousand pieces. I believed that God had saved me
for better use later.
"Are you okay, Lieutenant?" Han rushed to me after observing the
whole thing himself. He checked my body quickly and looked closely at
the 82mm dud.
"You must bow to that dud.You are a phoenix for sure. I've never heard
of anything like this."
"He saved me for some other mission I guess," I answered Han simply.
The left side of my fatigue was burnt black. But I was not bleeding and
suffered only light skin burns. My humble fatigue uniform had protected
me quite nicely.
"Sergeant, it is time to take that thing." I tried to collect myself for the
assault. I did not fear death anymore. I had a conviction that I wouldn't be
killed. While the support squad was concentrating its fire on the machine
gun window, the assault squad rushed forward like galloping horses for nearly
one hundred meters.The enemy fire was inaccurate, and we managed to kill
more than twenty in the trenches with grenade attacks. Some ran away to
Hill 983. Capturing this hill cost the platoon three men due to injuries, but
we now had the staging point we needed for our last and greatest chal-
lenge—Hill 983.As usual, the captain appeared quickly and issued orders for
the company's next move.
"As you know, the top of Hill 983 consists of highly reinforced bunkers.
We have to assume that their troop deployment is based on their firepower
plan.To evade their grid fire, we have to fool the enemy.We will have to find
out their weakness first. Once the company deploys into a battle formation,
I will order you to attack, but we will not move. Just shout and make all the
noise that you can so that the enemy will think we are coming.This way we
may be able to observe their firepower plan." Of course, all platoon leaders
had no objection whatsoever. Captain Jung was the most capable and re-
spected captain in the regiment.
"Attack, forward!" the captain roared. As usual the men repeated his
order at the top of their lungs while making the customary battle noise.The
enemy responded with vengeance in mind, using automatic weapons and
machine guns.
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"First Platoon, attack the left flank!"
"Second Platoon, attack the front!"
"Third Platoon, attack the right with everything you have!" The captain
issued orders to each platoon. His voice was loud and clear even amid the
intense volleys. He made sure that the enemy heard the order so that they
would think the whole company was attacking. Luckily, the fog was very
heavy, which gave the enemy limited visual observation. We responded to
their volleys and grenade attacks with moans and shouting to give them the
impression that they were inflicting heavy casualties on us. We fooled the
enemy on a grand scale; the Communists wasted a great deal of ammunition
firing on an army that was not coming. Moreover, we were able to read their
firepower plan, so we knew their strengths and weaknesses.
Meanwhile, the captain scored direct hits with three 60mm mortar rounds
on the enemy trenches about 150 meters away. The hits revealed his keen
knowledge of weapon systems. The enemy trenches were too far away for
grenades, but too close to use our 82mm mortars. The 60mm mortars were
the perfect weapon for the situation. When the captain insisted on securing
a large number of 60mm shells prior to the offense, none of us understood
his intention correctly. As it turned out, the three 60mm mortars worked
overtime. When they became too hot to fire, we cooled them off with the
water in our canteens.The enemy responded with their 82mm mortars, but
they did not know our exact position. Captain Jung, however, soon figured
out the location of their 82mm mortars.
"Lieutenant Lee, take your platoon and capture the mortars on the back
slope. Then occupy the enemy command post. We will take the top from
both sides. I don't believe they have any machine gun windows on the back
side.Your chances are good. I will hold the enemy's main force where they
are by using the two platoons I have here. I wish you luck!"
I immediately led my platoon south and then turned right into a valley.
When we reached the back slope of the hill, we found it much quieter than
the front side. While the forest was quite dense, we were able to advance
rapidly because I was sure there were no mines.When we were within fifty
meters of their positions, the enemy still had not posted guards. They prob-
ably didn't imagine that we could move that far so fast. I signaled the platoon
to advance, very carefully. When we were within twenty meters of the en-
emy, I ordered a grenade attack on their positions. More than ten grenades
exploded simultaneously, creating tremendous damage and confusion. The
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enemy mortar position was totally destroyed. A few survivors ran away. But
two enemy officers fled only a few meters because Master Sergeant Han and
I opened fire on them.Wasting no time, I ordered the final assault on the hill.
"Let's finish it!"
My men were more than brave soldiers.They were flying phoenixes.We
quickly overpowered the enemy positions on the top. Finally we did it!
We shouted loudly with our two hands kicking the sky. The captain
came up quickly.
"Captain ..." I could not say anything.
"Lieutenant Lee ..." We simply embraced each other.
Everyone had tears in their eyes. No one tried to hide them.They were
tears of joy rather than sorrow.
We found more than one hundred enemy corpses on the top of Hill
983. Soon both the Ninth and Tenth Companies made their way to the top.
U.S. Navy fighters flew over to the hill but headed south after they had
determined the hill was in friendly hands. In a few minutes the regiment's
top officers were all over the hill, including the regimental commander him-
self. To my great surprise, Colonel Hwang bestowed the highest military
medal on me right on the spot.
"You are the highest decorated second lieutenant in my regiment. I am
so proud of you." I was dumfounded and had little to say to the colonel. I
didn't fully comprehend the meaning of the medal at the moment.
Chapter 20
The Chinese Go Underground
In the fall of 1951, both sides began to dig in and the stalemated war of the trenches
began. The front lines actually changed very little for the remainder of the war. During
this period the CPVF concentrated on strengthening their defensive lines, which they
did by constructing an elaborate underground tunnel system. Their trench defense and
tunnel system were tested by the sudden onset of the UN Kumhwa offensive in mid-
October 1952. The U.S. Seventh and ROK Second Divisions began intensive shell-
ing of the Chinese Fifteenth Army's positions in the Osong Mountain region on
October 14, and occupied Hills 597.9 and 537.7, two small hills known as Triangle
Hill in the West. By October 16, the UN attack had forced the Chinese troops off the
ridge and into their tunnels. Captain Zheng Yanman's company joined the tunnel
defense as a reinforcement force on October 18. For more than a month his company
and other Chinese troops fought a seesaw action in a pattern. During the day, the UN
troops would force the Chinese troops into the tunnels, but at night, the Chinese
would counterattack and recover their surface positions, only to lose them again when
daylight came. The Triangle Hill battle soon turned into one of the bloodiest battles of
the war.
Captain Zheng Yanman
Eighth Company) 134th Regiment, Forty-fifth Division,
CPVF Fifteenth Army
WE WERE SHOCKED when we heard that our regiments had lost four-
teen out of sixteen positions on Hills 597.9 and 537.7 on October 16, 1952.
I couldn't believe that the regiment had 550 casualties in a one-day defense.
The next day, my Eighth Company received an order to reinforce the First
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Company's defense on Hill 597.9. At the company briefing, I didn't tell my
men that the First Company had only twenty men left, including the
wounded, out of the company's two hundred men. I didn't want to scare a
couple dozen new recruits who had been in our company less than a week.
I told my soldiers at the meeting that they could count on a very strong
defense system as a result of all our tunnel work on the hill. I was pretty sure
about this. In the past four months, we had been constructing tunnel fortifi-
cations along the frontal defense line on a rotation basis. Lacking advanced
tools and supplies, we depended largely on our own "carry-on" stuff, such as
small shovels and pickaxes. After one week of earthwork, when our tools
were worn down and our food had run out, we were replaced by another
company that continued digging inside the hill. Then we moved to the rear
for supplies and carried tools and food back to the hill for another shift. Usu-
ally, each combat soldier carried up to sixty or seventy pounds of supplies.
Since the logistical service was not really effective, we felt more secure carry-
ing supplies on our own backs than waiting for others to bring them to us.
We dug inside the hill, taking out rocks and sandy grit while trying to
avoid cave-ins. Lacking lamps to light the underground tunnels, we burned
pine resin instead. Broken glass and metal plaques were also used at tunnel
entrances to reflect sunshine inside during the daytime.
By this time, our regiment had constructed an underground network
inside Hill 597.9.1 had a map describing three tree-shaped tunnel systems.
About twenty to thirty feet below the surface, there were three main tun-
nels, like tree trunks, about seventy yards long, five feet high, and four feet
wide. Each main tunnel connected eight short side tunnels, like tree branches.
Each side tunnel had several shelters and storage rooms, like tree leaves. I
showed my soldiers the entrances, crossing points, and how the network
worked.
I told my company that we could defend the hill as long as we had our
tunnels. In fact, I was not sure about this. I had never fought from under-
ground against an enemy on the surface. I said it in order to clear up any doubt
in the minds of my soldiers so they would maintain high morale. I had to use
the Chinese folk tale of the Monkey King (Sun Wukong) as an analogy.
The Monkey King tale in China is as popular as the Superman story in
America. "We will make an assault on the hill and move into the tunnels
tomorrow night," I said at the briefing. "We are going to be SunWukongs
who will make trouble in the belly of the monster, the Princess of the Iron
Fan.We can defeat the enemy by getting into its stomach, kicking and punch-
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ing anytime and anywhere we want to.We can turn the enemy upside down
on the hill." It made sense to the soldiers. One could tell by their facial
expressions and voices they were not lacking in confidence.
As a captain, however, I knew this was going to be a tough fight. At a
commanders' meeting held earlier the same day at regimental headquarters,
Colonel Liu Zhanhua asked us to defend the hill to the last man. "Our
strong defense at Osong Mountain will bring the Americans back to the
negotiating table at Panmunjom," Colonel Liu said. "On October 7, the
Americans adjourned the Korean truce negotiations. Now they try the battle-
ground again to get what they couldn't get at the negotiations—more terri-
tory for South Korea.We can't lose even one bloody inch of land the Chinese
and North Korean soldiers have been fighting for during the past two years.
The hill belongs to North Korea as long as we can keep it in our hands.We
must stop the Americans right here and send them back to Panmunjom."
During the night of October 18, our company moved up to the hill in
the dark. "Seek cover," I told my lieutenants. "No contact with the enemy."
I wanted to make sure it was a concealed movement. My mission was to
reinforce the First Company in the tunnels and to keep these tunnels in our
hands. This would be defensive fighting; there would be no attacks against
enemy troops, who had dug in. Quietly, the more than two hundred men in
my company crept slowly up the hill.
About halfway to the top, our troops stopped. The vanguard squad re-
ported that they had seen ghosts on the hill. Actually, they were black American
soldiers sleeping in the trenches. Our new recruits had never seen black
people before. Crawling around the enemy positions, we could even hear
American soldiers snoring.
At the top of the hill, the troops stopped again. We had an unexpected
problem; we couldn't find the entrances to our underground tunnels. Two
days of fierce shelling and heavy fighting had changed almost every land-
mark on the hill. My map didn't work, and we couldn't communicate with
our comrades inside the tunnels. Since it was only about an hour before
dawn, we didn't have enough time to move back down the hill and with-
draw to safety. My two hundred men would be an easy target for enemy
artillery fire if we couldn't move into the tunnels before dawn. "Don't panic,"
I told my lieutenants. "Disperse and look for the tunnel entrances."
We found the new entrances to the tunnels by accident. One of our
soldiers fell into a deep shell hole while he was looking for the entrances. At
the bottom of the hole several hands suddenly grabbed him, held his legs,
Chinese soldiers work on their underground tunnels, 1951. (Courtesy
of the Center for Archives and Information, Heilongjiang Provincial
Academy of Social Sciences)
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Due to the serious water shortage in the underground tunnels, a Chinese soldier
patiently waits for a water drop from the rock. (Courtesy of the Center for Archives
and Information, Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences)
covered his eyes, and took away his rifle. "Wait! Don't shoot!" he yelled in
Chinese, and the hands on his eyes were immediately removed. He found
himself among several Chinese soldiers of the First Company at a new, con-
cealed entrance to the tunnels. I asked the First Company to use flour to
mark the way to the entrance. Before dawn, the entire Eighth Company
moved into the tunnels without any casualties (except two men missing in
action).
It was a big mess inside the tunnels. First, the three tunnels were cut off
from each other and there was no connection or communication between
the tunnels. Each tunnel had suffered severe damage from the enemy attacks
on October 17. Bodies, shells, and garbage were every where. There were no
supplies, no food, and most important, no water.
Understandably, the morale in the tunnels was low. There was no chain
of command, communication between the tunnels and our regimental head-
178 Voices from the Korean War
quarters was nonexistent, and nobody knew what to do. There were about
one hundred soldiers inside the tunnels, remnants from six different compa-
nies and ranging in ages from sixteen to fifty-two. About fifty of the men
were wounded, and they had received no medicine or medical assistance.
They were lying around, some of them dying, and nobody seemed to care.
In one of the shelter holes there was a pile of more than twenty corpses.
Neither did anybody care about safety.There were seven accidental rifle
discharges and two hand grenade discharges in the tunnels during the first
morning after we moved in. I was really mad when I learned that several of
my men were wounded by these accidental discharges.
Early the next morning, I held an officers' meeting. Sitting around a
candle in a tunnel, the commanding officers all agreed with my proposals.
First, we must have a chain of command. I would command the defense of
the hill and the tunnels.Though there were several other captains who had
survived in the tunnels, they had lost most of their men. For example, the
First Company had only sixteen men. I was the only captain who had a
radio and could keep in touch with our regimental headquarters.
Next, I sent the badly wounded soldiers down the hill and back to our
rear area. I asked those who were not severely wounded to stay on a voluntary
basis. During the next two nights, about forty wounded were evacuated. I was
told later that a battalion officer and several soldiers who pretended to be
wounded attempted to leave the hill that night.The officer faced a PLA court
martial in China. The soldiers who deserted were executed on the spot.
I decided to attack the enemy surface positions at night so as to secure
our tunnels through the daytime.This decision resulted from my experience
as a commander during my first two days on the hill.
About 9:00 A.M. on October 19, the first day of my command on Hill
597.9, the enemy discovered two of our entrances. At 1:00 P.M., they at-
tacked, firing recoilless rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers into our
tunnels.The "S-shaped" tunnels, however, limited their firing power, so they
tried to get into our tunnels. To defend our small and narrow tunnels, I
could only send three soldiers at a time to the entrances. Each team lasted
only eight to ten minutes. By sunset, the attacks stopped. We suffered heavy
casualties, forty-nine dead and seventeen wounded. Moreover, some of our
tunnels collapsed after the enemy's successive bombardments. Several men
were buried alive inside the tunnels.
Our soldiers became frustrated. During the evening of October 19, some
of them complained to me. "The Eighth Company never fights this kind of
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battle," they said. "We are not the super Monkey King here. We feel like a
monkey that got stuck in the trap inside the hill.The enemy walks around all
over our head. We can't do anything about it. All we can do is to wait for
another beating." Others wondered how long we would be able to stay on
the hill. Three days, maybe four days? It could not be much longer because
every day more men were killed and our tunnels were being taken apart,
piece by piece.
Colonel Liu also worried about us and asked me on the radio if I needed
reinforcement troops on the hill or to be replaced by another company.
"Don't send any more apples," I replied to the colonel. (Apples in our radio
code words meant reinforcement troops.) We couldn't take any more troops
because our tunnels were getting shorter and smaller. "The Eighth is all
right. We can stay." A new replacement company wouldn't do any better as
long as it used the same kind of defense and continued to sacrifice more
soldiers in order to stay in the tunnels longer. What we really needed was to
figure out a better way to protect our tunnels.
In the middle of the night, I sent a couple of squads out of the tunnels to
look for water and ammunition. "No engagement," I told the sergeants. But
some of them ran into the enemy trenches anyway and shots were fired.
To our surprise, as soon as the firefight was over, the American and
ROK soldiers pulled out of their positions and moved down to the bottom
of the hill. I was so happy to learn that the enemy troops did not seem to be
interested in fighting at night.They didn't have their air support and artillery
coverage at night, and probably thought they could retake the hill easily the
next morning.
A new defense plan came to my mind on October 20. According to my
plan, we would first get out of the tunnels at night and attack the enemy
troops. After their withdrawal, we would take over their positions on the hill
and try to hold them until the enemy counterattacked the next morning. I
calculated it would take them two or three hours to put together an assault.
When their attack started, we would retreat back into the tunnels. It would
take until sometime in the afternoon for the enemy soldiers to secure their
surface positions. Thus, they wouldn't have enough time left to find our
tunnel entrances and then organize a major attack on our tunnels before
dark. Our tunnels as well as our soldiers would be safe during the day. I
reported my new defense plan immediately to the regimental headquarters.
Colonel Liu approved my new plan and added that the regimental mor-
tar company could provide supporting fire to slow down the enemy daytime
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The 134th Regiment, Forty-fifth Division, CPVF Fifteenth Army uses the tunnels to
defend their positions on Hill 597.9, October 1952. (Courtesy of the Center for
Archives and Information, Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences)
counteroffensives. He named my plan an "active defense" plan when he
reported it to the Forty-fifth Division Headquarters.
Events soon proved my active defense plan worked well. During the
night of October 20,1 ordered six squads to attack the enemy positions on
the hill.When they opened fire, most of the American soldiers (U.S. Seventh
Division) and the ROK soldiers (ROK Second Division) withdrew from
their trenches and moved down to the bottom of the hill. With a few casu-
alties, we took over twelve out of sixteen positions on Hill 597.9 by the next
morning. I reported our success to the regimental headquarters. Colonel Liu
told me later that the division headquarters introduced our successful "active
defense" experience to other regiments on October 21.The Forty-fifth Di-
vision had lost more than four thousand men in its defense of the two hills
during the first seven days. My active defense, by improving the defense of
our tunnels, probably saved the lives of a number of Chinese soldiers.
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Our combat experience on October 22 further supported my proposals.
The enemy wasn't in a big hurry to retake their positions and didn't launch
their counteroffensive until 11:30 A.M.We spent most of the morning out-
side the tunnels, repairing the entrances, storing water, and collecting am-
munition on the hill. Our soldiers enjoyed the break and the sun for the first
time in four days.Their morale was high, and the commanding officers were
excited about my new tactics. "Captain, we can build concealed entrances
closer to the positions. It will be easier for us to take over these positions
again tonight," one of my lieutenants suggested. "Hey, Captain," another
lieutenant said, "let's bury our dead comrades inside the bunkers so their
bodies won't be destroyed by the shelling and bombing."
About 11:30 A.M., the enemy shelling began. We all moved into the
tunnels. That afternoon, the enemy occupied the surface positions on the
hill. By 5:00 P.M. they discovered two of our entrances. Just as I thought,
however, they didn't have enough time to put together a major assault on
our tunnels. They just threw in a dozen hand grenades before dark and left.
We had only two soldiers killed and five wounded in a twenty-four-hour
period. It was the first time we didn't have to fight a bloody, passive defense
during the daytime.
During the night, our attacks started again. The enemy troops seemed
better prepared for their withdrawal this time. They had everything ready
and just pulled out of their positions as soon as we opened fire. Next morn-
ing, they returned to their positions on the hill a little bit earlier. But, again,
they didn't organize any major attack on our tunnels. On the third day,
October 24, they repeated the same routine again. We discovered, however,
that most of the returning troops were ROK soldiers with only a few Ameri-
can soldiers. I reported this to regimental headquarters. Colonel Liu be-
lieved that the ROK Second Division was now the main enemy force on
Hill 597.9.To strengthen our defense, he sent me sixty soldiers as reinforce-
ments. It didn't matter which unit the soldiers came from; all the Chinese
troops on the hill were under my command.
On October 25, the situation on the hill changed. The enemy troops
returned to their positions with nine battle tanks and several searchlights. I
thought they might attack our tunnels in the late afternoon or even early
evening, so I ordered our troops to be ready for tunnel defense. By 8:00 P.M.,
however, nothing had happened. Again we became excited about our night
combat.The night on the hill belonged to us.
In the middle of the night, I began our attack by sending two demoli-
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tion squads to destroy the enemy tanks. About fifteen minutes later, one of
the squads came back without setting off an explosion. They couldn't see the
difference between the enemy tanks and our tanks, since both had a big star.
"We don't have any tanks on the hill," their lieutenant told them in an angry
voice. "The enemy tanks have a white star, and we have a red star. Go and get
them!" Twenty minutes later, explosions took place on the hill one after
another. Five of the nine light battle tanks were neutralized.
"Charge the enemy positions," I ordered. Immediately my lieutenants,
followed by about one hundred men in seven squads, poured out of the
tunnels. They attacked the enemy surface positions as they had every night
before.
But this time it was a totally different story. The enemy troops didn't
withdraw. Instead of packing and leaving, they turned on their searchlights
and fought back.The dark hill was suddenly lit up like a giant soccer field by
the enemy lights and flash bombs, and our soldiers were all over the hill
without any cover or protection.
The enemy machine guns and the four light tanks opened fire, sup-
ported by artillery pieces that shelled the hill for the first time at night. Our
attacking troops faced a strong defense in front of each enemy position.
After taking over two positions, our troops could advance no further. "Pull
back!" My voice disappeared in the deafening noise of the battle.
An hour later, ROK soldiers managed to encircle and inflict heavy casu-
alties on our troops in the two positions. I didn't have enough manpower or
firepower to rescue them. By 2:00 A.M. the fighting stopped and quietness
returned to the hill. Only seventeen of one hundred soldiers were able to
fight their way back to the tunnels. I was angry at myself; my miscalculations
had resulted in the loss of more than half of the Eighth Company.
Next morning, ROK troops (Thirty-first Regiment, Second Division)
on the hill launched their attacks on our tunnels. About 11:00 A.M., the
ROK soldiers discovered one of the entrances to our main tunnels. They
threw in a couple of dozen grenades and used flamethrowers to keep us
away from the entrance. An hour later, about twenty ROK soldiers managed
to slip into the tunnel. The S-shaped, narrow, and dark tunnel limited our
shooting range. Our soldiers could not see the enemy until they were very
close. As a result, it was hand-to-hand combat in the dark. I could hear
shooting, yelling, and screaming everywhere in the tunnels. Thanks to our
well-organized tunnel defense, we were able to eliminate the invaders inside
the tunnels at a cost of thirty-seven of our soldiers.
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Before we could identify and remove our dead and wounded comrades
in the tunnels, the ROKs sent more soldiers into the tunnels. It was the
bloodiest combat I had ever seen. While we managed to stop the second
ROK offensive by 5:30 P.M., the ROKs soon returned and smoked the tun-
nels with gas bombs. They followed by sealing the entrance to our tunnel
with rocks and wire nets.They tried to stop us from coming out at night and
attacking their surface positions again. We had to wait until dark to open
another entrance and get some fresh air. By the end of the day, October 26,
I had only sixteen men left, and only four of them were able to fight. Despite
our losses, however, we stayed on the hill.
On the morning of October 27, Colonel Liu reinforced Hill 597.9 with
160 men. I was instructed by the regimental staff on the radio to get my men
ready and pull off the hill on October 29. The Eighth Company would be
replaced by another company.
"No way!" I yelled on the radio. "I have lost two company political
instructors, eight lieutenants, all of my sergeants, and almost two hundred
men. I am not finished here yet. The fight is not over; how can I leave the
hill? How can I face my dead comrades?"
The regimental staff told me that it was Colonel Liu's order.
"Who cares? Nothing can make me withdraw from the hill. You may
pull me out of here after I die in the fight." I was really mad and didn't care
who heard me.
In fact, Colonel Liu was standing right there in the regimental head-
quarters and heard everything I said on the radio. He grasped the micro-
phone and yelled back at me: "Are you out of your mind, Zheng Yanman?
This is Colonel Liu Zhanhua. How dare you to disobey my order. Get ready
and pull your men out of there tomorrow."
I stopped my complaints. I just wanted him to know that we didn't fail.
We did our best to defend the tunnels and stay on the hill for twelve days.
Following Colonel Liu's order, I passed the tunnel defense command to
a captain from the 135th Regiment during the night on October 28. "I
heard everything, Captain Zheng," he said to me. "We will stay in the tunnel
and fight to the end."
During the night of October 29, the Eighth Company pulled out of the
tunnels and moved down the hill.There were only six men in the company
able to make their way back and walk down the hill with me. When we
moved up the hill just twelve days ago, I remembered, two hundred young
men were running and jumping, full of energy and heroic dreams. Tonight
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there were only six of them. Tired and wounded, they moved slowly down
the hill. Covered by the dust and blood, their faces and arms were black like
charcoals.Their uniforms were ragged, shabby, and torn at the elbows.They
looked like ghosts walking in the dark. "Wash your face," I told them in a
low voice when we stopped at a small pond. "You look terrible, like defeated
soldiers. We are the seeds of a new Eighth Company. We will welcome and
impress our new comrades."
I washed my face, but I couldn't wash away those familiar faces of my
comrades in my mind. My lieutenants, sergeants, and privates had followed
me from China all the way to Korea. They could never go back to their
homes and see their families.They were only nineteen or twenty years old,
and dropped their last blood on this foreign land. I let my tears drop in the
pond.
At the regimental headquarters, I learned that this was one of the most
bloody battles we ever fought in the Korean War. The 134th Regiment lost
most of its companies. The regiment lost 65 percent of its captains, 89 per-
cent of its lieutenants, and 100 percent of its sergeants. Our division lost
5,200 soldiers on the two hills. The Fifteenth Army had a total of 11,400
casualties from late October to early November, when the Battle of Triangle
Hill finally came to an end.
Chapter 21
North and South
A Korean Youth Serves in Both Armies
Lee Young Ho was born in Seoul in 1933. He was a high school junior when the
North Koreans attacked and captured the city in 1950. Following the invasion, the
entire family remained inside their home to avoid contact with the North Koreans.
After a few days, however, LeeYoung Ho decided to step outside to catch some fresh air.
He was spotted by a North Korean soldier, taken into custody, and forced to join the
North Korean People's Army without having the opportunity to say goodbye to his
family. After a few months as a soldier in the North Korean People's Army, he
managed to escape from the NKPA while it was retreating in October 1950. He later
joined the South Korean Marine Corps, participating in battles in the Sachonggang
district in 1952. He was discharged in 1957 and has since driven a taxicab in Seoul.
Private LeeYoung Ho
Third Battalion, Marine Corps, ROK Army
ONE DAY, WHILE returning home from an errand, I overheard several
elderly neighbors repeating some strange rumors. It was June 24, 1950.
"It is said that a war has broken out."
"Who in the world says such a thing?"
"Someone heard that the North's Reds are invading."
"That could be major trouble. But could that be true?"
I rushed home, but my anxiety remained unbearable. Could it be true?
But nothing happened that night. In the morning, my entire family was
terribly uneasy.We heard that war had indeed broken out. My father was out
checking on the rumors, but I couldn't stand the worsening anxiety. So I
went to the Donghwa movie theater that was pretty close to my home. Soon
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a jeep with a large speaker passed by blaring this announcement: "All mili-
tary personnel on leave, you must return to your unit immediately. We have
a war along the 38th Parallel."
All the people around us were in a state of shock and fear. Most began
packing essentials and preparing for an evacuation. But not many had any
idea where to go. Nevertheless, some left home immediately because there
were rampant rumors that the Reds would kill everybody.
On the afternoon of June 26,1 could see part of the war myself. Some
wounded soldiers passed through the neighborhood, which made the war
seem real to me. On the next afternoon, we were even more shocked by the
news that the enemy was already in Eijungbu.We could hear the sounds of
shell explosions and were in a state of near panic. Everybody talked a lot but
knew nothing about what we should do.
"We must evacuate. The Reds will shoot anybody they see."
"They are already in Eijungbu.There is nothing we can do now."
We spent the night with all doors locked. But the shells were falling
closer and closer. We were totally afraid of the enemy. We heard the Han
River Bridge was destroyed, leaving us no way to cross the river. The next
morning, June 28,1 very carefully approached the street nearby just to check
out the situation. We really had no idea on what was going on. There were
just a few pedestrians on the street. But to my surprise, some were wearing a
red armband. I guessed that they were Communists.
My neighborhood was poor and small, about seventy families. So we
knew many of our neighbors, like the Yoos. We soon found Yoo's entire
family wore armbands. Everybody was shaken because Mr.Yoo was well
respected in the neighborhood as an intellectual. My family spent the entire
day inside with the doors locked. We were just trying to understand the
things going on outside.
Soon we heard that an enemy tank force had established its headquar-
ters at Duksoo High School. Grownups lamented that there was no way to
escape death. But I was curious about the tanks. I had never seen a real tank.
In the alley I found several friends.
"Let's go and see the tanks!"
"It is dangerous. What if they catch us?"
Some objected, but we decided to try. Using alleys we approached the
high school.
"Ah ..."
The sight terrified us. There were rows of tanks guarded by the North
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Korean soldiers, who struck me as somewhat small and thin. I thought they
would be big and powerful. Of course, they had weapons. But I couldn't
understand how they were able to overrun our own forces.
My entire family continued to remain indoors, day after day, but very
insecure. To make matters worse, I came down with a bad case of malaria,
and there was no medicine available. My father used every home remedy to
save my life. Luckily, I recovered fully within a few days. During the illness, I
missed the fresh air and being outdoors. On the morning of July 12,1 de-
cided to go outside for some fresh air. I didn't intend to go far away but just
around the neighborhood.
"Comrade, come here!" someone yelled at me. I was frightened by the
order and looked back to see who he was. He was wearing a red armband.
He stared at my eyes and signaled me to come closer to him.
"Do you want me?"
"That's right!" He told me to follow him. No reason was given, but I
was already frozen and unable to do anything contrary to his command.
While following him like a loyal dog, I desperately looked for a familiar face.
But there was none. I wept in my heart. I was led to a building behind the
Hongik elementary school. Inside I found six young men sitting on a long
bench. I figured they were in the same boat as me. A middle-aged man
greeted me.
"Comrade, I welcome you. You are to fight for the hero of the people,
our great leader, Kim II Sung."
His talk made me shudder. I was not able to think rationally anymore.
He gave me a sheet of paper and ordered me write down my basic personal
information. I did what he asked. Then some hours passed. To my great
surprise the sister of Mr.Yoo entered the room. She wore the red armband
like other Communists. Nevertheless, I was delighted to see her.
I greeted Sukgi's sister warmly. To my desperate greeting she didn't re-
spond at all. She was no longer my friend's sister. But I didn't give up hope.
I thought she would do something for me. Meanwhile, they brought in
more young men. I found another neighbor who wore the red armband. He
was the guy known as the "bird's eye."
"Please tell my family where I am." But his face remained cold. He
treated me like a total stranger. Soon there were fifteen men. We were hun-
gry, but they didn't feed us. Instead they tied us together with a rope and led
us to some unknown destination. I lamented endlessly. It appeared that I
would never be able to see my family again. We arrived at the Jaedong el-
188 Voices from the Korean War
ementary school, where I found a group of about 150 young men. They put
thirty men in each classroom. In three days the number of so-called volun-
teers reached over three hundred men.Very quickly they organized us into
military units. That afternoon they gave each of us a bowl of food and or-
dered the group to move out. Just like that I became a North Korean soldier
and was on the way to some unknown place.
"We are going to Pyongyang."
"What?" I heard someone saying.
I was no longer afraid of anything. I just tried to concentrate on remain-
ing alert at all times. Our march continued northward.They placed soldiers
and security policemen in the area to prevent any attempt to flee. Although
exhausted, I kept thinking about my father. Then I missed my mother, who
died when I was a kid. She was from Shinmak, Hwanghae-do Province. We
went through Hwanghae-do Province on our way to Pyongyang.We passed
Moonsan and the Imjin Bridge, marching all night in the dark. Soon I was
dead tired, and I could think of nothing else, not even my family. Excruciat-
ing pain ruled every second of my life.
A few miles away from the city of Jangdan, we were allowed to take a
badly needed rest. More than anything we needed sleep. In the morning,
civilian volunteers brought balls of cooked barley, but it did not come close
to satisfying our hunger. In the evening we resumed our march. Within a
few hours we entered Gaesung. I realized that I was about to enter the land
of the Reds. I didn't have much confidence in my future in this strange
territory.
Our forced march continued in the same fashion. A rest during the
daylight was followed by long, exhausting night marches. We felt the Reds
relaxed quite a bit when we reached Shinnamchon. Perhaps they thought
the greater distance would make it impossible for us to return to our homes.
When I realized we were in Hwanghae-do Province, I thought about my
mother's family again. One of her uncles had even visited us after the libera-
tion in 1945. By the time we reached Shinmak I had suffered so much
mental anguish I contemplated the feasibility of an escape. I was so desperate
I finally asked my platoon leader for permission to leave. He was terribly
rude at first, but when I told him my story he was rather sympathetic.
"Is that so?Your mother's home was in the north? Okay, but don't make
any foolish mistakes. The next stop is Suhheung."
Permission granted, I set out to visit my maternal grandmother. I tried
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to find my uncles, but nobody seemed to know any of them. I was terribly
disappointed. At the last moment, however, I met a barber who knew one of
my uncles. He advised me to go to my aunt's home instead of my uncle's. I
didn't even know if my aunt was still alive, but I took his advice and found
her home quite easily She looked very much like my mother.
"I am Young Ho from Shindangdong, Seoul." I identified myself with
faltering words. She stared at me for a while and then exploded with joy:
"What? You are Young Ho?" She embraced me and shed a shower of
tears.
"You grew up this big without your mama! What are you doing here in
the middle of the war?" I explained to her what had happened to me. Quickly
my aunt took me to my grandmother's home.
"Mama, here is Young Ho, a son of my sister in Seoul."
"What are you saying?" My grandmother rushed out of the room to
greet me. Of course, warm tears streamed down her face. I washed myself at
the family well and put on my uncle's clothes. I felt like a new man. I ate and
rested for a little while. But I could not ask them to hide me there. Local
Communists had already jailed one of my uncles as a counterrevolutionary.
Another uncle was out of town to serve the party elsewhere. In addition,
they had to worry about the neighbors, who saw me coming. I had to say
goodbye to my grandmother and aunt without finding a place to hide, but
seeing those two dear ladies did me a world of good.
"You are back. I worried about you," my platoon leader said when I
returned.
Escape was really not feasible for me; wherever I fled, they would cer-
tainly catch me. There was not a single soul who could protect me from the
Communists. Next morning we resumed the march.We walked a whole day,
even after it became dark. Everything was pitch dark because we maintained
a complete blackout for fear of U.S. air strikes.
In Jaeryung, our group was divided into three units with about one
hundred men in each group.We finally arrived at the slope close to Guwolsan
Mountain.There we constructed a makeshift barrack with material we har-
vested locally. Soon we started the training that reminded me of children's
play. We used hand-carved wooden sticks for rifles. After three weeks of such
training, ox-carts brought us supplies, including rifles and uniforms. Wear ing
the NKPA uniform, I fired three rifle shots for the first time. In this way, I
became a People's Army soldier, just like the one I saw in Seoul. I was Kim
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II Sung's cannon fodder! I accepted this as my fate. But I still couldn't under-
stand how I became an enemy soldier. I hated the leftists with vigor, but now
I was a Communist soldier. I missed my family even more.
"Comrades, you should be ready to sacrifice your body for our great
leader.You must become a brave fighter," an officer with a star on his shoul-
der said to us. I sneered at him and resolved to escape whenever I could.
After another series of marches we were delivered to a regular North Ko-
rean unit. To my great luck I found that one of my new platoon members
was from Seoul. His name was KimTaesik, and he became a good friend of
mine. At that moment I badly needed a close friend.
We moved again. This time each company moved independently. My
company was the first to move out of the location, but they didn't tell us
where we were heading. I guessed that we were going south. When we
arrived at the new location I heard it was Jangsangot. From our position we
could see the sea. It appeared we were defending the shore areas. The fact
that I was now aiming my rifle to the south tormented me endlessly. I was
abducted by the Reds and became a Communist soldier against my will. But
who would believe that!
In early September, our immediate task was building bunkers to be used
for both sleeping and operational quarters. Each squad was divided into two
groups. We worked at night and slept during the day. The night work was
not that bad because we could steal a catnap from time to time. So I didn't
complain much.
That night the sky was particularly full with billions of bright stars. The
wind was fresh and cool. Again I was thinking of my family in Seoul. I was
sure that my father was wondering about his first son, who had just disap-
peared without a trace. He couldn't even be sure I was still alive, not to
mention being an enemy soldier. I thought about his frustration and despair.
But what could I do! Suddenly I thought I saw some lightning far away to
the south. It came from the direction where the city of Inchon might be. I
guessed a major storm had hit the area.
Strangely, we could still see the lightning a few nights later. The nightly
display of lightning showers seemed to make the company tense and unstable.
Soon we were ordered to prepare to move. We were dumbfounded and un-
happy with the prospect of another torturous march. Regardless, we were
ordered to move out. I gathered from the officers' behavior that the situation
was rather urgent.The march was exhausting, like the one we had done before.
But some rumors I heard during the march gave me reason to hope again.
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The rumor was that the United Nation's forces had landed in Inchon.
There could be no news more pleasant than that, if true.
"The UN forces undertook the landing operation in Inchon."
"Could that be true?"
"Yes it is. They have already taken Seoul."
"We are finally saved." I heard things like that during the march. Such
remarks made it difficult for me to suppress my surging emotions. My heart
was about to burst open with hope and expectations. I finally understood
the strange lightning that colored the dark sky a few nights earlier. It was not
lightning, but artillery fire from the invading UN forces. Our company was
ordered to move to Pyongyang as fast as possible. That meant one thing to
me—we were going north! Uneasiness spread among the soldiers quickly.
Nonetheless, we headed north. Again, our march was restricted to nighttime
to avoid the UN air attacks. The night marches exhausted us.
"Hurry up! Hurry up!" Officers kept pushing us, but we walked slowly
and reluctantly. Earlier we had been ordered to rush so we could defend
Pyongyang. Now we were ordered to march north, through mountain ranges.
The order encouraged us to fight the enemy for the party and the people.
That was a tall order because we suffered from hunger and extreme fatigue.
Nevertheless, we marched over the rough country roads and paths without a
word; we just followed the guy in front of us.
"Enemy fighters!"
"Get dispersed and find a shelter quick!" officers shouted desperately.
But there was no place to hide our bodies.While passing through a rice field
we became targets of sudden air raids. With no place else to go, I crouched
along a tiny elevated path that divided one property from another. It was
extreme chaos as everybody scrambled to find a place to hide. Our unit
countered the air raid with rockets hidden in the ox-carts. Others fired their
rifles and machine guns in desperation. But the enemy fighters clearly main-
tained an overwhelming dominance. Bombs landed all around me, while
machine gun bullets hit just inches away. The last thing I remembered was a
big boom. When I regained consciousness, there were no UN fighters, only
white clouds in the blue sky. The incessant moaning of the wounded filled
the air. The raid hit not only soldiers but also animals, which were pulling
carts. It was a hellish scene.We moved the wounded to a safer place and took
steps to repair the damage.
"You are alive!" I embraced KimTaesik. He was the only one I could
trust in the company.
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"We are going to share the same fate,"Taesik said. "We will live or die
together." Taesik was two years my senior, but less robust in appearance.
Under the circumstances, getting supplies was unthinkable. Instead we
were told to eat raw rice if we had it. Gingerly, we began to move again, in
the dark. Once again we came under enemy fire, and this time the UN
forces made extensive use of flares to locate our positions. In the confusion
of the battle Taesik and I were temporarily separated, but I soon located him.
"Will you do what I tell you? We have to act together," I yelled at Taesik.
"No problem. I will follow you," Taesik replied. We waited for a while
under a tiny earthen pathway to evaluate the situation. We found several
soldiers talking among themselves in low voices. It sounded like they were
planning to escape. When they slowly moved away we followed them qui-
etly. Soon we were away from the battlefield.We could see the battle was still
going on with even greater intensity. We kept going, believing we were
heading south.
"Hands up! Who are you?" We were terrified by the stern order. But
soon we realized that we were held up by the same soldiers we were follow-
ing. I was greatly relieved and said, "We followed you and left the battlefield
just because we didn't want to die there."
"Is that right?" Once they found out who we were they didn't ask many
questions.They didn't belong to our platoon, but we were somewhat famil-
iar to each other. They were from North Korea, while we were from South
Korea.
"We are on the same boat. So let's be careful," the leader of the four said.
"First of all, we have to become civilians. To do that we must get rid of
our uniforms." We all agreed to it. We followed their lead although we had
no idea where we were going. In the dawn we found a farmhouse nearby.
We approached the house very carefully, but it was empty. We emptied the
cabinet but there were no suitable clothes for us. But the North Korean
soldiers found some cheap cotton clothes and urged us to change. As they
asked us to do, Taesik and I buried our uniforms in the backyard and threw
away our rifles and munitions.We no longer belonged to the People's Army;
we were civilians.That made us feel much better.We continued to walk and
to eat the raw corn we found in empty farmhouses.
"It's safer from here on," the group leader announced. "But it will be
better if we separate." I felt as if the end had come.They were our colleagues,
who had led us safely to the south. I understood their decision, and we were
North and South 193
grateful for their help. But we had no idea how to get to Seoul. Then I
remembered Shinmak, where my grandmother lived.
"How far is it to Shinmak?" One of the soldiers gave me the directions,
and I felt sure we could find it. After exchanging genuine goodbyes, we
departed. We felt alone and abandoned, and we were on our own. I told
Taesik what I intended to do. He said he would go with me wherever I
went. We set out on our new journey to Shinmak.
While our new clothes gave us a humble appearance, we didn't look like
farmers because we had covered our hairless heads with pieces of cloth and
wore sneakers issued by the People s Army. So we threw away the sneakers
and wore homemade straw sandals we obtained from farmers, which hurt
my feet badly. When I couldn't stand the pain anymore, I walked barefoot.
After a few miles, my feet were in even worse shape. In addition, we were
suffering from incredible hunger. We finally decided to stop at a farmhouse
on a slope and take our chances.
"Hands up!" Someone stopped us with a rifle. I was stunned but noticed
they were wearing a shoulder piece of Taegukgi, the national flag of South
Korea. I realized what that meant. We had reached UN territory.
"You Communist bitch! Kim II Sung's dog!"They started beating us
with rifle butts without even checking our identities. Obviously we looked
like soldiers from the People's Army to them. I fell down and almost lost
consciousness.
"Where are you from, boys?"
I explained to them what had happened to me. But they didn't believe
me. Not only that, they threatened to turn us over to the military police. I
resigned and was prepared to accept my fate. It seemed a lot better than
dying at the hands of our enemies. I couldn't help but feel that the whole
thing was terribly unfair. So I tried one more time. I went down on my
knees and explained in detail the fateful journey I was forced to take since
my abduction. Finally they were convinced that I was telling the truth. I
asked them take me to my grandmother's house, but they refused. Instead
they cautioned us to be careful. They informed us that there were many
stragglers of Communists and local sympathizers staging wanton killings. We
spent the night at the village and resumed walking in the morning.
Our feet were all cut up, which made simple walking pure torture. We
even walked with four legs like an animal to relieve the pain on our feet. We
often discussed death as a better alternative and wept out of pain and des-
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peration. We could see military vehicles going north. But we were escapees
from the People's Army. As a last resort, we removed a piece of cloth from
our pants and wrapped our badly cut feet. With sheer determination we
continued to walk slowly and painfully. After all, we had to live! At last, we
arrived at Grandma s house.
"Aunt!" I couldn't say anything else. Aunt rushed to greet me, and
Grandma came out, too.
"Oh, my heaven.You are back alive!" Grandma wept uncontrollably.
I immediately went to sleep. Finally, after many hours of sound sleep, I
woke up and ate. After a bath and fresh clothes I felt like a new man. It had
been about four months since the Communists had abducted me in Seoul.
Grandma believed that heaven helped me to return safely. I was not so sure.
I heard that my uncle blamed Grandma for not providing a hideout for me
the last time. My uncle was a civilian worker at the makeshift airfield in
Shinmak, which was under the control of the South Korean air force.
The war was going well for the Republic of Korea. We heard the ROK
forces had liberated Pyongyang and were pushing north to capture the Baekdu
Mountain and Aprokgang River, which separated the Korean peninsula from
China. It looked like the unification of Korea was only steps away I was
hopeful that soon I would be able to return to my family in Seoul. I was
troubled, however, by information that the South had established a new
national identification system. Every man was required to carry two identi-
fication cards; one for citizenship and another for his military service status.
We were told that the authorities would arrest anyone as a Red who didn't
produce the proper identification. We worried about the new system. We
couldn't go to Seoul without the identification cards, but we couldn't obtain
the cards without going to Seoul.
With the loving nourishment of Grandma's family, our wounds healed
quickly. But the identification problems troubled Taesik and me. We dis-
cussed the problem endlessly but saw no easy solution. One night Taesik
informed me of his decision.
"Because of you I am here. So I owe you much. But now I have to face
my own fate alone. I will go to Seoul. We will meet in Seoul if heaven
allows."
"How can you go alone when things are still dangerous and extremely
unstable?" I tried to discourage him in every way I could.
"I must go." Since his decision was resolute, I could only let him go.
Warm tears rolled down our faces when we said our goodbyes.
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In early November, I had a lucky break. My uncle informed me that his
base would send a truck to Seoul to pick up some parts.
"If I arrange to take you to Seoul, I assume you can find your house."
"Yes. Just take me to Seoul." My uncle somehow convinced Sergeant
Kim to take me along. I said sad farewells to Grandmother and my uncle's
family. They were all happy for me but still wept, a Korean way of saying
goodbye. Still, I was happy to be going home. The truck, however, was in
such bad shape we could drive only at very slow speeds.We also had to stop
numerous times to fix something. I worried about falling into enemy hands.
The military situation in the area we were passing through was still unstable
even though it was under the control of friendly forces. We drove only dur-
ing the day, and I remained in the truck cab at all times. There were still
many checkpoints where they examined everything. Sergeant Kim did his
best to protect me at every checkpoint. Finally, after we had crossed the
Imjin River, I realized I was really returning to Seoul.
"Ah, how I missed Seoul!" I felt like going outside and shouting "Long
Live." The city was dark except for weak lamp lights here and there. I asked
the sergeant to let me off at the Gwanghwamoon area. He kindly offered to
drive me to my neighborhood, but I declined. He had already done more for
me than I had any right to expect. I expressed my heartfelt gratitude for his
help and kindness and set out to find my family. Since I knew most back
alleys I extensively used them to avoid identification checks. But I was not
able to detour the checkpoint at Chunggyechun. I worried about the po-
tential trouble of not having any identification at all. While I was looking for
a safe passage I saw a family carrying some heavy bundles. I volunteered my
service to carry one of their bundles. Carrying a large bundle on my back, I
was able to pass the checkpoint. In my humble clothes, I looked just like a
member of the family. That was the last hurdle I had to overcome to return
to my own home.
"Father!"
"Is this Young Ho?" Father almost fainted at my sudden appearance. I
wept loudly while embracing my father with both hands.
"You are back. ..." I found my brothers and my stepmother but not
grandmother. Father informed me she had passed away. After my disappear-
ance she went out to the street every day and called my name. She refused to
eat and died a short time later. I was so sad and felt guilty that my grand-
mother had died like this.
I was home but had no freedom to move around, because I dared not
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leave the house. So we considered every method to obtain the necessary
identification cards. After the neighborhood police chief rejected the peti-
tion submitted by fifteen adults on my behalf there was not much we could
do. I was incarcerated in my own home, but I was totally innocent.The only
thing I had done wrong was to allow the Communists to abduct me.
Through friends I did receive news about the war. In late November, I
saw a newspaper notice on navy recruitment. When I read it I realized that
joining the service was the only solution open to me. Moreover, I had an
obligation to serve the nation's armed forces just like any other young man
in South Korea. I decided to apply, although I still didn't have identification
cards. I prepared the application anyway and submitted it to the naval head-
quarters. I did my best on all four tests, because becoming a sailor was the
immediate solution for my involuntary incarceration. My father was pessi-
mistic because of my incomplete documentation. Luckily I passed the tests.
Soon I was on my way to boot camp, but to become a marine, not a sailor. I
was admitted to the fifth class of the Marine Corps recruits on December
20, 1950. After fifty days of basic training, I became a marine private on
February 10,1951.
As a machine gun operator I participated in many battles, including the
Dosolsan battle, one of the worst battles of the war.1 It was a price you
needed to pay to become a ROK Marine. On Hill 86 on the western front,
the enemy shelled us constantly, but we never let fear overcome us.
When the enemy shells were incoming, we usually guessed their land-
ing spots by their sound. If we thought it would land nearby, we scrambled
for shelter. We found such games to be exciting. We believed that was the
reason the ROK Marines got the nickname "Ghost Catchers."
One day, our Third Battalion was scheduled to trade positions with the
First Battalion. We were about to become a reserve unit after spending one
bloody month on the MLR. Early in the afternoon the enemy began shell-
ing our positions.The shelling was not heavy, and our artillery responded in
the same manner. About dusk, however, the enemy shelling became much
more intense. Shells were landing on the MLR and our four forward posts. It
was the most intense artillery barrage I had ever experienced.
"Those bitches must have heard of our shifting," I thought.They seemed
to know that the shift would take place at ten o'clock at night. I wasn't
feeling too good. When the darkness engulfed the area the enemy cut loose
on our MLR with machine guns. Flares lit up the MLR as the entire front
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was filled with heavy gunfire from both sides. I was excited by the immedi-
ate prospect of being in the middle of a decisive battle.
Under constant flares I could clearly see unfolding a human wave of
Chinese soldiers approaching our lines. "You bitches!" I cursed them un-
consciously and pulled my heavy machine gun's trigger. The area was noth-
ing short of pure hell. All sorts of weapons were discharging their deadly
bullets and shells at hellish rates.
"Oh, no!" It was an emergency and pure bad luck for me. My heavy
machine gun's leg was broken by the enemy shell fragments. I was in great
panic.While I was trying to fix it a shell landed close to me.There was a great
explosion and I lost consciousness, buried under a pile of debris. A little later,
I regained consciousness and realized I was still alive. But I couldn't move at
all. Worse, I found breathing to be extremely difficult. Realizing that I was
buried in dirt, I pushed my upper body with all the might I was able to
muster. Finally, I managed to crawl out of the dirt. I became alive again with
a supply of fresh air. Enemy shells, however, were still landing with tremen-
dous din. I was surveying the situation with most of my body still buried.
I heard voices. They were Chinese, and I thought the end was at hand.
But I tried to remain alert. I had experienced similar dangers in the north
many times, I thought. While I was trying to make up my mind on my next
move, friendly forces started their counteroffense with an artillery barrage.
Shells exploding in mid-air devastated the Chinese with showers of shell
fragments. I was close to a trench, but it was heavily damaged. Nevertheless,
I managed to make my way into the trench by using my hands. Nearby, in an
undamaged trench, I found grenades. I gathered an armful of grenades and
attacked the Chinese soldiers, who were carrying their wounded.
"I will kill all of you!" Yelling at the top of my lungs, I threw grenades at
the enemy soldiers. All alone on Hill 33, somehow I survived the night. At
dawn a squadron of American fighter planes attacked the hill I was holding.
Since the bunkers and trenches on the hill were all heavily damaged, I had
no place to hide. The planes attacked the hill anyway.
I could see some movement on the MLR that I assumed were position
changes taking place after the night's heavy battle. I thought that they should
relieve me too. I needed my replacement so I could return to my unit. Fi-
nally, I spotted three guys approaching my position. I was so excited that I
waved my hand to them to show them where I was. But they mistook me
for the enemy and quickly disappeared. It took some yelling on my part to
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convince them I was one of them. They had reason to be cautious, because
they assumed that I had been killed. When I returned to the platoon they
informed me that I had been missing for more than twelve hours.
"Private Lee, you are still alive!" my commanding officer greeted me. I
embraced my comrades with joy, and with a deeper appreciation for life.
Part Five
Behind the Front Lines
This page intentionally left blank 
Chapter 22
The "Lighter" Side of the War
When WWII veterans returned, if they talked about the war at all it was most likely
about some of the wild and humorous incidents they had experienced. Korean War
veterans, on the other hand, seemed to have less to say about the humorous side of the
war. This is not easy to explain. Perhaps GIs found it more exciting to liberate a
French or an Italian town than a Korean town. American indifference toward the war
may also have played a role. Returning Korean War veterans quickly learned Ameri-
cans were not particularly interested in stories about a war that ended in a stalemate.
Nevertheless, regardless of where they were, whenever large numbers of GIs came
together some wild and crazy things usually took place. Even in captivity, POWs in
communist prison camps found ways to play jokes on one another and sometimes on
their captors. The following stories, the first two by First Lieutenant Pendleton Woods
and the third by Staff Sergeant Bernard Case, attempt to tell something of the lighter
side of the Korean War.
First Lieutenant Pendleton Woods
Public Information Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
Forty-fifth Infantry Division
WHILE I WAS in Korea during the winter of 1951-1952, only one major
Hollywood performer visited our troops. It was still cold but not quite as icy
when Betty Hutton and a troupe of entertainers came by the Forty-fifth
Infantry Division.
Along with others, as Division Public Information officer I was present
with a photographer at the time of her arrival. When she got off of the
helicopter, I was concerned about her show appearance. She had a bad case
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of laryngitis and could hardly utter a sound. Nevertheless, she was deter-
mined "to go on with the show."
When the opening of the show came that afternoon, despite her ail-
ment and obvious difficulty, she was able to project her lusty voice and sang
beautifully. The show was great!
That evening the division commander and his staff, along with top regi-
mental officers, gave a party for Miss Hutton in the general's mess tent.
One of the cooks in the division headquarters mess hall, who had been
the head chef at the Skirvin Hotel in Oklahoma City, had prepared a beau-
tiful cake in her honor.We contacted the cook, asking him to meet us at the
tent at a certain hour so we could take a picture of our distinguished guest
and the cake for a news release.We asked him to wear his white chef's dress,
with the high, traditional-type cook's hat, which we knew he had with him.
When my photographer and I arrived at the tent, we were met by my
boss, a colonel well known for his arrogance and overbearing manner. He
greeted us heartedly with, "Hi Pen, come on in; I don't care what you write
about me, just spell my name right, heh . . . heh . . . heh."
"We want to take a picture of Betty Hutton and the cook," I said.
"The cook?" he answered. "To hell with the cook."
I explained that the cook, who had been a chef at the Skirvin Hotel, had
made the beautiful cake on the table.
"You can't take this picture," the colonel responded. "He's out of uniform."
By this time Betty Hutton had entered the room and saw what was
happening. She immediately put her arms around the cook and pulled him
over to the cake. "He's not out of uniform," she said. "He's wearing his
whites and he looks beautiful. I want a picture with him and my cake!"
We made the picture in three poses.Then the colonel walked out of the
tent without another word.
The next day the colonel called me. He said nothing about the Betty
Hutton scene, but bawled me out about something unrelated. I simply smiled
because I knew what had actually triggered his call.
As Division Public Information officer, I found it interesting to observe
which stories received national attention. Most of the time this depended
more on their uniqueness than their importance.
Bill Fields, a warrant officer in the Forty-fifth Division, had political
ambitions. Realizing his military service would be over before the coming
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fall elections, he registered by mail to run for sheriff of Tulsa County in
Oklahoma. The primary election was scheduled to take place in the sum-
mer, while he was still in Korea.
One day Bill came to my tent and told me about his dilemma, at the
same time asking me if I could help him publicize his campaign. I suggested
we make a political sign. We would shoot a picture of him nailing the sign
into the ground on the top of Old Baldy, a nearby mountain so named
because the heavy fighting had destroyed all of its vegetation.
This we did.The sign simply said,"VOTE FOR BILL FIELDS FOR SHER-
IFF OF TULSA COUNTY ."The picture caught on nationwide, and Bill was
elected in a landslide. After he won the primary, he came to me and asked
what he could do to repay me. My answer, "I want one free release from jail
if I should ever be arrested in Tulsa County." Fortunately, he never had to
make good on his promise.
Staff Sergeant Bernard E. Case
313th Engineer Utility Detachment, X Corps Headquarters
During my tour of duty in Korea in 1951 and 1952,1 never saw any hand-
to-hand combat or fired my rifle with the intent to kill anyone. Except for
incoming artillery now and then, I really had a pretty safe time over there. I
do remember one incident, however, that left me shook-up pretty good.
On-the troopship coming over, the General Black, I met a master ser-
geant and we became pretty good buddies, despite the fact I can't remember
his name. It was a rough crossing and almost everyone was seasick, but the
sergeant and I were not bothered by the rocking and rolling of the ship.
Since he was in ordnance and I was assigned to the engineers, we were
separated at Camp Drake. They sent me to Camp Gifu in Japan for a few
days of training in CBR (Chemical, Biological, and Radiological) warfare,
and I suppose he went right on to Korea.
I arrived in Korea a little later and was assigned to the 313th Engineer
Utility Detachment at X Corps Headquarters at Kwand-ri on the Inje River.
The general's "Latrine Repairers," we were called.
One day I ran across my old friend, the sergeant from the troopship. We
talked for a while, and he told me about his sister who had passed away and
another sister who was in poor health. He also told me his outfit was just
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Working on a supply road, Punchbowl, early 1953. (Courtesy of Richard Peters)
down the road, where he had a couple of bottles stashed away. He suggested
that I pay him a visit sometime and we would see what we could do about
the bottles.
A few days later I visited the sergeant, and after he had introduced me to
some of his buddies, we started in on the booze. I hadn't had much to drink
for some time, so it didn't take long before I needed to lay down and take a
nap. Sometime later the sergeant woke me up and told me I'd better get
started back to my outfit.
The sergeant offered to drive me back in his jeep, and I accepted. But
when we started to drive out the gate the guard held us up. He said the
officer of the day had issued orders prohibiting all vehicles from leaving the
area that night. The sergeant started arguing with the guard, so I butted in
and said, "No problem, I will walk back." But the sergeant just ignored me;
he was determined to drive me back.When I continued to insist on walking,
he snapped, "Shut up, I'm driving you back."
The sergeant and the guard continued to debate their differences of
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opinion with increasing volume and impatience, occasionally inserting a
few choice words from their rich, army vocabularies. Suddenly, the sergeant
asked the guard, "Do you have ammo in the carbine?" After the guard re-
plied "yes," the sergeant said, "Well then, start shooting." Then he told me to
lie down in the jeep, and we took off like a bat out of hell. We heard shots,
followed by the shattering of our windshield. Obviously, the guard was seri-
ous when he told us no vehicles were to leave the area that night.
Since I was crouched down in the jeep I really couldn't see what was
going on. When we got to my unit I asked the sergeant if we had hit a tree
limb or something and smashed out our windshield. "Hell no," he roared,
"the guard shot it out."
Despite a few too many nips on the bottle, at that point my mind began
to clear up.That bullet, I reasoned, hit the windshield of the jeep, and if I had
been sitting up straight in the seat, it damn well could have hit me. This was
not a pleasant thought, especially in my hungover condition. I went to bed
that night all shook-up and ended up wetting my bed.
After this I was transferred to another outfit in Eighth Army Headquar-
ters inTaegu, so I didn't see the sergeant again for some time. After a while,
however, I found myself back in the X Corps area, but now assigned to the
116th Combat Engineers. One day, when looking for a new generator, I ran
into the sergeant again. I asked him if he had survived the jeep deal without
any serious problems. He admitted it had cost him a promotion, but it didn't
seem to bother him. I told him I wouldn't be riding with him in a jeep
anymore because I didn't want to sleep in a wet bunk.
We laughed about the matter and that was that. I never saw the sergeant
again.
Chapter 23
A Korean Housewife's Story
Sometimes the saddest and most tragic stories in war are not about the soldiers, but
about the civilians, especially the women and children. The Korean War, like WWII,
saw thousands of civilian refugees on the roads enduring the hardships of a homeless
existence while trying to flee from an invading army. This is a story about one South
Korean family, living in Seoul, who fled from the North Korean army in the early
days of the war. Told by a Korean housewife and mother, she describes the hardships
the family suffered while trying to survive during the brief but oppressive North
Korean occupation of South Korea.
Lee Hyun Sook
Housewife in Seoul, Korea
(Translated by her daughter. Lee Hong Im)
AT THE BEGINNING of the Korean War in 1950,1 lived in Seoul with
my husband, Lee I. Won, and our nearly two-year-old daughter, Lee Hong
Im. I was twenty-four years old at the time, and I stayed home to take care of
the house and my little girl. My husband had an office job working for the
electric department in Seoul.
At the time, we knew there were big problems between South and
North Korea. Sometimes we heard about shootings around the 38th Parallel,
which divided the two Koreas. We also knew that sometimes those living in
North Korea crossed the Han River by boat to get into South Korea. Some
even paid money to cross the river.
The North Koreans attacked on June 25, early in the morning. I was
home and first heard the news on the radio. At that time most people had
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very little money or food, because it was near the end of the month, but we
knew we still had to leave before the North Koreans arrived in Seoul. For-
tunately, every day I had saved a handful of rice, so we had some food to take
with us on our journey to the South.
Together with my sister and her family, we crossed the Han River on a
boat, with my husband carrying the bag of rice. Unfortunately, my sister was
not a very healthy person, and she had several small children, so we could
only walk about ten miles a day. We walked for about fifteen days to Hong
Song, a city about seventy miles south of Seoul near the West Coast. We
chose Hong Song because this is where my husband's family lived. There
were many others trying to escape the North Koreans, and some became so
weak from lack of food they dropped out along the way and died. We saw
many dead people on the way to Hong Song. Because we had some rice, we
were okay. We even had some rice left over when we finally arrived in Hong
Song.
Everything seemed so peaceful when we entered the city, and we were
quite hopeful.We lived with my husband's family, and everything seemed to
be okay. Then, after we had been in Hong Song only about two days, the
North Koreans arrived, and our lives were changed forever.
Because he loved his country so much, in Hong Song my husband be-
longed to a local patriotic society. He received no pay, but sometimes gave
the local police information on those who supported the North Koreans.
The North Koreans, however, regularly arrested and put in jail anyone they
suspected of supporting South Korea.
To stay out of jail, my husband and some of his friends hid in the base-
ment of his older brother, Lee Chang Won, who lived in a very big house in
Hong Song. He was an important official in the South Korean government,
and sometimes he would hide as many as fifty people at one time in his
basement.
At this time it was very difficult to know who to trust because there
were many people in the South who welcomed the North Koreans, espe-
cially in the early part of the war. The North Koreans made Communism
sound so wonderful that many thought it must be like heaven. It seemed to
have a special appeal for both those with very little education and those with
a lot of education. Many college students supported the North Koreans,
especially those who studied in Japan.
While my husband's older brother was very helpful to those who were
wanted by the North Koreans, and hid many of them in his basement, he
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had a friend who supported the North Koreans and who became an impor-
tant head man in the North Korean police. Even so, he didn't interfere with
my family as long as we all stayed out of sight and caused no problems.
Unfortunately, one day my husband got tired of his basement hideout
and decided to walk around outside. He was seized by the North Korean
police, who brutally beat him up. When the friend of my husband's brother
learned what happened, he came to our house and took my husband to the
police station.
That night my husband never came home. I went to see my husband's
brother to see if he knew what happened. Together, we went down to the
police station and found my husband so badly beaten he was near death. His
clothes were so soaked in blood they stuck to his skin when removed.When
the head policeman, the friend of my husband's brother, learned what hap-
pened he made sure my husband received medical attention. Then he per-
mitted my husband to go home.Without his help, I'm quite sure my husband
would have died.
While my husband continued to suffer terribly from the beatings, it was
no longer safe for him to remain in our house. Fortunately, the friend of my
husband's brother understood this. So late one night he came to our house
and took my husband to another house about five miles away, where he
could hide more safely.
My husband stayed in this house for several months, almost like a dead
person. During the day he had to be very quiet and could hardly move. At
first he still could not walk, but at night he exercised with a rope, and he
built up his strength until he could walk again. Eventually, however, even this
house became too dangerous for him to stay So, with some other South
Koreans who were wanted by the North Korean police, my husband and the
others moved into the mountains, where they all lived in a cave.
Many of those who hid from the North Koreans were the former lead-
ers of South Korea, often professional people with a college education. The
North Koreans especially disliked these people and treated them with great
cruelty. I know of one occasion when the North Koreans gathered about
twenty to thirty of these people in a large building, then closed the door and
gave each a good beating. Then they gave shovels to each person and led
them into nearby mountains. After they had all dug a hole with their shovels,
the North Koreans tied their hands behind their backs and shot them beside
the holes. They just toppled over and fell into the holes all by themselves.
My husband and his friends remained hidden in the mountains about
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two months, until the UN forces drove the Communist forces back into
North Korea. When they finally emerged from their cave they were angry
toward all of those who had worked for the North Koreans, and they tried
to make sure they were arrested and sent to jail.
Gradually, my husband recovered from the beatings by the North Ko-
rean police. He spent the rest of the war in the South Korean army, although
he was restricted to light duty because of his injuries. My daughter and I
continued to live in Hong Song with my husband's family until the war
ended and he returned from the army in 1953. Then we all went back to
Seoul, to the same house, which somehow had survived all the fighting. My
husband went back to his old job in the electric department, but unfortu-
nately he died in 1958. Since my daughter eventually married an American
serviceman from Oklahoma, in 1985 I came to Oklahoma. In 1989 my
daughter and I went into the laundry business in Edmond, Oklahoma. We
called the company "Tammys." Together, my daughter and I owned and
operated Tammys until the early part of 2002, when we sold it and started a
new business. We still live in Edmond today.
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Part Six
POW Camps
North and South
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Chapter 24
An American Officer Observes
the Koje Island Uprising
In the spring of 1952, prisoner revolts on Koje Island and other POW camps were
not only a gargantuan headache for UN Command, they were also a major obstacle
to reaching an agreement in the peace negotiations. President Truman was determined
no prisoners in UN custody would be forced to return against their will. Unfortu-
nately, this policy led to pandemonium inside the camps. It divided the prisoners,
leading to beatings and even murders. The hard-core Communist prisoners, supported
by the governments of North Korea and China, were determined that all POWs
must return to their homelands. The non-Communist prisoners, however, adamantly
refused to go back. Whichever group controlled the compound imposed brutal justice on
the other group, often through kangaroo courts set up in the camp. In the following
story, First Lieutenant Pendleton Woods describes some of the horrors of the fighting
he witnessed on Koje Island.
First Lieutenant Pendleton Woods
Public Information Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
Forty-fifth Infantry Division
IN THE EARLY spring of 1952, the big news from Korea, which I followed
in the Stars and Stripes, dealt with the American prison camp on Koje Island,
located just offshore from Pusan.
Lhis prison had become so overloaded that control was almost impos-
sible. The Communist prisoners had fashioned eating utensils into knives
that they could use as weapons within the compound. Behind the chain link
and barbed wire fences they were conducting kangaroo courts, and maim-
ing and even killing their fellow prisoners.
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Finally, the situation became so bad that the Americans had to move in
with tanks to literally retake their own prison compound. In doing so, they
removed the weapons that the Communist prisoners had fashioned. This
brought the maiming and killing of fellow prisoners to a halt.
Only two days after the Americans had retaken the prison, we moved our
newspaper copy to Pusan for typesetting and printing.This time I chose to go
myself, because I wanted to visit Koje Island and see what was happening.
I arrived by train, took the copy to the printer, then crossed by boat to
Koje Island.There I had arranged to spend the night with a former room-
mate in Japan, a Red Cross representative with the army who had been
transferred to the island from Hokkaido.
Arriving on Koje shortly before dusk, as soon as possible I went to a hill
overlooking the prison compound. Although the killing had stopped after
the American "invasion," the demonstrations had not. By the time I arrived
on the hill, the prisoners were getting ready for a demonstration.
The action reminded me in some ways of a football pep rally. A "cheer-
leader" mounted a box, facing the mass of prisoners. He would yell out a
sentence, and the prisoners would repeat it over and over.
I was standing beside a South Korean soldier who spoke both English
and Chinese, so I asked him what they were yelling.
The first yell, the soldier said, was "Down with the American Imperial-
ists." The next was "Down with Capitalism," followed by "Up with Com-
munism." Finally, they yelled, "Hooray for Mao Zedong," the leader of the
Chinese Communist government. All the yells were repeated many times
and they went on for more than an hour, until almost dark.
After spending the night on Koje Island, I returned to the prison com-
pound the next morning, this time with my Red Cross friend. Everything
was quiet within the compound, but nearby, outside the prison walls, I saw a
platoon of men digging holes. I went over to see what was happening. They
allowed me in the area, but not my friend, the Red Cross representative.
I could see that they were digging graves and placing bodies, wrapped in
shelter halves, in the holes and covering them with dirt. These were the
bodies of the numerous Chinese and North Korean prisoners who had been
killed by their fellow prisoners following their convictions by the kangaroo
courts. Many of the bodies had partially decayed by the time Americans
stormed into the prison compound and retrieved them.
The platoon leader of those digging the holes told me that they would
not allow the Red Cross representative to come into the area because hasty
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burial in shelter-halves was against the Geneva Convention. They had no
choice, he pointed out, because the bodies were decaying and there was an
immediate threat of an epidemic disease. The smell was unbelievably strong
and nauseating.
Then I noticed a large tent nearby and asked what it was for. I was taken
there and shown its contents. Packed within the tent were the bodies of
literally scores of prisoners, each wrapped in a separate shelter-half.
In combat, an infantry soldier is often exposed to the dead. In seeing
one or two, whether allied or enemy, it is easy to relate to the soul that once
lay within that body. When seeing large numbers of dead, it is much more
difficult. One can relate to this by realizing that when one reads about a few
people who are trapped in a mine or well, it is easy to relate to each as an
individual. On the other hand, when reading about several hundred killed in
a tornado, relating to these unknown individuals is much more difficult. In
this case, however, I had no trouble relating to the men who had once occu-
pied those bodies, even though there may have been two or three hundred
packed into the tent. I removed my helmet and bowed my head. I thought to
myself, "Why did these men die? Did they speak out against Communism?
Did they speak up for freedom? Perhaps they refused to participate in a
demonstration, like the one I had seen the evening before."
The more I reflected on this event, the more I thought that "These men
were heroes. They would have made great Americans." I knew that they
never had and never would experience the freedom that we have in America.
The Koje Island experience made a great imprint upon my life.
Chapter 25
One Week of War,
Three Years of Captivity
This story is about a young American officer, First Lieutenant Wadie Rountree, who
saw only about one week of action before his capture in July 1950. During the early
weeks of his captivity, he survived the brutality of the "Tiger" a North Korean officer
known for his inhumane treatment of prisoners. A prisoner for over three years, mostly
in camps near the Yalu River, Lieutenant Rountree experienced the brutal North
Korean winters with inadequate clothing, housing, food, and medical care. As a result,
he dropped from two hundred pounds to about one hundred pounds during his captiv-
ity. Despite the harsh conditions, he and his fellow prisoners revealed amazing creativ-
ity in their attempts to relieve their boredom. They organized classes, miraculously
made bats and balls for softball, and played jokes on their Chinese captors. One
POW stole the antique Chinese dinner bell used to summon the men to assembly,
often for indoctrination classes, and dumped it into the latrine. The Chinese found it
only after the North Korean laborers had empted the latrine much later. Finally freed
on September 6, 1953, Lieutenant Rountree remained in the army and retired as a
lieutenant colonel.
First Lieutenant Wadie J. Rountree
/ Company, Twenty-first Infantry Regiment,
Twenty-fourth Infantry Division
I GREW UP in Twin City, Georgia, and saw service in the Army Air Corps
at the end of WWII. Out of the service in 1945,1 went back to college and
was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1947 through the Army ROTC
program. By March 1948,1 was back on active duty. Later assigned to the
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Twenty-fourth Infantry Division in Japan, I was in just the right place to see
action when the North Koreans invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950.
As it turned out, elements of the Twenty-fourth Division were the very
first U.S. forces assigned to the task of stopping the North Korean army and
defending the Pusan perimeter. Major General William F. Dean, the division
commander, ordered his Twenty-first Infantry regimental commander, Colo-
nel Robert (Big Six) Stephens, to form a reinforced battalion for deploy-
ment to Korea as soon as possible.The task of commanding this battalion fell
to Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, commander of the First Battalion.
Consisting of 440 bewildered soldiers, "Task Force Smith," as they became
known, climbed aboard C-54 Skymasters and landed at Pusan airport on the
morning of July 1, 1950. They were promptly loaded on trains and trans-
ported north, where they first engaged the North Korean army near the
town of Osan, about fifty miles south of Seoul. On July 5,1950, the battalion
was overrun by the North Korean forces. In this way the American soldier
was introduced to the Korean War.
My unit, the Third Battalion, followed the First Battalion by two days,
landing at Pusan on the 4th of July. At the time I served as a platoon leader
in I Company. By July 9, my battalion occupied positions south of Chonan,
a city between Osan and Taejon. About noon on July 10, the North Korean
army completely overran elements of the First Battalion, and we were or-
dered to counterattack. We managed to recover most of the lost ground and
evacuate the dead and wounded, but we also made some shocking discover-
ies. We found several GIs shot in the head with their hands tied behind their
backs. These were the first known North Korean atrocities of the war. There
would be many others.
Altogether we lost about a dozen men during the attack, including my
platoon sergeant,W.P. Darah, who was hit by machine gun fire and had to be
evacuated. He recovered from his wounds in Japan and returned to Korea in
the fall but was killed in an attack against the same enemy
A short time later our company commander, Lieutenant Cliff Barrington,
ordered my platoon to secure the base of a hill, and we moved out immediately.
When we drew near our destination, all hell broke loose and we found ourselves
under heavy fire. Approaching tanks and increasing small arms fire forced us to
withdraw and rejoin the main positions of the company. With the assistance of
our own tanks and a 2.36-inch rocket launcher we made certain two North
Korean tanks had completed their service for the Communist bastards.
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No sooner had we stopped the enemy tanks when a sniper bullet ripped
through the chest of Lieutenant Barrington and pierced his spinal column.
He well knew the seriousness of his wound, and I can still hear him mur-
muring Hail Mary's. None of us expected to see him alive again, but after
the war, I learned with great delight that he survived and became a certified
public accountant, although confined to a wheelchair.
Fortunately, Lieutenant Brockman, the company executive officer and
an ex-WWII platoon leader, carried on as if nothing had happened. For a
while things quieted down, and the men in I Company got a little rest. On
our left, however, K Company got hit pretty good and sustained a number of
casualties.
At this time the positions we occupied put us at a disadvantage, since the
North Koreans were literally breathing down our necks from the surround-
ing hills. Realizing this, our regimental commander, Colonel Stevens, gave
the order to withdraw to the positions we had previously held. We carried
out the withdrawal at midnight, but discovered that enemy soldiers had oc-
cupied some of our old foxholes. We got them out, but only after some
tough fighting.
The next morning, July 11, we were hit hard by the Third Division of
the North Korean army in a major attack. The fog was so thick the enemy
could approach within fifty yards of our positions before we could see them.
By the time the fog began to lift, about 9:00 A.M., my machine gun section
had nearly run out of ammunition, and hordes of North Korean soldiers
were advancing on our position from practically every direction. One North
Korean crawled to within twenty-five feet of our position undetected be-
fore the machine gunner, Private First Class Guidry, gave him about a half
pound of lead.
Suddenly I realized our supporting artillery was no longer firing. Un-
known to us, the enemy had overrun our artillery positions. To determine
what had happened, I decided to visit company headquarters, about one
hundred yards away. When passing the crest of a hill to get there, however, I
heard the rattle of a machine gun burst. One round struck the metal link of
my cartridge belt, another hit the stock of my rifle, and a third ripped through
my pants leg. I wasted no time in diving into the trenches of our mortar
positions a few feet away. Miraculously, I didn't receive a scratch.
With the help of Sergeant Wilson, whom I had never met before, we
managed to silence the enemy machine gun.Then, during a lull in the fight-
ing, I heard Lieutenant Brockman shout, "Wadie, we're moving out." By this
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time enemy tanks and infantry had penetrated and surrounded our posi-
tions; we were even receiving fire from our rear.
For the most part my platoon was still intact. Only when we attempted
to withdraw did we become separated and disorganized. As we fell back we
were bitterly disappointed to see an enemy tank covering a shallow river
that we had to cross. We paused for a few moments and watched while the
tank cut down about two dozen people trying to cross the river.
Since there seemed to be no firing to the east of our position, we as-
sumed this direction offered our best hope of escaping the enemy trap. We
soon found out differently. We had moved only a few yards in this direction
when we came under heavy enemy fire. From out of nowhere the enemy
swarmed all over us. Outnumbered and surrounded, further resistance would
have been, futile. Suddenly, we were prisoners of war. The time was 10:30
A.M. on July 11,1950, the beginning of what can only be described as three
years of living hell.
Immediately after we were captured, the enemy tied our hands behind
our backs with U.S. Army communications wire and prepared us for the
march to the north. They assembled more than three hundred of us on a
road that led to Seoul and marched us off in columns. It would be two
months before we reached our destination near theYalu River.
We got a pretty good idea of how the North Koreans intended to treat
us on our first day as captives, July 11, an extremely hot day in Korea. Burn-
ing with thirst, we halted late that afternoon close to a cool, clear running
stream but were not allowed to drink from it. Nor did we did receive any
food until about thirty-six hours later, and then only a handful of rice.
Very quickly, however, we learned that our North Korean captors were
capable of much worse behavior. Shortly after our capture, I witnessed a
North Korean soldier approach one of our men, point a muzzle of a rifle to
his head, and pull the trigger. This in turn prompted Lieutenant William
Jester, our battalion S-2 officer, to attempt an escape. Assuming he was next,
Lieutenant Jester started running like hell, with his hands tied behind his
back. It was a futile effort.The North Koreans didn't shoot him, but did club
him to the ground with rifle butts. He managed to survive the beating but
died in a prison camp during the spring of 1951.
On July 12, we moved into Chonan, and from there north until we
reached Seoul. In Seoul I underwent my first real interrogation during my
captivity. The interrogator demanded to know about my unit, and when I
refused to give him what he wanted, he asked me if I cared to go on living.
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I told him they could shoot me, but I still wouldn't answer his questions. He
replied that the Korean People's Army did not shoot their prisoners; they
had other means. That was a radical departure from what I had observed in
the past, I thought. Amazingly, I was not interrogated again until January
1952.
Seoul proved to be only a temporary collecting point for POWs, and we
remained there only a few days. It was long enough, however, for the North
Koreans to march some of us down the main streets of the city as exhibits,
much to the delight of our captors.
During the latter part of July or early August, we were moved to
Pyongyang, the capitol of North Korea. This time we were transported by
rail, in cattle cars. At Pyongyang we joined approximately three hundred
other American prisoners from Task Force Smith, plus those from our sister
regiment, the Thirty-fourth Infantry The total number in our group was
778, a number that decreased rapidly during the next year.
Like Seoul, Pyongyang proved to be only a temporary collecting point
for POWs. During the early part of September we were moved to Manpo, a
North Korean city located on theYalu River. We traveled mostly at night,
because the U.S. Air Force made movement during the day extremely haz-
ardous for trains. During the daylight hours we stopped and held up in one
of the many tunnels along the route. After five full days, on September 11,
1950, we finally arrived at Manpo.
Our new home was a former Japanese prison, located on a high cliff
overlooking theYalu. The place had its share of natural beauty, and from the
prison we could see the river meandering through the narrow valleys. In the
distance we could see the three railroad bridges that spanned the Yalu and
separated Korea from Manchuria.
In October 1950, UN forces were advancing rapidly toward theYalu,
and our captors decided we must move again. To our surprise, we moved
south along the Yalu. We stayed in several small towns, and everything was
pretty routine until three of our men, Gonzales, Stallings, and one other I
can't recall, attempted to escape. They were all recaptured within two or
three days, and two of them were shot. Corporal Gonzales, for some reason,
was allowed to return to camp.
About this time we witnessed something that for us was nothing less
than disastrous—the entry of the Chinese Communists into the war. Early
one morning we watched thousands of Chinese soldiers streaming down
the main road bordering theYalu River. It was one of the saddest moments
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of my life. None of us needed to be told how much this event could affect
our lives.
On October 25, we began the march back to Manpo along the same
route. When we arrived, however, we were not allowed to return to the old
prison barracks. Instead, we were forced to spend six days and nights biv-
ouacked on the banks of the Yalu, where we watched the never ending
stream of Chinese soldiers pouring into Korea. It was a depressing sight, and
this was without question one of the most miserable periods of my captivity.
By this time the cold had become the major problem for all of us. Most
of the men were still wearing the same fatigue uniforms they had on when
captured, totally inadequate for Korean winters. A few had received some
discarded Korean padded clothing.The temperature had already dropped to
below freezing at night, and we were still forced to sleep outside. We tried
everything to keep warm, including snuggling together as close as possible
and placing empty rice bags on top of us. We didn't keep warm, but we did
survive.
On October 31, we received a new group of guards and a new camp
commander, a homicidal maniac who became known as the "Tiger." That
same afternoon we began marching north, a death march that did not end
until November 8. The Tiger informed us that since no transportation was
available, we would have to carry our sick and wounded.
If I had to single out the worst day of my captivity, it would be the
following day, November 1, 1950. We began our march shortly after day-
break, after we had been divided into fourteen sections, with about forty
men in each section.The Tiger set a blistering pace for the march that would
have been difficult under normal conditions.We marched for about an hour
when the Tiger suddenly halted the column. Through an interpreter, the
Tiger informed Major John Dunn and several section leaders, which in-
cluded myself, that we had allowed people to fall behind in the march. This
was true, of course. The sick and wounded could barely walk, even with the
help of our most able-bodied men. Next, the Tiger ordered Lieutenant Cordus
Thornton to step forward, after which he tied the lieutenant's hands behind
his back and placed a blindfold over his eyes. Then the Tiger turned to his
guards and asked them if he should shoot Lieutenant Thornton. The guards
roared back their approval. Accordingly, the Tiger calmly aimed his pistol at
Lieutenant Thornton and shot him through the head. The lieutenant fell
forward and crumbled to the ground—dead. Why the Tiger selected Lieu-
tenant Thornton and no one else is still a mystery to me.
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This incident seemed to be the catalyst for which the guards had been
waiting. Almost immediately they began to commit similar atrocities.
Throughout the eight-day march, if anyone fell behind he was shot, al-
though we did not witness all of the shootings. The guards waited until all
the other prisoners were out of sight, and then we would hear the dull thud
of a rifle firing at close range. We lost approximately one man per mile
during this one hundred-mile trek.
By this time the physical condition of all of us had deteriorated. Every-
one had lost weight, some as much as fifty percent. Our diet consisted of
rice, millet, or cracked corn twice a day, plus an occasional bowl of soup to
be shared by several persons.The quantity of this food was totally insufficient
to sustain a person undergoing the physical strain we endured during the
march. In addition, sanitary conditions were primitive, and the water un-
drinkable. As a result of these conditions, virtually everyone had diarrhea.
Relative to the others, I was in good physical condition, so I helped
those less fortunate. I carried one soldier, Private Ambrou, for about an hour,
only to discover he had died. We moved his body to the side of the road and
sadly prepared to leave it behind. Then the guard said, "We think he is dead
but we want to be sure." He followed by firing a volley of about fifteen
rounds into the body of Private Ambrou.
On the following day, we continued our march. This time I carried
Lieutenant Books, who had a bad case of diarrhea and needed help. Eventu-
ally, I began to fall back toward the end of the column until I got help from
another officer, Major Newton Lantrun.That night we huddled together as
much as possible to keep warm. During the night Lieutenant Books died.
This was the first of many occasions when I woke up and found a dead
person beside me. We buried him early the next morning and resumed the
march.
About noon on the fourth or fifth day of the march, we were told to
assemble those incapable of walking. We gladly brought about twenty pris-
oners together, thinking they would finally receive some medical attention.
It was not to be. As we departed, Hubert Arthur Lord, the commissioner of
the British Salvation Army in Korea who served as our interpreter, over-
heard the Tiger instructing the local civilians to bury these men in un-
marked graves.
On the afternoon of November 8, 1950, our march terminated in the
town of Chunggang on the Yalu River. Although we had covered about
fifteen miles that day, the Tiger appeared and informed us that we must do
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thirty minutes of calisthenics. Both Major Dunn and Commissioner Lord
objected, but their efforts were futile. Following the calisthenics, the Tiger
assembled us and made a short speech. "You have made this march to repent
for your sins of coming to Korea," he barked. After this, we entered a vacant
school building that served as our quarters for the next two weeks.
By this time our men were dying off quite rapidly. Everyone needed
medical attention for something, much of it due to overexposure and mal-
nutrition. Frostbite was a common problem, since the North Koreans had
removed the shoes from many of the men, forcing them to walk in grass
sandals with their feet wrapped in cloth and other makeshift footwear.
Due largely to the untiring efforts of Dr. Boysen, the Communists fi-
nally provided us with a separate room for our most seriously ill. Five American
soldiers and a French priest, Father PaulVillemont, were placed in the room,
which was equipped with a stove.The guard for this room, however, discov-
ered a small hole in the stove pipe that he used as an excuse to douse the fire
with water. Unbelievably, he then preceded to open the door and windows
to the room. By morning, all six of the men had frozen to death. This in-
cluded Sergeant Richard Haley, the first sergeant in my unit at the time of
our capture.
After about two weeks we moved again, this time to another vacant
school near the Yalu, where the monotony, drudgery, and horror continued.
Our daily routine began long before daylight, when the guard stomped
through our building screaming and herding everyone outside for "fresh air
and exercise."The temperature outside was normally around twenty-five to
thirty degrees below zero, and most of us still wore the same fatigue uni-
forms we were wearing at the time of our capture. While we did have stoves
in our rooms, they produced more smoke than heat. I don't believe anyone
ever became comfortably warm during that first winter.
The schoolroom in which I stayed was approximately eighteen by twenty
feet, with four windows and a door. There were no beds; as a matter of fact,
I never slept in a bed during my entire thirty-eight months of captivity. To
make things worse, there wasn't enough room for everyone to lie down at
the same time.This is the way it worked: Some of us placed our heads against
the walls while the others placed their heads together in the center. Our feet
and legs overlapped each other up to the waist, and we had to lie on our
sides, back to breast, to fit into the existing space. If one man turned over, the
entire row had to turn over. When our captors gave us a single blanket in
mid-January 1951, we gave it to the unfortunate soul sleeping next to the
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door. At one point we had over one hundred men in our room. Most of us
had to relieve ourselves several times during the night. It was a living hell.
Death, hastened by the cold, diet deficiency, and frequent beatings from
the guards, became an everyday occurrence for us. It was not unusual to
wake up in the morning and find the man on either side of you dead. I had
this happen to me on several occasions. It was during this period I lost two
of my closest friends, Lieutenants Brockman and Lewis.
In late January we moved again, this time to separate officers and NCOs
from the others. According to their Communist logic, we were capitalist
reactionaries and as such exerted a bad influence on the other members of
the group.This time we moved only a short distance to a Korean mud house,
which we found just as cold and miserable as our previous quarters in the
school house. There were only about twenty of us to a room, but the room
was so small we were just as cramped for space as before.
Fortunately, by late February conditions began to improve.The worst of
the winter was behind us, and the reign of the Tiger came to an end. This
came about shortly after a visit by a staff major from the North Korean
Army Headquarters in Pyongyang. During the visit he talked to Major Dunn,
who bravely told the major about the wretched living conditions we were
enduring. A few days later the Tiger was relieved. Major Dunn's frankness
had paid off, although he took a great risk. None of us had anything but the
greatest respect for Major Dunn. After we were released it came as no sur-
prise to learn he was awarded the Legion of Merit for his courage and
leadership while in captivity.
In March 1951, for whatever reason, we moved again. By this time I had
concluded it was a waste of time to try and figure out the mind of a Com-
munist; they were completely unpredictable and illogical. Again we moved
only a short distance, and this time our living conditions actually improved.
For the first time since our capture we were allowed to go outside into a
compound. I never realized how nice fresh air and sunshine could be, even
though the air was biting cold.
With this new freedom and the coming of spring, our morale improved.
On occasion we were taken to neighboring hills, where we gathered fire-
wood. It was a welcome escape from the daily monotony.
Unfortunately, it was during this period that I reached my worst physi-
cal condition while in captivity. When captured I weighed 200 pounds; by
this time I estimated my weight at about 100 pounds. Even so, I was still in
better condition than most of the prisoners. By the early summer of 1951, we
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had lost more than 400 of our original group of 778 men. When liberated at
the end of the war only 280 of us remained alive, a little over one-third.
Overall, the death rate among American POWs captured in Korea was about
40 percent, most dying during the first year of captivity. Such a high per-
centage of deaths can only be the result of a diabolical plan prepared and
executed by the North Korean and Chinese Communists.
The summer of 1951 brought warmer weather, welcomed by all, and
improved living conditions. The new camp commander was a more sane
individual than the Tiger, and deserves to be credited with some of the
improvement. The indiscriminate shooting of prisoners had for the most
part stopped by this time. Our death rate was still high, however, undoubt-
edly the result of the hardships suffered by the men during the winter months.
Summer passed, autumn came, and we still had no idea how the war was
progressing. For all we knew, it could be over. We still had received no mail,
and would not until about a year and half after our capture. No new prison-
ers had joined us since Thanksgiving 1950, almost one year earlier. It had
been nearly six months since we had seen friendly aircraft in the area, which
had the effect of increasing our anxiety about the war. Most of all, we were
beginning to wonder if we would ever be released.
In the early part of October 1951, our guards informed us we were
going to move again. At the time we welcomed the news. Anything, we
thought, would be better than spending another winter at Camp #7 in
Chunggang.
Our trip began on October 8.We walked about thirty miles and then, to
our surprise, they put us aboard sampans (river boats) for our voyage south,
down theYalu.The rapids were swift, and at times our small boat seemed to
completely submerge as it balanced from rock to rock. Then, much to our
relief, the boat emerged undamaged and we continued our voyage.
Finally, we reached the backwaters of the Suiho Reservoir, where we
boarded a tugboat in a driving rainstorm for the rest of our journey. Soaking
wet, we eventually docked at a small Korean village south of Pyokdong. For
about two weeks we stayed at Camp #3, but then moved to Camp #2, a
consolidated camp for officers. Sadly, this was the last time we saw the NCOs
and enlisted men until we were released. I have never been associated with a
better group and leaving them was difficult.
Upon arriving in Pyokdong we had a change in command; the Chinese
took over for their Korean comrades. By November 1951, the Chinese had
placed all military prisoners under their authority.There was one exception,
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Major General William E Dean, who remained under the control of the
North Koreans. On the surface, the Chinese were a little more sensible than
the Koreans, but underneath they were just as dirty and filthy rotten as their
Korean counterparts.
When we arrived at Camp #2 in Pyokdong in November 1951, little
did we realize that we had reached our last POW camp. The camp was
located in the little village of Pi-Chong-ni, our "home" until repatriated in
September 1953.
Unfortunately, by this time we had not only been separated from the
enlisted men but from the civilian prisoners as well. I regretted this very
much. Most of the civilians were missionaries, who had spent the greater
part of their adult lives devoted to the spiritual and physical well-being of
the Korean people. They were a fine group of people, and I became good
friends with many of them. I might add, they received no privileges as a
result of their civilian status. They made the same marches and endured the
same savage treatment as the military prisoners. Some of the civilians in our
group were women. I especially remember two wonderful American ladies,
Miss Nellie Dyer from North Little Rock, Arkansas, and Miss Helen Rosser
from Atlanta, Georgia, both missionaries.
My favorite civilian, however, was Monsignor Thomas Quinlan. A tall,
impressive man with a black beard, he had served in China and Korea since
1920.1 loved to listen to the soft tones of his beautiful Irish accent, always
giving us words of encouragement. "Well, me lads, it won't be long now," he
would say, or, when referring to the UN forces,"they're fighting well." Most
of us knew that he manufactured about 90 percent of this for our benefit,
but we didn't care. We welcomed good news of any kind, and we had faith in
the bishop. After the war he returned to Korea and continued his missionary
service.
I also have fond memories of the nuns in our group, who performed
countless acts of mercy for everyone. Somehow they found the time to
launder our soiled clothing and care for the seriously ill. And the nuns re-
ceived the same treatment as the rest of us. If they fell behind when we
marched, they were shot, just like the others. Most of the nuns were elderly,
but somehow all but three of the group of about fifteen managed to survive
the ordeal.
Our stay at Camp #2 in Pi-Chong-ni, a quiet little village located on
the main route connecting Pyokdong and Manpo, lasted twenty-one months,
much longer than any of the other camps. At the beginning of our stay, we
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assumed the nightmare of prison life would continue, but this time condi-
tions did improve. For the first time we received mail from home. We also
had the opportunity to speak with prisoners outside our group, who pro-
vided us with some of the first news of the world we had received in about
a year and a half.
Camp #2 also had better facilities than the other camps. Our room was
actually large enough for all of us to lie down at the same time, a real im-
provement. We had barrels for hot water, and the morning after we arrived
we had our first hot bath.The same morning we received a change of cloth-
ing and they boiled our old clothing to kill the body lice. Amazingly, we
were never bothered with body lice again, and this amounted to a significant
improvement in our living conditions. We were also given one blanket per
individual, the first since our capture. Our food improved, with increased
rations of rice, and flour from which we made bread.
The Chinese even permitted us to attend religious services, something
the North Koreans had never allowed. Unfortunately, the saintly Father (Cap-
tain) Emil J. Kapaun had died in the spring of 1951, so we had no Catholic
clergy. We were allowed, however, to put together a makeshift chapel in a
large room that also served as a library. One of our officers made a beautiful
crucifix from an oak limb, and another officer, Captain Ralph Nardello,
conducted our services. Protestant services were conducted by a British chap-
lain, Captain Stanley J. Davies.
Receiving mail from home, especially from my wife, was a real morale
booster. She actually was on her way to join me in Japan when the war
began. Unfortunately, by the time she arrived I had shipped out for Korea. I
learned from her letter that she landed in Japan on July 12, 1950, the day
following my capture. She spent about six weeks in Japan trying to learn
something official about my fate, but eventually gave up and returned to Ft.
Smith, Arkansas. She wrote the letter out of sheer hope I might still be alive.
Not until the list of prisoners was exchanged in late 1953 did she have any
realistic expectation that this might be true.
By the spring of 1952, most of us had recuperated to the point where
we could actively engage in athletics, which the Chinese permitted. Our big
problem—we had no equipment.We pooled our creative talents and amazed
ourselves with the results. Somehow, softballs miraculously emerged from
discarded combat boots. Coming up with suitable wood for bats was tough,
but we managed. Whenever firewood was delivered to the camp, we rum-
maged through the pile until we found the right limb with a good grain for
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a bat. Then we would cut and scrape until we produced a reasonable fac-
simile. In the summer of 1952, we were actually provided with equipment
for volleyball, soccer, and basketball, which gave us more options.The games
were a big help in breaking the monotony of prison life.
Since we were given flour to make bread, Lieutenant Bill Watson de-
cided to build an oven, which he did from two fifty-five-gallon oil drums,
rock, mud, and an axe.To our great delight, it worked.We still needed bread
pans, which we made from some stove pipe stolen from a Chinese guard
house.The yeast came from fermented potatoes. Believe it or not, the bread
tasted pretty good, or at least we thought it did at the time.
We even held classes at Camp #2, although we had to do this surrepti-
tiously, because the Chinese forbade POWs from engaging in any organized
activity. Classes were offered in math, science, and languages. There was an
amazing range of talent among the POWs, and the instructors knew their
stuff. No textbooks were available, of course, but the POWs still came up with
some very creative teaching aids. During the latter period of our captivity, we
even produced our own plays, some of which were hilariously funny.
Our conditions improved so dramatically at Camp #2, we began to
wonder what the motives of our captors were. We really had no way of
knowing at the time. We only knew that since July 1951 the two sides had
been engaged in peace talks at Panmunjom, and we thought this might have
something to do with it. In December 1951, the Chinese and UN represen-
tatives even concluded an agreement to exchange lists of prisoners then held
in custody. When the war finally did end, surely there would be an exchange
of prisoners. Most of us who had been in captivity since the early part of the
war had lost as much as half of our weight, and we were literally walking
skeletons. The Chinese were well aware of this, and knew that if we were
released in this condition they would be at a disadvantage in the propaganda
war. Better to give us more rice and fatten us up a bit before our release.
Whatever the motives of our captors, we definitely received more hu-
mane treatment. Between November 1951 and September 1953, we re-
corded no deaths at Camp #2.The Chinese did kill one British officer, but
they claimed he was trying to escape. Perhaps. In any case, we were far better
off than during the first year and a half of captivity, when we lost two-thirds
of our original group. While the peace negotiations seemed to drag on for-
ever, partially because the UN representatives insisted that no prisoners would
be forcibly repatriated, these talks were still instrumental in improving our
living conditions while in captivity.
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One very obvious improvement at Camp #2 came in the form of better
medical treatment. Previously, medical care for POWs was almost nonexist-
ent, in part because the Communists would not permit our own excellent
doctors to practice their profession. As a result, our wounded were often left
unattended, sometimes for days. Now we received much more medical at-
tention than before, but the quality of care was often laughable. When I was
suffering from beriberi, diarrhea, and malnutrition, a Chinese doctor told
me Americans got sick because we walked on the floor with our shoes on,
which was "not sanitary." Then he cleared his throat and spat against the
wall. When Lieutenant Bob Howell came down with some mysterious ail-
ment, the Chinese sewed a chicken liver to his intestine. The camp was alive
with stories about incompetent Chinese doctors and their weird practices.
Work details were often a part of our daily activity. Frequently, the Chi-
nese marched us to the Yalu River, about two miles away, where we un-
loaded supplies from incoming barges. On our trips to the Yalu we passed
through Pi-Chong-ni, a village that the Chinese used to keep POWs in
solitary confinement. They were mostly prisoners who had tried to escape
and failed, or, according to Chinese logic, were "plotting against the people."
We shouted words of encouragement to them as we passed through, which
they generally acknowledged from their manmade caves, basements, cell
blocks, and other creative places of confinement.
There was one thing about Camp #2 we all intensely disliked—the
systematic program of indoctrination initiated by the Chinese Communists.
Widely publicized as brainwashing, this was something quite new to us.
While we had been brutalized by the North Koreans in every way, they had
never subjected us to a program of organized indoctrination. The Chinese
were different.
To launch their campaign, the Chinese put us through a complete course
on the "Causes of the Korean War." In their view, of course, the United
States was totally responsible for the war. They also hammered us on the use
of germ warfare by the United States. The Chinese claimed the tinsel foil
dropped by UN planes to jam their radar was laded with germs. A propa-
ganda poster depicted American planes parachuting rats into North Korea
to spread disease. To make sure the Americans were identified with capital-
ism, the eyes of the rats were replaced with dollar signs.
The Chinese also gave us a heavy dose of stuff on the merits of Com-
munism and the wonderful progress the "New China" was making since the
"Peoples Enemies" had been eliminated. We learned all about their new
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roads, dams, and schools, and the happy life of the peasants.We also sat through
lectures on the "Capitalists of WWII." The Soviet Union, we were told, not
only won all the important battles in Europe but also played the major role
in the defeat of Japan.
The biggest problem presented by all of this indoctrination garbage was
boredom. Every day we attended lectures for about an hour and a half each
morning and afternoon.Then in the evenings we were supposed to read and
have group discussions on Communist literature. The lectures were so dis-
torted and biased it was difficult to take them seriously. Also, we attended
the lectures seated on the floor in unheated rooms, which did not help our
attitude.
Despite all the time and energy the Chinese put into their indoctrina-
tion program, several months passed and they still had nothing to show for
their efforts.They apparently understood this, because in the spring of 1952
they discontinued the program, at least in Camp #2. We had witnessed far
too many atrocities and suffered too much to be taken in by Communist lies
and propaganda. With a very few exceptions, the UN prisoners rejected
Communism as an ideology and as a way of life.
Despite our captivity, we somehow managed to find ways and the courage
to harass our captors. Sometimes these antics were organized and sometimes
they were spontaneous, but either way they provided great entertainment for
all the prisoners.We discovered we could easily frustrate the Chinese guards at
roll call, which normally took place about 4:30 A.M. One morning everyone
in a particular room would go into a delaying pattern and hold up roll call,
perhaps as much as thirty minutes.The next morning the same guys would get
up early, dress, and wait for the guard to open the door.Then they would burst
through the door wildly, yelling as they ran from the building to the parade
ground, and fall into ranks with the precision and smartness of West Point
cadets. Such erratic behavior totally baffled the Chinese.
One of our best pranks involved the antique dinner bell that the Chi-
nese rang whenever they wished to assemble the prisoners, often for indoc-
trination lectures. While I was never quite sure who did it, one of the guys
managed to steal it and dump it into our latrine, a simple hole in the ground
about eight to ten feet deep. Only when the Korean laborers emptied the
latrine later, a chore they carried out regularly because they used the human
waste for fertilizer, did the Chinese locate their missing bell.
Finally, I must tell the story about Lieutenant John Thornton (USN)
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and his "motorcycle." Every morning and afternoon he appeared for roll call
riding his imaginary motorcycle.With unmistakable sound effects John would
circle the group several times, park his motorcycle, and join the formation.
Not surprisingly, the Chinese thought he was a little affected. They called
John to their headquarters and informed him that he could no longer keep
his motorcycle, because it was against camp "rules and regulations." When
John returned and told the story to the men, some of them actually ap-
proached the Chinese and demanded they return his motorcycle. The story
is almost unbelievable, but it is true. It just reflects the crazy things men will
do in captivity to find relief from the boredom.
As the winter of 1952—1953 neared the end, we really began to look
forward to spring and summer. While the winter had been milder than the
previous winters, and we did have warmer clothing by this time, we still
looked forward to milder weather. We continued to receive letters from
home regularly, but they took nearly two months to arrive. When they did
arrive, we remained just as ignorant about the war as before; letters that
contained war news didn't make it through the Chinese censors.
Since Camp #2 was located at the northern end of MiG Alley, we some-
times entertained ourselves by watching the air battles in the sky. These
battles were usually fought so far away we couldn't see the identification
markings on the planes, but we could still tell the "good guys" from the "bad
guys" by the sound of their weapons when they fired.
By the late spring of 1953, we could tell from the mood of our captors
that the war was slowly coming to a close. Finally, the last contentious point,
the forced repatriation of POWs, was settled. The signing of the armistice
took place at Panmunjom at 10:00 A.M. on July 27,1953, exactly three years,
one month, and two days after North Korea invaded South Korea.
In compliance with the armistice agreement, all prisoners were to be
informed the hostilities had ended. During the late evening hours of July 27,
we were pleasantly surprised to hear American jazz played over the Chinese
loudspeakers, something we had never heard before. We all knew the day we
had been dreaming about for so long was now at hand.
About mid-afternoon on the following day, the Chinese finally assembled
the prisoners and officially gave us the good news. We received the news
quietly, without cheers and applause. Apparently the Chinese were expecting
a wild melee of jubilation, because they had placed cameras all over the place.
After three years of waiting and abusive treatment, we were more than
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ready to go home. All of us, except a few—the twenty-one "turncoats." In
compliance with the armistice agreements, there would be no forced repa-
triation, and twenty-one Americans chose to remain in Communist China.
I personally knew only one of these men, Private First Class William Cowart,
who had been a member of my platoon prior to the war. I remembered him
as a kind of perpetual sorehead with a bad attitude. I was not aware, however,
of any particular ideological or political beliefs that he possessed prior to his
capture. According to reports I have subsequently received, he accepted per-
sonal favors from the Chinese and eventually moved into their billets. I really
don't think he refused repatriation because he had embraced Communism
as a better way of life. In my opinion, he stayed behind because he feared
reprisals from other prisoners as well as from the U.S. government. Much
the same may be said for the others who remained in China.
Once we realized we would soon be repatriated, the days passed with
the speed of a slow turtle. Each day seemed like an eternity. The Chinese
told us only that we would be released "soon," but they never gave us a
definite date.
Finally, one day in late August, a large convoy of trucks appeared, and we
knew this was it.We fell out in formation and, after a period of time, climbed
aboard Soviet-built trucks. But the trucks did not move. At last, after more
waiting, we heard the order, "Unload, unload."
At first we thought the Chinese were playing one more dirty trick on us
before we left, but this time we were wrong. Flash floods the previous week
had caused several mud slides, and time was needed to repair the roads.
The next day went much better. The rain let up, the sun came up over
the mountains, and once again we climbed aboard the trucks. Even the
Chinese seemed to be in a good mood. While we waited for the trucks to
start their engines, someone passed a bottle of Chinese whiskey around,
which made the time go faster.
Finally, the truck engines roared, and we began one of the happiest days
of our lives—the first leg of our journey home. We actually headed north,
along theYalu to Manpo, where we arrived late that same evening. At Manpo,
after joining up with other prisoners, we boarded a POW troop train. Once
again we were in box cars, but unlike the cattle cars used on our trip north
three years earlier, this time we had mattresses and straw on the floors.
The rail portion of our trip lasted two days, slowed by the condition of
the bridges and tracks along the way. We traveled virtually the same route
south we had taken north after our capture. All along the way we saw the
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Stuck in the mud, not an uncommon problem in Korea, especially in the spring.
(Courtesy of Forty-fifth Infantry Division Museum)
results of the war—ruined locomotives and vehicles and destroyed bridges.
Finally, the train came to a halt, and suddenly I realized we were in
Panmunjom.
Operation Big Switch, as it was known, began on August 5, 1953. On
average, about three hundred UN prisoners were released each day until the
final day of repatriation on September 6. Until our release, we lived in a tent
city purposely constructed for the prisoners.Those to be released on a par-
ticular day were generally given only a few hours' notice.
I began to grow impatient; it seemed they were never going to call my
name. At last, on September 4, when I was about to give up hope and pre-
pare for another long day of waiting, it happened.The Chinese finally called
out my name for repatriation, the next to the last name on the list to be
called. It was like a dream, and while I went to bed that night, I didn't sleep
a wink.
The next morning, those of us to be released were up at dawn, restless
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and nervous. After breakfast we were assembled, searched, and loaded on the
Soviet-built trucks for our journey to the exchange point, located about
halfway between Panmunjom and Freedom Village. At the exchange point
we were transferred from the trucks to U.S. Army ambulances, where two
huge marines assisted us.
"Welcome back," they said smartly. I can think of nothing in the English
language they could have said at the time that would have sounded any
sweeter than those two little words.
Chapter 26
A First Sergeant's Experience
Not many soldiers wanted to go to Korea, but WWII veterans found it especially
hard; after all, they had already served. In the early part of the war, however, their
leadership and skills were desperately needed, and many veterans were called up.
James Hart, a reservist with mortar experience, was typical of these veterans. Arriving
in Korea in January 1951, he was first placed in charge of a 60mm mortar section,
then became the company's first sergeant. Unfortunately, during the massive Chinese
offensive on April 22, 1951, his company was cut off and surrounded. As a result,
Sergeant Hart spent the remainder of the war in captivity. After a hard march, he
experienced the same horrors endured by other POWs in the Communist prison
camps, including hunger, the terrible cold, unbelievable filth, and brainwashing. Ser-
geant Hart strongly opposed the "limited" war policy and believed the UN armies
should have continued offensive operations until the Communist forces were crushed.
Master Sergeant James Hart
F Company, Second Battalion, Fifth Regimental Combat Team
LIKE SO MANY others, when the Korean War began in June 1950,1 en-
tered the war as aWWII retread. I had served in the First Cavalry Division in
the Philippines, then spent a year with the occupation forces in Japan. In
December 1948, after a year and a half of college, I had started a new job.
Since I had stayed in the reserves in order to preserve my rank as staff ser-
geant, and the army desperately needed experienced personnel, I was just
right to be called up.
In September, I received my notice to report for active duty on October
I.I reported to Fort Hood,Texas, which was the same place I had completed
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my basic training during WWII. I stayed there until I received my orders,
sometime in December, which were "pipeline" for Korea. After a few days
traveling I arrived at Camp Stoneman, California. A short time later they
trucked us to a troopship, and we embarked for Japan.We arrived in Yokohama
in early January 1951.
Since I had served in WWII, I was not at all happy about returning to
active duty, and especially for duty in Korea. The other reservists felt pretty
much the same way We all very much resented going back into the army
when there were so many others who had never served. I will admit we
didn't fully understand the army's desperate need for trained personnel with
combat experience. Especially in those critical days early in the war, we
provided the skills and leadership that were so essential for success on the
battlefield.
After disembarking at Yokohama, we spent one day processing at Camp
Drake and promptly shipped out for Korea. After about a day on a ferryboat,
we arrived at the port of Pusan. Almost immediately the army put us on
board an unheated train with straight, wooden seats, and we headed north to
a replacement depot somewhere near the front lines. From there we went
our separate ways to our assigned units. I was assigned to the Fifth Regi-
mental Combat Team (RCT), which at that time was attached to the Twenty-
fourth Division. I arrived at the Fifth RCT Headquarters sometime in the
early part of January 1951, and from there on to Fox Company, Second
Battalion. Since I had experience in an 81mm mortar section during WWII,
they made me a squad leader in charge of a section of 60mm mortars.
In the early part of February, we went into combat. At the time I thought
I was in pretty good physical condition, but I found out differently. Korea is
just one hill and one mountain after the other, and since we also carried
about eighty pounds of equipment, soldiering in Korea was pretty exhaust-
ing. Most of us required another six to eight weeks after arriving to get in
top condition.
By late February, General Ridgway had ordered a major counterattack
along a wide front, known as Operation Killer. It aimed at making a clean
sweep across Korea and driving the Chinese and North Korean armies back
across the 38th Parallel. To do this, it was very important for us to keep the
Chinese and North Korean troops in front of us. We had learned, through
bitter experience, that it was a favorite tactic of the Communist forces to
break through our lines and set up roadblocks behind us. Then, when we
tried to go through a mountain pass, they would cut us to pieces with small
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arms fire coming from each side of the mountain. In the early days of the
war, this tactic had succeeded far too often.
Not long after we hit the front lines, one of the guys I had met coming
over on the ship, who had become a good friend of mine, was killed. We
were going up a hill when an enemy machine gun opened up, badly wound-
ing him. Even so, he still managed to knock out the machine gun with a
grenade before he died. I think he received the Silver Star for this action, but
I'm not positive.This was the first casualty I witnessed in the war.
During the early part of April, I became the first sergeant for Fox Com-
pany. I also became a master sergeant a little later, but I was already in captiv-
ity when I learned about it. I didn't have long to enjoy my promotion anyway.
On April 22, 1951, the Chinese army attacked with a quarter million men
along a forty-mile front north of Seoul. They just sent masses of humanity at
us and suffered the consequences. We had a lot of firepower, so we inflicted
heavy casualties, but they just kept on coming. Unfortunately, my company
was cut off and surrounded.
At the time, we were fighting just north of the 38th Parallel in the
Kumhwa area. When the attack came, I was several miles behind the Fox
Company positions at our company command post (CP).We knew as soon
as we received news of the Chinese attack that the men would quickly run
out of ammunition, so we loaded up a jeep and a trailer with ammo and
took off for the front. There was much confusion that night, and it seemed
like it took forever to reach the front. Fortunately, there was a full moon,
which did help some. While we were in the process of getting the ammo to
the men, the Chinese managed to surround the company. I had six or seven
men with me, and we fought a fierce rearguard action, repulsing four or five
attacks in about a two-hour period. While we managed to get most of the
ammo to the company, we had to fight our way out, and in the process we
became separated. I managed to elude the Chinese for about eighteen hours
before they grabbed me. All the other men with me also became POWs.
After my capture the Chinese put me through one of their interroga-
tions. They told me they were getting ready to surround another American
unit, and they wanted me to tell them to surrender. This I refused to do. In
hindsight, I probably should have done it. I would have been closer to the
front, and the confusion that accompanies heavy fighting would have pro-
vided me with a better chance of escaping. Of course, I also would have
stood a better chance of getting killed, so maybe things worked out for the
best after all.
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As a POW the Chinese bounced me around from one group to another.
At first I seemed to be the only POW in the area, but soon others were
added and we kept getting larger and larger until finally there were about
four hundred of us gathered in a place we called Peaceful Valley It actually
was a place near Kumhwa in central Korea, and we stayed there about three
weeks. Our food was the bare minimum for survival.They fed us very little
because they were getting ready to brainwash us and they wanted to degrade
us to an animal existence. The Chinese reasoned that this way we would
credit them for the improved conditions we received later. Thus, we would
be more likely to accept them as friends, or so they thought.
As the UN forces pushed the Chinese and North Korean forces back to
the north, the POWs moved north as well. On May 19, we started marching,
and for about thirty days we just kept going. It was a tough march, and we
lost about 10 percent of the men along the way. Finally, on June 19, we
reached theYalu River, the border between North Korea and China.This is
where the POW camps were located, our "homes" for the remaining part of
the war. Unfortunately, our suffering and our losses were just starting.There
were about sixteen hundred prisoners in each of the two major POW camps,
and I think we lost about 60 percent of them by the time the war was over.
Some days we would bury as many as twenty men.
Ironically, in July 1951, not long after I was captured, the peace talks
began.The Chinese wanted to talk because they wanted to buy some time;
they weren't interested in serious peace talks.They wanted to use the time to
dig in and build up their defensive lines, which would make it more difficult
for us to push them back. At the time I was not aware of this, but after the
war I learned how successful they were in using the time for this purpose. I
believe President Truman made a serious mistake when he stopped our of-
fensive operations and allowed the Communist forces the opportunity to
dig in; we should have continued to attack while we had them on the run.
Then we could have negotiated from a position of strength and made the
Chinese get serious about the talks.
The first winter I spent in Korea as a POW, 1951—1952, was the tough-
est. I spent this time at Changsong, a prison camp near theYalu River in the
northwestern part of North Korea. A whole lot of people died that winter
from simple malnutrition and disease. Beriberi and pellagra were very com-
mon. Everybody lost weight, some guys getting down to around eighty
pounds. Also, we had to go through what the Chinese called reeducation,
better known in the United States as brainwashing. They tried to get us to
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accept Communism as the best form of government possible, and they made
this an important part of their agenda.Those who openly opposed the Com-
munist ideas were placed in solitary confinement. The Chinese had what
they called "reactionary camps," where they kept the most difficult prison-
ers. The majority, I think, tried to forestall punishment by avoiding open
resistance, but still remained unchanged by the Communist propaganda they
threw at us.There were a few individuals, however, who were either so weak
or so uneducated they went along with the Communist line of thinking.
Fortunately, they represented only a very small minority of the POWs.
One of the worst things about being a prisoner in those early months of
captivity was the lack of any opportunity to clean up. Our hair grew down
to our shoulders, our beards to our chests, we had lice, and all of us were
filthy. In the winter, the cold was a major problem, because the temperature
could get down as low as thirty to forty degrees below zero. Since we stayed
in simple mud huts with no heat, we had very little protection from the cold.
A lot of the guys ended up with frozen fingers, hands, and feet, which they
eventually lost, and almost all of us had frostbite in some form. In the sum-
mer, in addition to the heat and humidity, flies were a major problem. The
walls and ceilings of our huts were literally black with flies.
As time passed, our treatment did improve, but we still didn't know how
the war was going or how the peace talks were progressing. The Chinese
would tell us the peace talks were going very well and that we would be
going home soon. Then, a week or so later, they would say the peace talks
had broken down and we would have to remain prisoners indefinitely. Natu-
rally, this kind of thing kept us upset. Eventually we got to the point where
we just didn't believe anything they said, and this made things a little easier
from a mental point of view. Life was tough enough; we didn't need all that
psychological garbage the Chinese were throwing at us to go along with the
cold, the hunger, and the lack of anything even remotely approaching de-
cent sanitary conditions.
Most of us who managed to make it through the first winter to the fall
of 1951 survived the remaining years of imprisonment and eventually went
home. After that first year, for whatever reason, we did receive better treat-
ment, and the death rate dropped considerably.
On July 27,1953, the war finally came to an end when an armistice was
signed at Panmunjom. Ironically, July 27 happens to be my birthday. I fig-
ured an armistice was a pretty good birthday present. The exchange of pris-
oners had actually begun in April with the exchange of the sick and wounded
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Silver Star winner Master Sergeant James Hart, Fifth RCT, getting off a plane in
Amarillo,Texas, September 18, 1953, following his return from Korea as a POW.
(Courtesy of James Hart)
(Operation Little Switch). Then, between August 5 and September 6, the
other prisoners were exchanged (Operation Big Switch).
At the time it seemed to us that the prisoners who had given the Chi-
nese a hard time were the last to be repatriated. Usually these people were
the NCOs and officers. I came out on September 5, the next to the last day.
It was a large group, but I don't remember anybody who was not an NCO
or an officer. Furthermore, most of those left behind who came out on the
last day were also NCOs or officers. This last group also included a few
hardcore guys that had never cooperated with the Chinese in any way.
One thing always bothered me about the war, not only at the time but
also after I got out. I believe we should have defeated the Chinese and North
Korean armies decisively when we had the opportunity. If we had commit-
ted our forces in full strength, I think we could have crushed the Commu-
nist forces and ended the war much sooner. I hated the idea of a "limited"
A First Sergeant's Experience 241
war and the restrictions placed on the military that kept us from winning the
war. The limited war concept meant that Washington politics determined
how we conducted the war, and the shape of the victory, if any. I didn't want
to be in Korea, but if I did have to be there, I wanted to fight to win and go
home.
I must admit, however, that while I was in Korea I really didn't under-
stand how we ever got involved in that mess. As far as I was concerned, it
really didn't mean anything if South Korea did fall to the North Koreans. In
retrospect, I do confess I see the war a little differently now. For the first time,
we stopped the expansion of Communism, and this has had a great effect on
the events which followed. While the Communists may not have given up
their expansionist ideas, they were at least stalemated. So I feel our involve-
ment in the forgotten war was not all in vain, and I'm proud to have been a
participant. I also feel good when I think of the millions of South Koreans
who now live in a free society, something that so far is not even remotely
possible in North Korea.
Chapter 27
Organizing the Riots on Koje
Colonel Zhao's Story
By 1952, there were 132,000 Chinese and North Korean Communist prisoners in
the UNC camps. About 70,000 of them were held at Koje Island, an isolated, hilly
island a few miles across the sea from the shore ofPusan. On May 7, the prisoners in
Compound 76 seized UNC Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd as a hostage. On
May 9, General James Van Fleet arrived with 15,000 heavily armed UN troops to
face the mass of prisoners behind the wire. Though Dodd was released the next day
after negotiations, the conflict continued. By July, the rioting had claimed the lives of
1 15 prisoners. As the secretary general of the ((Chinese Communist United Front" at
Koje-do, Colonel Zhao Zuorui's reflections provide an untold story about the fight-
ing that took place inside the camps among the Communist and non-Communist
prisoners, and the efforts of the Communist prisoners to organize and plan the
1951-1952 riots.
Colonel Zhao Zuorui
Secretary General, "Chinese Communist United Front,"
UNC Koje-do Camp
Former Political Commissar, 538th Regiment,
180th Division, CPVF Sixtieth Army
DURING THE CHINESE People's Volunteer Forces' Fifth Campaign in
the spring of 1951, the UN forces managed to surround the 180th Division.
The 538th Regiment, my regiment, was assigned the mission of breaking
through the enemy lines and leading the division's retreat to the north.
When we attempted to carry out our mission during the night of May 24,
we failed. I lost contact with regimental headquarters during the night and
Organizing the Riots on Koje 243
was captured by the UN forces on May 25. By May 28, most of the division
was gone, and nine thousand Chinese soldiers, I learned later, became pris-
oners of war.
On May 26,1 was sent to Suwon. About one thousand Chinese prison-
ers had already gathered there. Defeated and uncertain about their future,
many of them seemed to have lost their courage and spirit. Those who were
from my regiment felt a little bit better when they saw me there with them.
I told my captors that my name was "Wang Fang," not Zhao Zuorui, and
that I was a cook, not a regiment officer. The UN personnel couldn't iden-
tify our ranks since we all wore the same uniforms, wore no officers insignia,
and had our heads shaved (including division and regimental commanders).
Later, we were shipped by train to Pusan, where we were registered. The
Koreans working at the UNC registration tables were prisoners from the
North Korean People s Army. Speaking both Chinese and Korean, they were
friendly and supportive. While they gave us encouragement, they also indi-
cated we might be shipped to Taiwan.
On June 16, we boarded UNC landing crafts. On my landing ship there
were about two hundred Chinese prisoners, and none of us knew where we
were going. We did know it could be really bad if we were sent to Taiwan.
The Chinese Nationalist Army could easily identify the Chinese Commu-
nist Army officers, and they would execute all the commanders. I had to do
something before it was too late. After the ship left the port of Pusan, I sat
around with a couple of regimental and battalion commanders on board,
and we discussed the possibility of killing the guards and taking over the ship
when it got close to the Shanghai coast, about halfway to Taiwan. About two
hours later, however, before we could come up with a plan, the ship stopped
at an island not far from Pusan. It was Koje Island.
We got off the ship and walked into a camp, numbered 72. A UN officer
asked us, "Who are the battalion officers?" No answer. "Any company com-
manders?" Again, no answer. Two days later, however, on June 18, all the
Chinese officers in Compound 72 were identified by the UN interrogators.
Somebody in our division had betrayed the CPVF. These scums apparently
told everything to the enemy.
The UN guards transferred seven of us, the regimental and battalion
officers, from Compound 72 to a "POW Officer Compound." There I met
other Chinese and North Korean officers, including a North Korean gover-
nor. They told me that there were about one hundred thousand North Ko-
rean prisoners and more than twenty thousand Chinese prisoners detained
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on Koje-do Island. Most of the Chinese prisoners were in Compounds 71,
72, and 86. Many North Korean compounds had been organized by leaders
of the Communist Party, who were preparing for a general riot in Septem-
ber. The North Korean officers hoped that the Chinese compounds could
be organized and join in their struggle. Having learned a lot in the "Officer
Camp," I became confident. I knew what I could do and how to do it. I was
ready to carry on my duty in the POW camp and continue to fight the
Korean War on Koje Island. It was the second front of the Korean War.
A month later, in late July, we were sent back to Compound 72. The
situation, however, had totally changed there.The Chinese prisoners, includ-
ing my own men, didn't want to talk to either me or the other officers.They
wouldn't even look at me. I could feel a heavy pressure and a terrible fear
over the entire compound.The UN camp officers had changed their policy.
They now allowed those Chinese prisoners who had turned traitors and
cooperated with the enemy to run the camps.
After the Chinese prisoners had been interrogated and sent to their
camps, like Koje-do, they became both useless and a burden for the UNC.
Many of the guards treated the prisoners like animals. The UN officers and
men believed that we, the Chinese and North Koreans, were not people like
themselves, but near animals, who could be controlled by the use of the
same brutality we were accustomed to employ against each other. They se-
lected the traitors and defectors from the prisoners and used them to watch
us.These Chinese turncoats, I have to say, were worse than the American and
South Korean guards in dealing with the problems in the camp.
The Chinese traitors, supported by the UN guards, controlled Com-
pound 72 by terror. They organized the compound into a brigade, which
included six prisoner teams, and took charge of both the brigade and the
teams. Then the leaders and their deputies installed rules that forbade the
prisoners from talking to each other, holding meetings, and passing notes.
They also hand-picked individuals from their own people and organized
them into "prisoner guards" that they armed with knives, steel pickets, spiked
clubs, barbed wire flails, and blackjacks to enforce their regulations. If you
violated their rules, the "PCs" would take you to an isolated room and beat
you up. Some of our comrades were beaten to death.
In early 1952, the brigade leader, Li Da-an, wanted to tattoo every pris-
oner in Compound 72 with an anti-Communist slogan. Some prisoners
objected because a permanent and visible tattoo like "fangong kanger" (fight
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against the Communists and the Soviets) on their bodies would cause prob-
lems when they returned to China.
One morning, Li called a general assembly in the compound exercise
field. He ordered the prisoner guards (PGs) to beat those who refused the
tattoo in front of the five thousand prisoners. Some of those who couldn't
stand the beatings gave up and agreed to the tattoo.
One prisoner, however, Lin Xuepu, continued to refuse the tattoo. Li
Da-an finally dragged Lin up to the stage and in a loud voice asked Lin: "Do
you want it or not?" Bleeding and barely able to stand up, Lin, a nineteen-
year-old college freshman, replied with a loud "No!" Li Da-an responded by
cutting off one of Lin's arms with his big dagger. Lin screamed but still
shook his head when Li repeated the question. Humiliated and angry, Li
followed by stabbing Lin with his dagger. After Lin finally collapsed, Li
opened Lin's chest and pulled out his heart. Holding the bleeding but still
beating heart, Li yelled to all the prisoners in the field: "Whoever dares to
refuse the tattoo will be like him!"
I cried quietly that morning. It was not because of Lin's death—I had
seen many young comrades fall on the battleground. Nor was it because of
the traitors' atrocities—this happened all the time in the camp, and I was
prepared for the worst. I cried because I felt so useless and powerless when
Lin was brutally murdered. Later, I used these savage acts to mobilize prison-
ers and organize our resistance movement. More and more prisoners be-
came angry about these outrageous acts of violence by their own countrymen.
More and more prisoners realized that there was a life-and-death struggle in
the camp between the Chinese prisoners and the Chinese traitors.
Why were there so many turncoats among the Chinese prisoners? Why
did so many turn after they became prisoners of the UNC? Unfortunately,
the Chinese army had its own problems.
First of all, there were some bad elements in the CPVF carried over
from its past. When WWII ended in 1945, the Chinese Communist Army
with about 3 million troops engaged the Chinese Nationalist Army with
more than 7 million troops in the Chinese Civil War. In 1948, the Chinese
Communist Army was reorganized into the Chinese People's Liberation
Army. In October 1950, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Commit-
tee made its decision to send the Chinese troops, the PLA troops, to Korea.
In order to avoid a risk of being in a direct state of war with the United
States and other nations that had joined the UN forces in Korea, the CCP
Chinese soldiers sign up to go to the Korean War, October 1950.
(Courtesy of Zhao Zuorui)
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Central Committee established the CPVF by using the name "volunteers."
In fact, the CPVF soldiers were not volunteers; they were exactly the same
Chinese Communist troops, the PLA troops.They were the Chinese troops
assigned to the Korean War. The CPVF command was actually the PLA's
front command in Korea. The Chinese leaders expected to convince the
world that the CPV Forces were organized by Chinese volunteers, not the
Chinese government.
Although the PLA won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, it also lost most
of its WWII veterans and seasoned Communist soldiers.The civil war proved
to be one of the bloodiest wars in Chinese history, and total military casual-
ties on both sides were about 10 million in three years.
During the Chinese Civil War the PLA completely exhausted itself. It
desperately needed new recruits as replacements to enable it to continue the
fight against the Chinese Nationalists. In order to meet the PLA's large de-
mand for new recruits, some recruiting officers ignored the army's criteria
and practiced an "open door" policy, accepting almost all the applicants.
Now the "bad elements" were able to join the PLA.
Some of the new recruits came from wealthy families, such as landlords,
business owners, bankers, and other bourgeois and capitalist classes accus-
tomed to exploiting the less fortunate members of society. Others had lost
their land or business during our land reform. In some cases their parents
were jailed or sentenced to death, and they joined the PLA to escape the
revolutionary movement or class struggle.They hated the PLA and the Chi-
nese Communist Party.
Obviously, the PLA contained some anti-Communist elements. During
the civil war, the PLA began to look for new recruits who could fill their
technical and engineering positions. The PLA began to consider a person's
training and career more important than his political background. Unfortu-
nately, there were many "bad elements" among these new recruits. When
they were sent into the Korean War, many of them defected to the enemy. As
prisoners, they now had the opportunity to take revenge against the Com-
munist prisoners in the camps, like those at Koje-do Island. For instance, Li
Da-an, the brigade head of Compound 72 at Koje-do, had been a police
officer in the Nationalist government in Northeast China. He hated the
Communists. When the Nationalist army was defeated and fled south in
1948, Li didn't have a chance to go with them during the civil war. In 1949,
he was recruited by the Communist local government and joined the PLA
as a truck driver because he knew how to drive.
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Li Da-an came to Korea with his truck transportation regiment in 1951.
During a supply mission to the CPVF frontline troops, Li drove his truck
across the MLR and went over to the enemy. The UNC sent Li and other
Chinese defectors to the POW camps and let them deal with the Chinese
prisoners. As we know, Li became a diehard traitor and a nightmare to the
CPVF, but a "model collaborator" to the UNC at Koje-do.
One day, Li and a dozen traitors followed me into my tent and began to
beat me with big sticks and bricks.
"Why, what for?" I tried to defend myself, but my moves attracted more
attacks.
"Why? You know why." One traitor answered by shouting at me: "Be-
cause you Communists beat me in China. Now I can beat you back here!"
Another shouted, "You Communists took my land and killed my father.
I want to even up this bloody debt with you today."
While I was beaten to near death, Li watched and laughed at me. Differ-
ences over the class struggle and hatred became one of the important sources
of conflict in the camp.
Another source of camp problems was the conflict between the Chinese
Communist soldiers and the former Chinese Nationalist soldiers. During
the Chinese Civil War, the PLA enlisted a large number of the so-called
"liberated" soldiers. These were former Chinese Nationalist soldiers who
accepted the Nationalist army's defeat and were willing to cooperate with
the Communists and join the PLA. For example, the PLA took over Beijing
in January 1949. There were about 200,000 Nationalist troops who surren-
dered to the PLA during the Peking campaign. From February to April,
more than 150,000 former Nationalist troops were inducted into the PLA.
This included commanding officers at the regiment, division, and army lev-
els of command.
Some of these former Nationalist soldiers and officers had no choice,
but they concealed their unwillingness to join and waited for the right op-
portunity to defect. Wei Sixi, the brigade deputy for Compound 72 and a
former Nationalist captain, is a good example. His entire regiment was in-
ducted into the PLA after the Nationalist army lost Beijing. He kept his
Nationalist Party membership card and sewed his Nationalist army ID in-
side his uniform. After his regiment entered Korea, he went over to the
enemy, using his Nationalist Party card for identification.
The conflict between the Chinese Communist prisoners and National-
ist traitors became more serious after July 1951, when the peace negotia-
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tions began in Korea. The POW issue became one of the most important
and difficult issues in the peace talks. It took two more years of bloody
fighting before the POW problems were settled. The fighting took place
both on the battleground and in the POW camps.
While the Chinese—North Korean delegation demanded a total repa-
triation of "all the current prisoners in the Korean War," the UN delegation
insisted on a "voluntary" or a "self-motivated" repatriation. That meant the
released prisoners could go wherever they were "willing" to go. Thus, the
Chinese prisoners had their choices.They could either go back to Commu-
nist China where they came from, or join the Chinese Nationalists onTai-
wan.The compound brigade leaders, or the traitors, tried to persuade Chinese
prisoners to go to Taiwan. We had to stop their efforts and bring all our men
back to China.
First, we established Communist organizations in the camp. We devel-
oped the underground CCP groups in the fall of 1951. We recruited the
party members from those who had belonged to the same CPVF unit and
knew each other. Each party group had six to ten party members.The group
leaders called secret meetings, exchanged information, and made plans to
fight against the PGs.There were about two thousand CCP members among
the Chinese prisoners, and at least half of the party members were organized
into the underground party groups. Meanwhile, Chinese Communist Youth
League (CCYL) groups were also organized among the CCYL members.
Next, CCP and CCYL branches were established. Each branch included
four to seven party groups and had about fifty party members. The branch
had a secretary and a committee with five to seven committee members as
the leaders. Most of the party branch secretaries and committee members
were CPVF officers. There were about one thousand officers among the
Chinese prisoners at Koje-do, and they played a very important role in our
struggle.They met secretly on a regular basis, gave assignments to their groups,
and coordinated the plans for the fight. For example, the CCP branches
organized a campwide hunger strike on October 1,1951, China's National
Day, to protest the brutal treatment of the prisoners by the UNC guards.The
organized CCP party members and CCYL members played a very impor-
tant role in the hunger strike, and made the campwide collective effort pos-
sible and successful.
We also established the CCP-sponsored mass leadership in the camp.
The CCP party members made up only 20 percent of the Chinese prison-
ers. And the CCP groups and branches operated secretly The party leaders
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were usually active behind the scene. Our goal was to unite the Chinese
prisoners, including those who were neither CCP nor CCYL members, and
involve all of them in our struggle. We needed elected leaders who could
speak for all the Chinese prisoners, organize public meetings, and negotiate
with the UNC camp officers on the table.
Finally, in April 1952, after careful preparations and many discussions, the
"Communist United Front" (CUF) was founded and I was elected secretary
general. I had three deputy secretaries and a standing committee of eleven
members. Most of them were CPVF regimental or battalion commanding
officers. The CUF organized several subcommittees, which included public
relations, propaganda, communication, information, security, and counterin-
telligence.The CUF also established a branch committee in each brigade.
On April 8, the UNC began the screening of the so-called voluntary
repatriates in Compound 72. In order to persuade more prisoners to return
to China, the CUF called an emergency committee meeting. We decided at
the meeting to demand the following from the UNC: (1) the CPVF-NKPA
statement must be read to all the prisoners; (2) all prisoner guards must be
removed from the compound so the prisoners could make their own deci-
sions without any pressure or fear; and (3) the UNC camp officers must
agree to meet the CUF representatives and discuss the improvement of camp
life.1 It came as no surprise that the UNC refused our proposals.The UNC
thus supported the atrocious tortures of the prisoner guards against those
who wanted to go back to China.
One by one, the UNC and the PCs screened the prisoners to determine
who wished to be repatriated to China. They tried to create a picture of
mass defections on the part of the Chinese prisoners, hoping this would
persuade the Chinese—North Korean delegation to agree to the proposals
favored by the UN delegation. In order to force the prisoners to say "no" to
repatriation, the UNC reduced our rations, cut off our medical service, and
stopped our water supply. Also, the PCs became even more violent. When-
ever the prisoners told the UN screening authorities they did not want to go
to Taiwan but wished to be repatriated to China, the PGs tortured and
sometimes murdered them. There were ten prisoners fatally beaten by the
PGs. On April 10, fighting between the guards and prisoners during the
screening led to the deaths of seventy-five Chinese prisoners and the mur-
der of an American guard.
To counter the UNC s suppressive measures and the prisoner guards'
atrocities, the Communist United Front encouraged the prisoners to go to
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the "Returning Home Compound," or Compound 602.The new camp was
established by the UNC in April for those who had been confirmed for
repatriation. But prisoners who wished to move into Compound 602 took
a big risk of first being beaten or even killed.
When my turn came for the repatriation screening, I told a half dozen
PGs that I wished to go to Compound 602 and return to China. Several PGs
came up and hit me really hard. After I passed out, they said I couldn't make
any decision and took me back to my room. A couple of days later, they did
the same thing. I kept telling them, "I don't want to go to Taiwan. I want to
go back to China." Finally, they gave up and let me go to Compound 602.
About six thousand out of twenty thousand Chinese prisoners moved to
Compound 602 and waited for their repatriation. I wish we could have
convinced more Chinese prisoners to move to Compound 602.
In the new compound, we continued our fight and tried to persuade
more prisoners to join us in 602. We exposed the UNC and PG crimes, and
held the funeral services for the murdered prisoners. To protest the UNC
plots, we organized hunger strikes, mass allies, and parades.We also commu-
nicated with other compounds and supported the North Korean prisoners'
struggle for their repatriation. We used the camp clinic as our message ex-
change point.
On May 1, our compound liaison person came back from the clinic and
brought us an important message from the North Korean Communist lead-
ership. The underground North Korean Workers' Party committee in the
camp had decided to capture Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, the Ameri-
can commander at Koje-do and a staff member of the U.S. Eighth Army.
The Koreans planned to capture Dodd at one of the Korean compounds and
then use the event and world attention to expose the UNC prisoner abuses to
the world. The Korean party leaders asked us to assist them by organizing the
Chinese prisoners and starting a mass protest rally and hunger strike.
I called a CUF standing committee meeting and discussed the situation.
All the committee members were excited and wanted to kidnap Dodd at
one of the Chinese compounds. But our Korean comrades insisted on car-
rying out this action themselves. They also asked us to carry out two more
assignments. First, during our protests, we needed to demand face-to-face
negotiations with Dodd. Second, when Dodd appeared, we must stop all
protesting activities so Dodd would believe that he was the only person who
could deal with the camp problems, thus making his personal appearance
very important.
252 Voices from the Korean War
Our committee made a detailed plan and gave assignments to the Chi-
nese party branches in each compound. On May 2, the CUF presented a
public letter to Dodd, demanding direct negotiations between himself and
the Chinese prisoner representatives. On May 3, we organized a general
protest rally in all the Chinese compounds.
On May 4, our general hunger strike began. At Compound 602, the
prisoners hung up their dinner plates, rice bowls, and spoons on the wires.
At Compound 72, the grain and vegetables were moved out of the kitchens
and storage rooms and thrown outside the compound gates. Meanwhile, we
informed the camp headquarters that our hunger strike would continue
until we met with Dodd.
During the afternoon of May 4, we were told that Dodd would meet the
Chinese prisoner representatives in his headquarters.We refused the invitation
in his office and insisted on a meeting inside Compound 602.We said that our
representatives' safety could not be guaranteed in his headquarters.
On the morning of May 6, Dodd arrived at Compound 602 with his aide
and a platoon of armed guards. We asked him to come inside the compound.
His aide declined our request by using the same security excuse. Following
this exchange, an unusual meeting took place at the compound gate between
Dodd and the Chinese prisoner representatives.The compound gates at Koje-
do were see-through gates made of wood logs and wire net.
The three Chinese representatives, standing inside the gate, were Sun
Zhenguan, Zhang Zeshi, and myself. General Dodd got out of his jeep, walked
toward us, and stopped outside the gate, about two or three yards from us.
The gate remained closed, but both sides were close enough to hear and talk
to each other through the wire net gate. It was my first time to meet Dodd.
Well built and well dressed, Dodd looked fit and sharp. His uniform and
golden badges were shining, and his eyeglasses gave him an intellectual look.
"Welcome, General Dodd," Sun greeted him in Chinese. "We appreciate
your visit since you have a very busy schedule." After Zhang's translation
into English, Dodd nodded and said: "I always respect the Chinese people.
Please tell me what you need."
"We'd like to have your personal inspection on the serious problems of
our poor nutrition and lack of medication in our compound," I said. "We
hope the Chinese prisoners will be given humanitarian treatment, which is
clearly stated in the Geneva Joint Pledge on POW's Rights. Your country was
one of the signatories."
"We always follow the Geneva Pledge," Dodd argued."With a minimum
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staff and limited transportation sources, we have tried our best to follow the
Geneva Convention Agreement." Dodd became impatient and asked his
aide to read some related articles in the Geneva Pledge.
"Obviously, the current treatment we have here is way below the stan-
dard set up by the Geneva Pledge/' Sun declared in a loud voice as soon as the
Chinese translator finished. "Two bowls of rice per day is not enough for
one prisoner. No meat and very little vegetables. If your country has diffi-
culties fixing the problems in the camp, please inform our country. We be-
lieve China will help you improve the starving situation here immediately."
When the English translator finished, Dodd became upset. "If you are
starving, I don't think it necessary at all for you to organize this hunger
strike. Your action certainly puts more pain and miseries on your fellow
countrymen." Then he added, "Well, I will consider your unusual appetite
and the Chinese diet habits. And I will think about how to improve the
medical care in the camp."
"If Your Respectable General can seriously consider our requests and
solve our problems," I replied, "we will end our hunger strike and resume
our regular meal schedule."
"I am fully responsible for my own words," Dodd said. He seemed serious.
The three of us nodded to each other with a smile of understanding.
Then, Sun said to Dodd: "We are willing to believe Your Respectable General's
sincerity. We appreciate it that you came to this meeting in person. Thank
you very much."
Dodd seemed satisfied and glad it was over. He nodded to us through
the gate, went back to his jeep, and left with his aide and guards.
We were also happy, because we had accomplished our goal of luring
Dodd to the compounds. By setting up a gate-side meeting format, we made
possible the successful kidnaping of Dodd by the North Korean prisoners a
short time later.
As planned, the actual kidnaping of Dodd took place in one of the
North Korean prisoner compounds, Compound 76.1 learned about it only
after it happened.
After a three-day protest, at 1:30 P.M. on May 7, Dodd finally arrived at
Compound 76. With Dodd were Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur Ravin and a
platoon of armed guards in armored vehicles. The meeting was held at the
compound gate much the same as before. After discussing some differences
and reading the Geneva Pledge, Dodd became impatient and asked Ravin to
negotiate with the North Korean representatives. At the same time Dodd
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began to cut his fingernails with a nail scissor. His guards were also relaxed,
talking to each other and looking around.They were about ten yards behind
Dodd, Ravin, and their aide.
At that moment, a prisoner janitor group approached the gate from the
compound kitchen. They were doing their daily routine of taking the gar-
bage outside and dumping it into the sea.The wire gate opened, and Dodd
and Ravin stepped aside to let the janitors walk through the gate. When the
janitors walked out of the gate and lined up between Dodd and his guards,
several of the North Korean representatives suddenly jumped outside the
gate and grasped Dodd and Ravin.Tall and young, Major Ravin managed to
avoid capture by hanging on to the gate post until he received help from the
guards. Dodd, however, was captured and carried by four Korean prisoners
inside the compound before he realized what was going on. The gate was
closed immediately and locked by the prisoners.
"Save me! Save me!" Dodd shouted to his guards from inside the com-
pound. The guards rushed to the gate, but it was too late. Dodd struggled
with his North Korean captors but soon disappeared in the tents.
Dodd became a prisoner of his prisoners. The news shocked the entire
world. The event is known as the "Dodd Incident" or the "Koje-do Riot."
That afternoon, UNC forces armed with tanks, heavy machine guns,
and offshore gunboats placed Compound 76 under siege. Two helicopters
also patrolled the area. About 3:00 P.M., the North Koreans hung up a big
sign in English at the compounds gate:"WE CAPTURE DODD AS LONG AS
OUR DEMAND WILL BE SOLVED HIS SAFETY IS SECURED. IF THERE HAPPEN
BRUTAL ACT SUCH AS SHOOTING, HIS LIFE IS IN DANGER." At 3:30 P.M., a
note from Dodd was handed over to the UNC officers outside the com-
pound. Dodd asked the UNC officers to set up a telephone line for him
from the outside to his tent in the compound, to send him some personal
items for his daily needs, to reduce the number of the surrounding troops,
and to invite prisoner representatives from other compounds to Compound
76 for talks.
As the secretary general of the Chinese Communist United Front, I
attended the meetings in Compound 76 with the other three Chinese rep-
resentatives.
During the late evening of May 7, before the negotiations with Dodd,
about thirty Chinese and North Korean prisoner representatives met in
Compound 76. It was the first time for such a joint meeting. We were repre-
senting seventy thousand prisoners on Koje Island. The Korean leaders at
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Compound 76 chaired the meeting.We discussed three topics: first, the agenda
for the negotiations; second, when and under what conditions Dodd should
be released; and third, what our next step should be in the event the negotia-
tions broke down.
Regarding the negotiations with Dodd, our Korean comrades made
three proposals: (1) stop the abuse and murder of the prisoners; (2) stop the
"voluntary repatriation" preparations; and (3) agree to the organization of a
"Chinese-North Korean Prisoner Delegation" to coordinate the camp ac-
tivities. I agreed with their proposals but suggested the termination of repa-
triation screening should be added as a separate item. Some comrades said
that the "termination of the voluntary repatriation efforts" item had in-
cluded my suggestion, but I continued to insist the item must be added. I
said, "We should emphasize the illegality of the screening in order to stop
the brutal and forceful repatriation screening immediately." Finally, they agreed
to add this item to the negotiation agenda.
Regarding Dodd, some representatives wanted to execute him for his
crimes and to avenge our dead comrades on Koje Island. Others wanted to
keep him a hostage as long as possible to protect the prisoners. In case of a
UNC rescue attempt, he would be eliminated before the UN troops could
free him. I disagreed by arguing that "An alive and a freed Dodd out there
could do much more for our cause than a dead or a detained Dodd in here."
I explained that a hostage situation might give the UNC an excuse to mur-
der more prisoners and put more pressure on the Chinese—North Korean
delegation at the truce negotiations.The situation might get out of control
and turn into a real riot, as the UNC had already declared in its anti-
Communist propaganda. It would not help us in our efforts to improve
camp life or to achieve a total repatriation of the prisoners and a cease-fire in
the war. I suggested we protect Dodd during the negotiations and release
him as soon as he accepted our four demands in writing. After our discus-
sions, the other representatives agreed with my views.
During the meeting, we elected a Chinese—North Korean Prisoner
Delegation. I was elected one of the deputy chiefs of the delegation. We
chose General Lee Jong-jun, a division commander in the North Korean
People's Army, as the chief of the delegation.
On the morning of May 8, we met with Dodd in a new tent.The setting
inside the tent looked like a courtroom.The head table had five seats for the
delegation chief and deputies. A small table with one chair, facing the head
table and in the middle of the tent, was reserved for Dodd, the defendant.
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The forty-three representatives from the seventeen Chinese and North Ko-
rean prison compounds sat on both sides as jurors. I sat at the head table next
to our delegation chief and negotiation chairman.
Dodd was called in. He slowly walked to his table and sat down. His red eyes
and tired-looking appearance revealed he had spent a sleepless night in the com-
pound. He also wore a dirty uniform with missing buttons, indicating his des-
perate struggle during the capture. Our chair addressed the purpose of the meeting
and read our four demands to him. Dodd refused to accept our proposal. He
didn't believe the murders and brutal screening in the compounds took place
under his command. We invited badly beaten and wounded prisoners, who
testified to the brutality of the prisoner guards during their screening.The clinic
nurses brought their medical records to show Dodd and provided additional
eyewitness testimony The warehouse bookkeepers explained how the camp
supplies were sold by ROK soldiers to the black market. Two female prisoners
told their stories about frequent rapes and gang rapes by both guards and prison-
ers. Dodd became nervous and sometimes seemed touched by the stories. He
just said, "I can't believe it. I can't believe it."
The negotiations continued the next day. On May 9, we learned by
listening to Dodd's telephone calls that the UNC had appointed Brigadier
General Charles Colson as the new commandant of the Koje-do POW
Camp. Our delegation discussed the changing situation and decided to deal
with Dodd inside and Colson outside the compound at the same time. By
listening to their telephone conversations, we knew that Dodd and Colson
were classmates at the West Point Military Academy, and that Dodd's wife
called Colson day and night asking him to save her husband's life. Further-
more, she was coming to Koje-do from Tokyo, Japan. We took the opportu-
nity and applied even more pressure on Dodd.We added individual meetings
to the general meetings. General Lee met Dodd after dinner on May 9.Then
I talked to Dodd. Thereafter, two more meetings were held in Dodd's tent
that evening. Meanwhile, we translated and made copies of the minutes of
the meetings for Colson.
Finally, Dodd gave up. On the morning of May 10, after another round
of prisoners' testimony, Dodd stood up from his chair and said in a low voice:
"I am responsible for what happened here. And I am guilty." After Korean
and Chinese translations, General Lee stood up and read our requests again.
Dodd agreed to sign it. Lee also asked him to sign the minutes of the meet-
ings. He agreed.
By noon, two documents were ready for Dodd to sign. One document,
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UNC guards bring the Chinese POWs back to their compound after the Koje riots,
May 1952. (Courtesy of the Center for Archives and Information, Heilongjiang
Provincial Academy of Social Sciences)
entitled "Korean—Chinese Prisoners' Grievances to the World," contained the
testimonies of the witnesses of the meeting. The other document, entitled
"UNC POW Camp Affidavit," contained our four demands. At the same time,
copies of the two documents were sent to Colson for his signature. Dodd
inside the compound and Colson outside the compound both signed the two
documents, thus accepting the charge that the UNC had forced the prisoners
to refuse their repatriation, and promising to improve the camp conditions.
These documents embarrassed the UNC by acknowledging the measure of
justice in the Communist prisoners' case. We had scored a propaganda tri-
umph for the Chinese and North Korean prisoners at the Koje-do Camp.The
documents revealed to the entire world the UN forces as the brutal persecu-
tors and murderers of their prisoners. In Compound 76, about seven thousand
Korean prisoners who had been waiting outside the negotiating tent for the
signature ceremony learned the good news and cheered the victory. We re-
leased Dodd unharmed on the night of May 10.
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Colson, however, didn't keep his promise. Instead of improving the liv-
ing conditions in the camp, he brought excessive violence and brutal sup-
pression to Koje-do. On May 11, he refused to return the Chinese and
Korean representatives to their own compounds. I was stuck in Compound
76 and lost contact with the Chinese Communist United Front in the Chi-
nese compounds. In late May, Colson divided the compounds, which had an
average of several thousand prisoners in each, into much smaller camps of
about several hundred prisoners each. His new policy made any organized
resistance very difficult, if not impossible. In early June, Colson transferred
all the Chinese prisoners in Compound 602 to another island, Cheju-do. At
the Cheju-do Camp, six thousand Chinese prisoners were divided into ten
small compounds.
The North Korean prisoners in Compound 76 opposed the division and
refused to leave their compound for relocation. On June 10, Colson personally
commanded an attack against Compound 76. The North Korean prisoners
used bricks and wooden sticks against tanks, machine guns, gas bombs, and
over one thousand UN troops. After a bloody two-day fight, more than five
hundred Korean prisoners were killed or wounded. Most of the tents were
burned down to the ground. All of the Korean and Chinese representatives
and delegates were sent to the "War Criminal Camp" at Koje-do.
I was jailed there with eighteen other Chinese representatives until the
fall of 1953.The Korean Armistice was signed in July 1953. On September 5,
we were told that we had visitors. When I saw the Chinese government
delegation waiting for us in the visiting room, I cried. The delegates told us
that we would be released the next day and returned to China soon. By the
end of September, 7,094 Chinese prisoners had been repatriated to China.
Meanwhile, more than 14,000 Chinese prisoners refused to return to China.
They went to Taiwan.
Perspectives on the War
IN JUNE 1950, the invading North Korean army, trained and advised by
the Soviets, armed with Soviet weapons, and indoctrinated with the Com-
munist rhetoric of its leader, Kim II Sung, quickly forced the ROK Army
into a hasty retreat. Labeling themselves as "liberators" who invaded to free
the enslaved South Koreans from the tyranny of Syngman Rhee and the
capitalist-imperialist Americans, many South Koreans initially saw the inva-
sion as a means of achieving a unified Korea and welcomed the invaders.
The North Korean army's brutal persecution and needless killings, however,
quickly turned the South Koreans against the invaders.
When American troops began arriving in Korea in July, they found the
retreating ROK Army in disarray. American soldiers in Korea were often
critical of the performance of the ROKA, especially in the early part of the
war. It is true there were serious problems in the ROKA of 1950. It lacked
effective leadership in the higher commands, its communications were poor,
and many soldiers were anything but enthusiastic about their president,
Syngman Rhee. The ROKs also lacked the air force, tanks, and heavy artil-
lery necessary for a successful defense against the larger and more mecha-
nized North Korean army. While the Soviets had generously provided these
weapons to North Korea, the Americans refused to do the same for the
ROKA, primarily because they feared President Rhee would use them to
invade North Korea. Given these factors, plus the element of surprise, the
retreat of the South Korean forces during the first days of the war was virtu-
ally inevitable. Although many GIs considered the ROK units to be unreli-
able and inclined to "bug out," later experience revealed that when ROK
soldiers were well trained and well led, they could fight with great tenacity
and courage.
The Demarcation Line, July 27,1953. Source: Department of the Army, United States Army in the Korean WariTruce Tent
and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), Map IX.
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If the South Korean army had problems in 1950, so did the American
army that came to its rescue. Starved for funds during the military cutbacks
of the immediate postwar period, the battalions were short on both man-
power and equipment. In part this may be explained by the belief of Ameri-
can military planners that the dark shadow of Soviet Communism was most
likely to fall on western Europe, an area still torn by the war and economic
distress. Hence, first priority in men and weapons went to American troops
in Europe, not Asia. Furthermore, the first GIs to land in Korea were troops
from Japan. They had been steeped in occupation duty, not rigorous combat
training. It may also be said that much of the American army underestimated
the strength of the North Korean army. Combined, these factors under-
mined the effectiveness of the first U.S. troops to reach Korea, and the North
Korean People's Army continued to advance south. This came as a great
shock to most Americans, who expected that the presence of a single American
division would be sufficient to roll back the army of a backward and under-
developed nation such as North Korea.
As the North Korean army drew closer to Pusan, American reinforce-
ments began to pour into Korea. Green American troops quickly gained
battlefield experience, helped immensely by a nucleus of career officers and
noncoms who had served in WWII. Increased American firepower, much of
it from the air force and navy, was just enough to prevent the fall of Pusan.
The much celebrated Inchon landings followed in September, which placed
the North Korean forces in great danger of being trapped and cut off.
MacArthur's admirers believe these landings stand out as one of the master-
ful military strokes in history; his detractors consider them largely the result
of good fortune. Whatever the truth, it is a fact the Inchon landings went
smoothly, and they so enhanced MacArthur's reputation as a military genius
that his opinions took on godlike dimensions in the days ahead, not to be
questioned by anyone. Urged on by MacArthur, the American army and
UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel and advanced toward theYalu River.
As the U.S. and UN forces moved northward, the North Korean People's
Army began to fall apart. Part of the NKPA fled to the hills and conducted
guerrilla warfare operations, for which they had been thoroughly trained.
Other North Korean soldiers were reorganized into small, lightly armed
units and employed hit-and-run tactics. By this time the American and UN
forces had overwhelming firepower superiority, both on the ground and in
the air, and they met only light resistance as they pushed on toward theYalu.
Both troop morale and support for the war back in the States had never
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been higher. The war, it appeared, would be short, and President Truman
could take pride in his risky decision to commit American troops to this
distant peninsula.
Suddenly, the Chinese entered the war, and the American army found
itself engaged in a different kind of war against a different kind of enemy.
The Chinese People sVolunteer Forces consisted largely of conscripted peas-
ants, most of whom were illiterate. The CPVF's command structure was
chaotic, and often favored personal relationships and political orthodoxy at
the expense of ability and performance. While the Chinese were rich in
manpower, their lack of an industrial base preordained weakness in armor
and technical expertise.
The Chinese reliance upon manpower rather than armor reflected both
the social-economic reality of China and the philosophy of their leader,
Mao Zedong. Mao believed that although weapons were important in war,
"It is people, not things, that are decisive." Not only did Mao believe that a
highly spirited warrior could vanquish a stronger opponent in battle, this
belief was deeply rooted in Chinese culture. In part, as least, this explains
why the Chinese repeatedly sent masses of whistle-blowing soldiers against
overwhelming American firepower, knowing the cost in casualties would be
enormous.
In contrast, the Americans utilized armor, artillery, and air power at ev-
ery possible opportunity.This allowed them to both minimize casualties and
draw on the vast industrial capacity of the United States. Morale and fight-
ing spirit were important assets in war, but they could not be expected to
replace artillery and air power.
The logistics of supplying the two armies also reveal striking differences.
American air power forced the Chinese to take to the hills, and Chinese
soldiers carried a large portion of their supplies on foot. Since the average
Chinese soldier (as well as the Korean) had tremendous physical endurance
and could live on far less food than American soldiers, this primitive supply
system worked reasonably well, except when attempting to supply large-
scale offensive operations. Amazingly, the Chinese even found ways of mov-
ing artillery to their frontline positions high in the mountains of Korea. In
contrast, the American army relied much more on motor transport to move
supplies to the front. Supply roads carved out of the mountains by huge
bulldozers went right up to the MLR.
After entering the war in the fall of 1950, the Chinese employed their
hit-and-run guerrilla tactics against the Americans. Initially these tactics
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worked well, especially in the Chosin Reservoir fighting.The Chinese flanked
the American troops and attacked from the surrounding hills, forcing them
to withdraw to the south. The heroic and much publicized retreat of the
First Marine Division, now so much a part of marine legend, was part of a
general UNF withdrawal. Frequently, the Chinese established roadblocks
that not only obstructed the retreat but at some points threatened to cut it
off altogether. The combination of hard fighting and intense cold at the
Chosin Reservoir made this engagement one of the worst of the entire war,
for all participants. Dressed in their light canvas shoes and cotton-quilt uni-
forms, the Chinese suffered from the cold even more than the Americans.
The Chinese entry into the war collapsed American morale overnight.
In Korea, American soldiers knew there would be no quick victory and
prepared for a long war. Back in the States, most Americans assumed the
Soviet Union had orchestrated the Chinese entry and feared the Korean
conflict would lead to WorldWar III.There was also fear of a third world war
in other countries, especially in Europe.
The Chinese offensive, however, soon exhausted itself. By early 1951,
the American and UN forces carried out their own offensive operations and
began moving north. In part, this amazing turnaround may be attributed to
the new Eighth Army commander, General Matthew G. Ridgway. When
the Chinese army attacked and their troops were exposed, Ridgway hit them
with everything in the Eighth Army arsenal, plus whatever the navy and the
air force could deliver. Although the Chinese usually advanced at the outset
of the attack, they did so at the cost of horrendous casualties. When the
attack faltered, as it inevitably did when the Chinese had exhausted their
supplies, the Eighth Army attacked. After each advance a new defensive line
would be established, and the troops would hold their positions until the
next offensive. In this way the U.S.-UN forces again worked their way up
the peninsula to the 38th Parallel.
By the late fall of 1951, the war had become a stalemated war of the
trenches. Despite the overwhelming firepower possessed by the U.S.-UN
forces, the UNC was unwilling to pay the price essential for a total victory,
especially in casualties. No doubt this reflected the opposition to the war
that had developed in many UN countries, including the United States,
where the war had become very unpopular. It had become a "limited" po-
litical war, which Americans neither understood nor supported. As news of
the war moved from the front pages to the back pages, most Americans
viewed it with either complacency or hostility. They did not understand a
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war where political decisions made in Washington constrained the decisions
of the generals on the battlefield.The ceaseless arguing over trivial matters in
the truce negotiations only added to their frustration over the war.
In the meantime, the war continued and the casualty figures mounted
on both sides. Many young American men still received their "Greetings"
from the local draft board and ended up in Korea as replacements, where
most were more interested in acquiring the thirty-six points necessary for
rotation home than in winning the war. Worldwide, public opinion clearly
favored bringing the war to a close. The exceptions were Syngman Rhee
and his supporters, who wanted to continue the war until Korean unifica-
tion had been achieved. Mercifully, agreement was finally reached on the
terms for a truce, and on July 27, 1953, the guns fell silent.
Although the human costs of the war were much higher than anyone
expected at the outset, the Korean War succeeded in achieving its original
goal—the expulsion of the North Korean Communist forces from South
Korea back to the 38th Parallel.Yet, Americans have tended to ignore this
achievement about the war. Most remember it as an unpopular war of the
trenches, the war the United States failed to win. Thus, Korean veterans
returned home to a silent welcome, uncertain about their standing with
their "big brothers," the heroes ofWorld War II, and the American public in
general.
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